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Although often not viewed as such, a nation’s collective memory has use in 
international relations.  The United States left some one-hundred thousand military 
remains interred in European soil following World War I and World War II, the 
majority of these in France.  Instead of resting in a symbolic void, the memory of 
American military dead abroad became a means for the living to articulate 
contemporary foreign policy goals.  Elements of the American war memory abroad 
remained consistent through the twentieth century:  sacrifice for a free Europe, fear of 
radicalized revolutions, and Franco-American friendship.  Yet, beneath the formulaic 
memory lingered evolving motives for remembering.  The memory also reflected both 
American and French domestic politics. Memories of military remains became safe 
ground for Americans and French to engage with each other in times of peace and 
conflict.  Thus, analysis of the evolving memory assigned to American military bodies 
abroad helps inform broader diplomatic strategies.  In the absence of U.S. military 
abroad following WWI, the United States strategically chose locations to leave a military 
presence abroad through war remains.  The bodies signified a commitment to Western 
Europe and the similar ideals of the American and French Revolutions.  Following 
WWII, the memory of aspiring power was replaced by a memory of real power.  Through 
the Cold War, the tone of America’s war memories in France changed as French 
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I first arrived at the Meuse-Argonne American World War I Cemetery in 
Romange-sous-Montfaucon, France in the pre-dusk hours of an unseasonably cool 
August day.  A summer internship with the American Battle Monuments Commission 
(ABMC) brought me to this remote village in eastern France where U.S. soldiers fought 
in the Great War’s final offensive.  As part of a research team, my task was bringing to 
life the battlefield experiences of American soldiers buried within this cemetery for the 
ABMC’s Great War Centennial projects.  Tired from travel, I caught only a passing view 
of the white marble headstones before turning onto the access road to the 
superintendents’ houses.  These bungalow-style living quarters and the visitor center of 
the cemetery would be home for the next ten days.  Hopes of walking the expansive 
memorial grounds that first evening diminished as daylight faded while unpacking and 
adjusting to new surroundings.  Following a late dinner, I returned to quarters well after 
midnight to rest for the busy week ahead.  A look out the window after darkening the 
room revealed that my introduction to the cemetery grounds could not wait until 
sunrise. 
 The Meuse-Argonne cemetery grounds create a sort of valley.  A large memorial 
highway runs through its central low point. Fourteen thousand graves span the hill to 
the side of the road leading up to the memorial and chapel at its crest.  To the other side 
of the road, is a large green field with a visitor’s center and houses for the two American 
superintendents at its peak.  My room was above the visitor’s center, which directly 




first night in the cemetery it appeared that the memorial chapel was ablaze. In each 
loggia, and before the chapel doors, large flames shot into the night sky and faint 
shadows moved before them.  Having heard nothing in orientation that might explain 
this occurrence, my colleagues and I hurriedly walked to the house of the 
superintendent.  “I thought that might get your attention,” was the greeting he offered 
waiting for us on his porch.  He then explained that a French military regiment from 
nearby Verdun had asked to use the American cemetery as the site to initiate its newest 
members.  It had slipped his mind that the initiation was that night.  Not aware that the 
ceremony involved flames, he invited us to accompany him to the chapel for assessment 
of the situation.  Together, we all walked in the darkness toward the distant fire.  When 
we reached the asphalt road between the slopes, the sound of approaching boot steps 
caused us to pause.  Through the darkness emerged a unit of camouflaged French 
soldiers leading a smaller group of men bound together with a large rope and sacks over 
their heads.  Not seeing us, the soldiers turned and marched up the hill through the 
center of the burial grounds towards the flames. We silently followed, now more 
intrigued by what was taking place than the fires.  The reflective glow of the moon off 
the field of white marble tombstones helped us see the way. The armed French soldiers 
became aware of our presence as we neared the chapel and their commander rapidly 
approached.  After a short discussion, we learned that the flames were safely contained 
and that the hooded soldiers were the ones to be initiated.  They had just completed 
their final twenty-five mile forced march, had been blindfolded, and unknowingly led 
into the cemetery.  In thanks of allowing them to use this sacred American site, the 




 The new soldiers were marched onto the chapel steps with their heads still 
covered and positioned to face the American graves.  Once all were in place, the hoods 
were dramatically removed from the soldiers’ heads.  Shock of being in a large cemetery 
was evident on several faces.  The commander let the moment sink in for a few heavy 
seconds.  He then told the soldiers that they owed their freedom to American and 
French soldiers who sacrificed their lives in the Great War.  His cadenced words echoed 
through the cemetery.  He explained to them that they must be thankful for the sacrifice 
of American soldiers.  This large American cemetery was chosen because it represented 
the inherent risk of their chosen profession.  Each of the initiated was urged to 
understand the necessary willingness to make the same sacrifice for France as 
Americans did nearly a century ago.  Following the speech, the soldiers received pins 
then sang their regimental song and the French national anthem.  It was in this surreal 
moment of standing in a massive American World War I cemetery at 1:30 am, watching 
a secret military ritual, and listening to French soldiers sing La Marseillaise in torchlight 
that the idea for this dissertation took root.  Although this site was the final resting place 
for American soldiers, it was far more than a cemetery.  It was a sacred site that 
protected an American memory, but also elevated that memory into the realm of 




offered a gateway for French and Americans to articulate cultural ties. 
 
Intro.1: View from author’s living quarters at Meuse Argonne American Cemetery with memorial chapel 
in far distance.  Source: Taken by author August 2012.  
 
Spread across six Western European countries, in 1,098 acres, are the remains of 
104,113 American military personnel from World War I and World War II.1  Of this total, 
60,510 American remains occupy 647 acres of French soil—28,544 in five World War I 
cemeteries, 30,401 in five World War II cemeteries, and 1,565 in the dual-war Suresnes 
                                                             
1 Figures calculated from numbers maintained by the American Battle Monument Commission at 
http://www.abmc.gov/cemeteries/cemeteries.php, accessed April 15, 2014.  The countries are:  France, 




American Cemetery outside of Paris.2  This study focuses on the American military 
remains in France and seeks to explain why those American bodies are there, and the 
utilitarian uses of their resting places.  Remains cannot move themselves.  So, why were 
so many American military dead left in France following World War I and II? Why, 
since 1918, has the U.S. government annually spent considerable sums of money to 
maintain those graves? How does the American government decide in what soil 
American military remains should rest, and in what soil they should not?  Are the 
resting places of American dead present in France only to commemorate America’s role 
in both world wars, or do they serve other purposes?  How do Americans and French, at 
all levels of society, interact with these American resting places?  Do memories of 
American military dead in France remain static, or evolve with time? These are the 
central questions that this work answers. 
Although often not viewed as such, a nation’s collective memory has use in 
international relations.  The United States left some one-hundred thousand military 
remains interred in European soil following World War I and World War II, the 
majority of these in France.  Congressional legislation created the American Battle 
Monuments Commission in 1923 to perpetually care for those remains and articulate 
their memory to the public.  Even before this agency came into being, American and 
French leaders saw the important diplomatic uses that American remains possessed.  
Instead of resting in a symbolic void, the memory of American military dead abroad 
became a means for the living to express contemporary foreign policy goals.  Elements 
of the American war memory abroad remained consistent through the twentieth 
                                                             
2 Figures calculated from numbers maintained by the American Battle Monument Commission at 




century:  sacrifice for a free Europe, fear of radical political revolution, and Franco-
American friendship.  Yet, beneath the formulaic memory lingered evolving motives and 
commemorative assertiveness.  Memories changed with international situations, as did 
the aggressiveness of the memory to address them.  The memory also reflected both 
American and French domestic politics. Memories of military remains became safe 
ground for Americans and French to engage with each other in times of peace and 
conflict. Thus, analysis of the evolving memory assigned to American military bodies 
abroad helps inform broader diplomatic strategies.  The shared collective memory of 
American war dead facilitated France and the United States in working together to 
eliminate or contain mutual threats and also allowed the United States a means to 
project power in Europe.  These two outcomes did not always function cooperatively. 
Historians have looked at the architectural rhetoric of American military 
cemeteries abroad, but generally, analysis halts here.3  American military dead are 
largely an untouchable piece of American culture.  Questioning the uses, or motives, of 
leaving military remains abroad is not well received by the American public.  Posts on 
the ABMC’s Facebook page following the 2013 shutdown of the Federal Government, 
and temporary closure of cemeteries in France, impart the veneration that segments of 
the public still hold for remains killed long ago.  One poster commented that “even the 
dead are disrespected by our politicians, outrageous.”  Another responded to a family 
that was turned away from visiting an uncle’s grave that “If I was there, I would 
demolish the gate for you so you can visit your relative’s grave, and then leave a blank 
                                                             
3 Ron Robin, Enclaves of America:  The Rhetoric of American Political Architecture Abroad, 1900-1965 




check in their office drop box to provide the money for damages caused.”4  The 
emotional nature of these posts reveal why some hesitation might exist among scholars 
to critically analyze non-commemorative uses of American military remains. 
Historian Kurt Piehler offered the suggestion in his 1995 work Remembering 
War the American Way, that “overseas cemeteries served to symbolize U.S. global 
military commitments undertaken after 1945.”5  This implies an understanding that the 
location of American military cemeteries coincides with military alliances.  More 
recently, Dutch historian Peter Schjrivers showed in The Margraten Boys how the 
Dutch people embraced the American WWII military cemetery at Margraten by 
adopting graves, and frequently using the cemetery to articulate their relationship with 
the United States.  Schrijvers sees much more than military commitments in the 
locations of the American military cemeteries.  He views them more as sites of “memory 
diplomacy.”6  Schrijvers never completely defines his conception of memory diplomacy, 
yet his work shows how the presence of American military remains in the Netherlands 
provides the Dutch a location to demonstrate commitment or displeasure with U.S. 
foreign policy by engaging with the memory of American dead. Memory diplomacy is a 
useful way to approach the topic of American military cemeteries.    The current work 
weds Piehler’s idea of military memory with Schrijvers’ nascent conception of memory 
                                                             
4 Shelly Neidich, Facebook, last modified September 30 at 6:07pm, accessed October 1, 2013, 
https://www.facebook.com/abmcpage and Robery Rumsby, Facebook, last modified September 30 at 
4:44pm, accessed October 1, 2013, https://www.facebook.com/abmcpage.  Responses were from the 
ABMC’s September 30, 2013 post:  “In the event of a U.S. government shutdown beginning tomorrow, 
October 1, 2013, ABMC cemeteries and memorials will be closed to the public for the duration of the 
shutdown, and the ABMC Facebook page will not be available.  We regret and inconvenience these 
temporary actions may cause.  ABMC will resume normal operations when a new funding measure is 
passed by the U.S. Congress and signed by the President of the United States.” 
5 Kurt Piehler, Remembering War the American Way (Washington, DC:  Smithsonian Press, 1995), 132. 
6 Peter Schjrivers, The Margraten Boys:  How a European Village Kept America’s Liberators Alive (New 




diplomacy.  It argues that the memory of American military sacrifice embodied in ABMC 
cemeteries in Europe reflect aspects of American culture capable of transfer to a foreign 
audience for diplomatic purposes.   
What is termed memory diplomacy in this work is not the first priority of leaders.  
No ambassador holds the title of “memory diplomat.”  Nor, is memory diplomacy a term 
defined by leaders and actively carried out, instead it tends to happen organically.   
Memory diplomacy is best viewed as one step toward achieving a desired political goal.  
Close attention to the rhetoric of memory and its usages indicates the trajectory of 
foreign policy aspirations.  If one studies foreign policy goals and then analyzes the 
many steps taken by leaders to achieve those goals, the methods will reveal themselves 
in a variety of ways.  Throughout the twentieth century, engaging with the memory of 
military dead consistently showed itself to be an avenue to champion foreign policy 
objectives.  American cemeteries are as much sites of memory diplomacy as military 
relics.  The living make annual pilgrimages to these sites and use the memory of 
American military dead to provide meaning to present international situations and see 
evidence of an amicable relationship.  It is understood that American foreign leaders do 
not immediately turn to military cemeteries to influence foreign policy in the direst of 
situations.  Yet, the rhetoric of leaders on special occasions in military cemeteries and in 
the midst of developing international situations effectively reveals a snapshot of a 
broader foreign policy goals.  In other words, American military cemeteries are not the 
ends to achieving a policy goal, but a means to articulate bigger goals and comment on 
contemporary inter-state relations. 
The American soldiers buried at Meuse-Argonne died nearly a century ago, yet 




government.  This space was not merely to commemorate American sacrifice, but had 
utilitarian value.  It is a site that shows American bonds with its host country.  Similarly, 
it allows the living from all nationalities to gather and provide a voice for those long 
gone.  American military bodies permit sites like this to have meaning.  Without the 
feeling of humanness, vocalizing a memory becomes difficult.   The remains of these 
soldiers continue to serve their country.  They tell visitors of key elements in American 
culture: military sacrifice, commitment to a Franco-American partnership, Judeo-
Christianity, social equality, democracy, and capitalism—all things the remains 
supposedly died for.  The human sacrifice represented by the graves give validation to 
the messages imbedded in the chapels, memorials, landscaping, and commemorative 
speeches. Without remains, the meanings of the sites would be greatly diminished.  
This work seeks to bridge multiple historiographic gaps.  It will tie together the 
American and French memories of both world wars using the resting places of American 
military remains as a meeting place of Franco-American culture. It will look at the way 
citizens of France and the United States view themselves, and one another, through the 
memory of American military remains.  Diplomatic history is the primary lens through 
which these American military cemeteries are analyzed.  Historian Ron Robin effectively 
showed that ABMC sites serve U.S. public diplomatic needs.  A nation’s public 
diplomacy is a form of “soft power,” a method of projecting power abroad through more 
peaceful cultural channels as opposed to the blunt physical force of military 
intervention.7  Although military cemeteries certainly present a memory of violent 
international periods, they predominately transfer more peaceful cultural messages 
                                                             




between nations.  Public diplomatic sites are easily accessible to the general public and 
intended to be present in everyday life.  These locations convey well thought out 
messages intended to “impress, but not annoy” foreign audiences, showing them what 
makes American culture appealing.  The most successful public diplomatic sites should 
tactfully draw on the heartstrings of foreign audiences to create mental ties between 
nations.8   
The spread of military memory through remains primarily falls under the broad 
umbrella of cultural diplomacy.  A nation’s collective memory is a cultural product just 
as capable of transfer to bolster international relations as more studied cultural 
exchanges like consumerism:  Levis, Coca-Cola, Wrigley gum, and Hollywood films.9  
Because the collective memory transferred for a diplomatic purposes is one of military 
sacrifice, this work also incorporates military history into the analysis of the diplomatic 
uses of memory as well. 
The centennial of the Great War’s beginning and the seventieth anniversary of 
the Second World War’s end are approaching as this study is written.  Scholars have 
exhaustively covered these conflicts from almost every angle—motives for fighting, 
military strategies, biographies, and studies of both wars’ legacy.  Studying the collective 
memory of the conflicts proves a worthy analytical approach as well.  These memory 
                                                             
8 Ron Robin, Enclaves of America, 52 and Schrijvers, Margraten Boys, 61. 
9 For similar studies of anti-Americanism and cultural transfers between Europe and the United States see 
For examples of cultural transfer studies see works like Peter Schrijvers, The Crash of Ruin : American 
Combat Soldiers in Europe During World War II (New York: New York University Press, 1998), Reinhold 
Wagnleitner, Coca-colonization and the Cold War the Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria 
After the Second World War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), Richard H Pells, Not 
like Us : How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II 
(New York, NY: Basic Books, 1997), Victoria De Grazia, Irresistible Empire : America’s Advance Through 
Twentieth-century Europe (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2006), 
Richard Kuisel, Seducing the French:  The Dilemma of Americanization (Berkeley:  University of 




studies not only teach us about the past, but also reveal trends in contemporary 
cultures. For scholars looking at American memory of both wars, the central questions 
seem to center on the public amnesia of the Great War and the demystification of the 
Second World War’s ‘greatest generation.’  European scholars, on the other hand 
recognize that the Great War is very much alive in their collective remembrance and in 
many ways outshines their WWII memory.  European scholars of the Second World War 
using memory as their analytical approach tend to focus on the search to find a usable 
memory among landscapes of atrocity and guilt.  Much of this focuses on the dichotomy 
of victims and perpetrators, in hopes of healing wounds and moving forward.10  
  Almost always, memory is associated with the past, or manipulation of the past 
to affect the present.  Diplomacy, on the other hand, seldom triggers connection with the 
past.  Diplomacy takes place in the present.  It deals with the current relations between 
nations and offers solutions for the future.  The past certainly is not totally absent in 
diplomacy, however.  Good diplomatic relations heed history.11  Still, memory and 
                                                             
10 Stephen Trout, On the Battlefield of Memory:  The First World War and American Remembrance, 
1919-1941 (Tuscaloosa:  University of Alabama Press, 2010), Lisa Budreau, Bodies of War:  World War I 
and the Politics of Commemoration in America, 1919-1933 (New York:  New York University Press, 
2010), Mark Snell ed., Unknown Soldiers:  The American Expeditionary Forces in Memory and 
Remembrance (Kent, Ohio:  Kent State University Press, 2008), Kurt Piehler, Remembering War the 
American Way (Washington, DC:  Smithsonian Press, 1995), Michael Adams, The Best War Ever:  
American and World War II (Baltimore:  The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), Kenneth Rose, 
Myth and the Greatest Generation:  A Social History of Americans in World War II (New York:  
Routledge Press, 2008), Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands:  Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (New York:  
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diplomacy are on different planes.  The history of the future offers a remedy for this 
disjuncture.  Roxanne Panchasi’s study of interwar France shows how societies temper 
their memories of the past according to their anticipation of the future.  Panchasi 
suggests that because individuals have little control over how their future unfolds, they 
create a nostalgic past as a proactive measure to make the uncertainty of what might 
come more bearable.12  The public memory of the past that is visible effectively reveals 
what a society hopes for in the future.  This idea explains how memory diplomacy 
functions in American military cemeteries.  The memory of the World Wars represented 
in American military cemeteries reflects American desires for a future of diplomatic 
power and dominance in the Old World.  The American memory of both World War I 
and World War II reflected this anticipation of the future.  Following World War I, the 
United States failed to fully commit itself to European politics.  Yet, the memory of its 
remains in Europe reflected an aspiration of a strong American presence abroad.  
Following WWII, this aspiring American memory was replaced with a more aggressive 
memory reflective of real international power.  
 War remains, their symbolic importance, and the livings’ interaction with them 
are the core of this study.  Scholarly attention to the significance of remains in forging a 
collective memory and national identity is currently popular in memory studies and 
public history.13  Memory is such an important mode of analysis because contemporary 
society still struggles to remember a version of the World War era that is politically 
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usable.  Additionally, the rapid disappearance of historical actors from this era has 
caused an anxiety to record their memories while possible.  In a recent past rife with 
victims and perpetrators, it is necessary to heal wounds, seek forgiveness, and move in a 
forward direction.  Accomplishing this generally requires efforts from the state to 
manipulate narratives, focusing on the good and pushing aside the bad.  Successful 
manipulation of memory requires tools, and ways to package memory for the public.  
Bodies of historical actors killed during specific periods serve as some of the most usable 
instruments of memory transfer.   Instead of focusing on the obvious logistical questions 
regarding war remains:  recovery, identity, ownership, and repatriation, more focus on 
the political and cultural uses that governments find in war remains is needed.  The 
messages that the living assign to remains are not as static as the decomposing matter 
they are.   Anthropologist Katherine Verdery’s analysis of the politics of human remains 
in post-Soviet Eastern Europe has informed this project greatly.  She posits that because 
bodies reflect an image of complex lived life, humans assign more symbolic meaning to 
them than other lifeless relics such as brick, mortar, or art.  The complexity of remains 
makes them artifacts that are both “concrete and protean.”14  Leaders are able to 
capitalize on the powerful connotations that the living attach to them, and put words 
into mouths of the deceased.  These words create a message that fulfills a societal need 
of the living.  In short, it is easier for governments to “rewrite history with dead people 
than with symbols that never spoke.”15  American scholar Michael Sledge made similar 
observations about political uses of American military dead in his 2005 work, Soldier 
Dead.  Sledge contended in his work that “a soldier’s body is the physical representative, 
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or envoy, of his nation and, as such, embodies its ideology, political beliefs, and 
culture.”16  For the American government to retain legitimacy and support of the 
American people, it needs to care for those that serve it in life and death.  Sledge argued 
that the government’s ability to care for the corpses of its soldiers became indicative in 
the public mind of the government’s ability to care for the living.17  Sledge failed to grasp 
the larger implications of leaving American remains overseas.  In his view, the ABMC 
caretaking is reflective more of an inconvenient burden that Washington had to 
undertake when hundreds of thousands of American soldiers died abroad because to not 
do so would have caused public mutiny.18  He does not acknowledge the presence of 
other government motives in the decision. 
A nation’s capacity and aspiration to care for its war dead reveals much about its 
cultural and political priorities.  The fact that the United States Congress appropriated 
over fifty-seven million dollars to the ABMC in 2013 to care of American soldiers’ graves 
killed abroad in the era of World Wars shows that Americans place both emotional and 
monetary value on their war dead.19  This sum has remained relatively unchanged for 
the past several years despite a faltering economy and multiple wars in the Middle East.  
If the billion dollar marker has not been reached in caring for these dead since 1923, it 
soon will.  Although U.S. policy since the Korean War has been to repatriate all 
American service members killed, and recovered, this was not so for the World Wars.  
Next-of-kin received a choice from the federal government to decide the final resting 
place of their soldier dead in these conflicts.  A little fewer than half of the families of 
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deceased Americans in each World War, respectively, opted to leave the dead where they 
fell.  These families did so with the promise of their government that “time will not dim 
the glory of their deeds.”20  Ensuring the perpetuity of this promise requires a steep 
price tag. Still, this bill is one that a majority of American deem worthy of paying.  The 
service provided not only commemorates the dead, but also ensures that the cemeteries 
and monuments displaying American culture remain immaculate and open for public 
diplomacy on all days except federal holidays.  Americans seldom ask what other value 
these cemeteries possess.  Are they purely the self-evident sites of commemoration that 
they appear as?  Or, does the American government spend so much money on these 
sites to fulfill more practical needs of statecraft?    
Death is a universal human experience.  Civil War historian Drew Faust argues 
that even when dying, humans are active, not passive participants.  They spent a lifetime 
preparing for their final moment, “imagining it, risking it, enduring it, and seeking to 
understand it.”21  The living must find their identity and alter their lives according to the 
persistent “annihilation” of their fellow man.22 Human remains universally connote 
deep meanings with the living.  This is evident in a variety of ways. They elicit thoughts 
of mortality and a spiritual afterlife in many religions and cultures.23    Indigenous 
groups and politically weak nations use their dead as one of the few available political 
weapons.  They actively seek to repatriate their remains that powerful enemies took for 
trophies or scientific experimentation.  They consequently want the remains of enemies 
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removed from their own land, along with the victorious memories assigned to them.  
Sometimes they use the presence of their remains in soil to legitimize claims of land 
ownership.  In all of these cases, control of your own dead represents ownership of your 
past, and a balance of power.24   Groups who lack political power are not the only ones 
who leverage their dead.  Powerful national governments, like the United States, “glorify 
the remains of figures who significantly reflect the principles and mission of the nation,” 
they “confer immortality on particular national heroes” to consecrate sacred spaces.25  
The ability to care for its own dead and be accountable for the wrongful death of others 
also rectifies a nation’s power. 26  When a collective group of remains possess substantial 
cultural meanings to a people, they become even more powerful.  In the United States, 
military sacrifice represents one of the most sacred cultural traits.27  Thus, writing about 
American military remains is a difficult subject.  Hyper-patriotism throughout the 
United States makes questioning the use of military remains somewhat controversial.  
This is particularly true when dealing with any engagement of the dominant narrative of 
the American military’s noble sacrifices in the World Wars.28   
 The twenty-four ABMC sites abroad are capable of assigning different meanings 
to each individual.  Some might see the thousands upon thousands of headstones as a 
message of peace where others see a message of American military might.  This varied 
message comes from American leaders themselves.  Throughout the twentieth century, 
                                                             
24 For this type of argument see Andrew Gulliford, “Bones of Contention:  The Repatriation of Native 
American Human Remains,” The Public Historian, Vol. 18, No. 4, (Fall 1996), 119-143 and Vedery, The 
Political Lives of Dead Bodies. 
25 Laderman, The Sacred Remains, 6. 
26 The Public Historian:  Where are the Bodies?  A Transnational Examination of State Violence and its 
Consequences, Vol. 32, No. 1 (February 2010). 
27 Faust, This Republic of Suffering.   
28 The politicization of the WWII monument on the National Mall in DC during the late 2013 government 




and into the twenty-first, leaders gave multiple voices to the soldier dead.  The only 
constant variable in these sites has been a discourse of American sacrifice for the broad 
ideals of democracy, liberty, and freedom.   
 
Notes on Methodology  
America’s military cemeteries are divided by a distinct chronological barrier—
eight are from the Great War and sixteen from World War II.  While sharing many 
similarities, analysis of these sites of memory from different wars requires some 
separation.  Similar difficulties arise due to geographic considerations.  Although the 
vast majority of the cemeteries are in Western Europe (Manila, Carthage, Corozal, and 
Mexico City being the exceptions), it would be irresponsible to lump them all into an 
overbroad categorization of Western Europe.29  Each cemetery has a unique history 
determined by local factors.  For instance, the feeling of the Suresnes American 
Cemetery on the outskirts of Paris is quite different than the much more isolated Meuse-
Argonne American cemetery in eastern France.  Engagement of locals in the cemeteries 
also varies by location.  Historian Peter Schrjivers shows a storied past of Dutch citizens 
reverently adopting American military graves in Holland.  Grave adoption programs 
exist at other ABMC cemeteries, but none quite reach the scope or thoroughness of the 
Dutch example.30  Conversely, while it is not useful to broadly frame all cemeteries in a 
Western European mold, it is also not useful to view them as isolated locations with no 
connection to one another.  America’s military cemeteries are standardized 
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representations of American sacrifice created by a federal commission as part of an 
overarching plan to assert an American presence in Europe.  Essentially the only 
difference from cemetery to cemetery is size, memorial design, and the secondary 
language of text.  All of the ABMC’s WWI and WWII cemeteries were respectively built 
as the same house with different paint.  Still, this does not mean that foreigners treat 
each cemetery the same way, or that the American government uses each site in a 
completely standardized fashion.  It was impossible to know in the early 1920s how a 
town where an ABMC cemetery was located might look in the distant future.  For 
instance, at Meuse-Argonne American cemetery a grand highway connecting Romange-
sous-Montfaucon to neighboring towns was optimistically built through the American 
cemetery.  The town never grew however, and the large highway remains bookended by 
small country roads.  
An additional obstacle placed in front of scholars of this subject is the number, 
and quality, of sources available regarding each site.  At its moment of conception, the 
ABMC was a historically minded commission dedicated to not only to building and 
maintaining cemeteries and monuments, but to writing accurate histories of the 
American Expeditionary Forces.  Its founders rightly understood that good 
commemoration and history went hand-in-hand.  The appointment of Major Xenophon 
H. Price as the commission’s first administrative secretary attests to this. His capacity as 
chief mapmaker on Pershing’s personal staff during the war made him the expert on 
American military positions in the Great War.31  Much of this historical mindedness 
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began leaving the ABMC once its cadre of WWI leadership faded away.  At the 
conclusion of WWII, the greatly expanded military machine of the United States took 
over much of the historical part of the ABMC’s mission.  Where the ABMC created the 
official history of the A.E.F. following the Great War, the U.S. Army’s historical section 
compiled the official WWII history.  Thus, following World War II much of the ABMC’s 
institutional commitment to produce historical products to accompany its 
commemoration began to diminish.  The commission became an agency less concerned 
with telling a story, and more concerned with keeping the grass green and the 
headstones white.  This system worked while the World Wars remained fresh in the 
American consciousness.  As the WWII generation aged and began to die, this lived 
memory also dissipated.  Americans no longer needed an ABMC that served as a mere 
caretaker of graves and memorials, but one capable of historical interpretation.  
Thankfully, more of a historical mind seems to be returning to the commission at the 
start of a new century.   
This recent institutional return to history does not help historians writing the 
history of the ABMC, however.  Records of the commission’s early work are rather 
comprehensive at the National Archives, but as the twentieth century progressed, the 
quality of archival material devolved into little more than administrative minutiae.  
Historical records of individual ABMC sites vary with each location.  Some of the WWI 
records stored within buildings on cemetery sites vanished during Nazi occupation of 
Europe, or during the transition of administration between the Graves Registration 
Service and the ABMC.  ABMC sites in Europe also vary greatly by leadership.  Many 
cemeteries are in remote locations and are cared for by an American superintendent 




guests and direct a staff of workers from the host-country.  They often take residence at 
a specific cemetery for several years, and then move on to oversee another.  With only 
moderate direction from ABMC headquarters in Washington or Paris, these 
administrators can set an agenda and use spare time depending on personal discretion—
so long as they fulfill the commission’s mission.  Some administrators are more 
historically minded than their counterparts and make an effort to chronicle the lives of 
remains buried within the walls they tend, record interactions with visitors, etc.  As a 
result, some cemeteries have much more complete historical holdings than others 
depending on the caretaker.32   
My goal with this work is to walk the analytical tightrope, trying to bring 
specificity while not losing focus on broader connections.  In the following pages, much 
focus is given to the Suresnes American Cemetery and the Meuse-Argonne American 
Cemetery.  These two cemeteries, one in France’s main metropolis, and the other in its 
remote eastern frontier, are indicative of my focus on Franco-American relations 
through the twentieth century.  France is the primary receptacle of American military 
dead from the World Wars, and one of America’s closest allies throughout the past 
century.  Aside from the historic democratic alliance borne from each nation’s 
revolution, Franco-American relations are also historically strained. Twentieth-century 
Franco-American relations are best characterized by allegiances built out of necessity. 
Feelings of mistrust, misunderstanding, and animosity are the norm.  I focus on 
Suresnes and Meuse-Argonne out of the need to limit my sample.  Of the eleven 
American World War cemeteries in France, Suresnes deserves attention because it is the 
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only cemetery with burials from both World Wars, and because of its proximity to Paris.  
Meuse-Argonne is noteworthy because it is the largest American military cemetery in 
Europe and represents the main American sacrifice in the Great War.  The two very 
different cemeteries allow for a strong conceptualization of American military 
cemeteries in France.  Still, focus on these locations does not mean I am binding myself 
to one cemetery from eastern France and one from the west.  Chronologically, I intend 
to show the continuity of change in ABMC sites from their inception into the present.  
While I would like my vision to be a perfect tapestry, it is not so.  The narrative of 
American commemoration in Europe is riddled with holes that must be mended to see 
its entirety.  Many of these gaps will be filled by relevant examples found in cases from 
other cemeteries.  Put simply, this is not a case study of Suresnes or Meuse-Argonne, 
nor is it an attempt tell the story of every ABMC site in Europe.  It is a study that 
understands its limits and creatively seeks to find answers.  Time and place create many 
different stories, but a common thread runs through all.  This thread shows that ABMC 
cemeteries are more than depositories for American military dead and isolated 
lighthouses spread throughout continental Europe.  Instead, they are cultural 
representations of the United States strategically placed for political and diplomatic use.  
The dead within their walls do not always rest in peace, but are frequently summoned to 
aid the living. 
As sites of public diplomacy, American military cemeteries have had mixed 
success depending on time and international situations.  Immediately following World 
War I and World War II, American cemeteries had near-unanimous support from host 
nations.  American remains represented liberation from period of oppression still in 




interwar years, war debt policies and radicalized political movements on the left and 
right increased French animosity towards the United States.  Following World War II, 
virulent anti-communism, control of nuclear weapons, and unpopular proxy wars 
eroded American popularity in Europe.  American military cemeteries were not immune 
to the changing diplomatic situations.  As sites strongly representative of American 
culture, cemeteries became possible targets for the French to protest against the 
perceived U.S. overtaking of the Old World.  Both World War I and World War II are 
what some scholars consider two glimmering periods in a century of Franco-American 
relations mostly characterized by tension.  French historian Philippe Roger notes that 
“brotherhood in the trenches was replaced by a new, uncomprehending transatlantic 
dialogue.”33  The period of misunderstanding began shortly after WWI and then again 
shortly after WWII.  Members of the American armed services left in European soil 
during these times of uncomprehending were called upon to bring reason and 
understanding to current American intentions.  Sometimes the voice of the dead 
alleviated misunderstandings between nations and strengthened bonds between 
nations—the eve of WWII stands as a great example of this.  At other times, the voices 
failed to resonate with the host nation, and only served to reaffirm cultural differences. 
The pages that follow will show both the fluidity and consistency in American 
political uses of military remains from the World Wars.  This work largely flows 
chronologically to reveal to the evolution of the discourse of war dead.  The discourse of 
the dead is not a one-sided American construction, but defined and redefined by 
Americans, the French, and other Europeans as international situations evolved over the 
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twentieth century.  Research for this project draws primarily from State Department 
Records, U.S. Consular Post Records, U.S. Army Quartermaster Records, Records of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, American Battle Monuments Commission Records, and 
Commission of Fine Arts Records.  The personal papers of ABMC staff and U.S. 
Ambassadors to France during specific time periods have also invaluably shown how 
American leaders used cemeteries to achieve diplomatic goals.  Because this work is not 
concerned only with the decisions of top level officials, efforts have been made to 
uncover the voices of American and French tourists and visitors to U.S. cemeteries.  
Newspaper archives, letters in burial files, War Department surveys, and State 
Department correspondence have provided this personal perspective.  Published 





The American memory of its sacrifice abroad fluctuated between liberal and 
conservative world views through the twentieth century.  Chapter I explains how 
President Woodrow Wilson first cast the memory of American WWI dead in France as a 
sacrifice for a liberal world dedicated to open borders, free trade, collective defense, and 
self-determination.  This memory generated positive expectations among decimated 
European allies and debate within the United States.  Wilson articulated his liberal view 
in a dedication speech given at Suresnes American Cemetery outside of Paris during 




Nations and its goal of collective security.  American leaders and the public split on this 
memory and debated whether their bodies should stay in Europe as reminders of this 
sacrifice, or come home.  Some thirty-thousand remains stayed abroad in European soil 
under the care of the new ABMC led by General of the Armies John Pershing. The 
commemorative system created by the ABMC abroad established strategic locations for 
American and French leaders to use American memories of the war as commentary on 
contemporary issues.  During the interwar years, the American memory on French soil 
reflected U.S. diplomatic aspirations more so than real power. 
 A decade of conservative leadership revised U.S. memory abroad following 
Woodrow Wilson’s presidency.  The roaring twenties, popularly perceived as a time of 
growing U.S. prosperity and cultural relevance, also represented a period when U.S. 
policymakers rejected the tenets of the League of Nations.  Distancing the United States 
from European political and military entanglements was a primary American foreign 
policy goal.  The desire to stay out of European problems coincided with the growing 
influence of left-wing and right-wing political movements abroad. Communists offered 
Europeans an alternative to democratic capitalism and growing fascist movements 
vocalized disenchantment over war reparation policies. Chapter II shows that with no 
U.S. military presence in Europe, the memory of American remains became a viable 
platform for U.S. policymakers to respond to anti-American protest stemming from 
these groups.  The optimistic memory that Wilson assigned to American dead evolved 
into a reactionary memory attacking political radicalism.  Maintaining its traditional 
policy of freedom of action regarding political and diplomatic engagements, the United 
States faltered on fully committing to European problems.  But, through its memory of 




memory of American soldiers buried in France increasingly focused on positive 
similarities imbedded in the ‘good’ revolutions of France and the United States.  There 
was no American military presence in Europe, but the memory crafted for American 
remains suggested that so long as European countries adhered to democratic-
capitalism, American force might come to their aid in future conflict.  Some of the most 
visible uses of U.S. memory working to improve Franco-American relations came in the 
wake of war debt manifestations and Sacco-Vanzetti protests in the streets of Paris. 
 Franklin Roosevelt assumed power at the height of the Great Depression and 
fascist leadership in Italy and Germany.  Chapter III shows that through the 1930s, the 
memory of American military dead abroad harkened back to Wilson’s peaceful designs 
instead of retroactively responding to social unrest. The message of peace associated 
with American memory abroad came from leaders in the United States and citizens 
travelling as pilgrims.  The U.S. Congress funded pilgrimages for mothers and wives 
who lost loved ones in World War I to visit graves abroad.  These women traveled as 
public diplomats through the 1930s. Grieving American women showed Europeans the 
continued U.S. investment in international stability.  In the late 1930s, as fascist 
governments initiated aggressive foreign policy, the United States and France turned to 
memories of American remains to bring peace to the continent by containing nationalist 
aggression. A wave of official ABMC dedications in Europe in 1937 created a timely 
platform for U.S. and French leaders to espouse public messages of peace.  In this 
period where U.S. memory abroad offered hope for peace in Western Europe, the United 
States also attempted to remove its dead from Soviet soil who died fighting Bolsheviks in 
the years after the Great War.  This recovery mission came in the first year that the 




recover American remains for grieving families, but also to erase a negative memory 
from Soviet soil. 
 Peaceful memories of American military remains in Europe failed, of course, to 
stop the European economic and diplomatic crisis of the 1930s from becoming a second 
world war.  Yet, the diplomacy of collective memory surrounding remains continued to 
tie France and the United States together during the war and proved especially 
important in the post-war era. Chapter IV analyzes the expanding utility of American 
military memory during World War II.  After France’s capitulation to Nazi Germany, 
and prior to U.S. entry into the war, the French retained hope that the United States 
might come to their aid and showed continued commitment to America.  One sign of 
this commitment was the French government’s circumvention of the Vichy regime to 
maintain U.S. WWI graves.   Once the United States entered into World War II, its war 
presence abroad entirely dwarfed the scope of its WWI contributions.  Throughout the 
war, U.S. military leadership and leaders in the ABMC took measures to ensure that its 
new war memory abroad reflected the increased American sacrifice and commitment to 
a free world.  Efforts were made to ensure that a majority, or all, new U.S. military dead 
might be left abroad.  Not all dead remained abroad, but approximately 100,000 did—
most in France.  These dead entered into the same U.S. WWI commemorative system, 
but one on a much larger scale.  The ABMC’s commemorative boundaries following 
WWII encompassed the globe.  This expanded sphere of memory overlapped with 
increased U.S. influence abroad in the new Cold War. 
 Through the first two decades of the Cold War, the United States increasingly 
used the memory of its military remains as a means to project U.S. power abroad and 




sacrifice in the World Wars helped pave the way for America’s twentieth century 
ascension, more so than other cultural influences that generated European scorn, like 
U.S. consumerism.   The more assertive uses of memory as a diplomatic tool stemmed 
partially from the volatile ideological battle between the United States and the Soviet 
Union.  It also came in response to growing anti-Americanism in France regarding 
growing U.S. dependency.  Discontent manifested in France in the form of widespread 
communist protest of U.S. and French policies in Korea and Indochina.  When 
communist protestors attacked NATO and other symbols of U.S. dominance in France, 
U.S. leaders and conservative French leaders turned to popular memories of U.S. soldier 
dead to ease tensions.  Chapter V demonstrates how American dead in this early Cold 
War period became weapons and reminders to France of the significant sacrifices that 
the United States made for France in the recent past.  French and American leaders 
conceptualized American dead from the World Wars as extensions of shared Franco-
American battles against communists in the Far East in the very early stages of the Cold 
War. 
 Chapter VI asserts that the aggressive uses of U.S. military memory through the 
1950s became more reserved during the liberal presidencies of JFK and LBJ.  
Throughout Kennedy’s brief presidency, he and his diplomatic appointees focused less 
on using American remains in France as weapons.  Instead, more emphasis went 
towards highlighting positive memories of the centuries old Franco-American 
partnership and the future.  The sentimentality of U.S. memory did little to improve 
Franco-American governmental relations through the 1960s.  Much of the barrier came 
from realist French President Charles de Gaulle’s leadership of the Fifth Republic.  




from the United States.  The United States’ withholding of nuclear technology from 
France, escalation in Vietnam, and insistence on France trusting NATO as its primary 
defense all increased French anti-Americanism.  The low-point of twentieth century 
Franco-American relations came in 1966 when President de Gaulle withdrew France 
from NATO and demanded all U.S. military personnel leave French soil.  This briefly 
turned U.S. remains back into diplomatic weapons and caused the U.S. Congress to 
consider removing all U.S. military bodies from France.  By 1968, the American memory 
of its remains in France had moderated again because of international protest against 
the U.S. war in Vietnam.  Washington ordered U.S. diplomats to avoid Vietnam 
references in public speeches and the U.S. military memory in Europe became a less 
militarized than ever before.  The ambassadorship of Sargent Shriver epitomized the 
toned down rhetoric of American memory in this period.  Decreased public attention to 
ABMC sites in the late 60s and Congressional debates to abolish the Commission also 
indicated the diminishing value Americans placed on military memory abroad.  
 In large part due to the mounting death toll in Vietnam, coupled with faltering 
support amongst the U.S. and European public, President Richard Nixon reinvigorated 
the ABMC.  The final portion of Chapter VI explains the aggressive politicization of the 
ABMC by conservatives.  Nixon believed in the power of ABMC sites to instill 
nationalism in Americans, and became an advocate of the ABMC.  Leaders in the ABMC 
capitalized on Nixon’s support, emerged from Congressional attacks intact, and 
reinvigorated their public affairs program.  The ABMC became a conservative ally of the 
Nixon administration.  It sent its commissioners to the battlefields of Vietnam to 
improve troop morale and created a video for public television explaining the 




early 1970s towards a clearly politicized ABMC and military memory abroad marked the 
start of a new era in U.S. memory diplomacy.  By the end of Vietnam, it was clear that no 
Cold War remains would be interred in old or new ABMC sites.  ABMC sites were 
effectively frozen in time, but the memory assigned to them continued to change with 
new administrations and altered international situations.  As American military 
interventions abroad became more controversial at home and abroad from the end of 
the Cold War through the present, positive memories of American remains from the 
“good” wars of World War I and World War II continued to serve as a point of entry for 
scholars to study American foreign policy objectives. 
Jay Winter stressed in Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning, a groundbreaking 
study of European World War I memory, that historians over stress the political 
character of war commemoration.34  According to Winter, political studies are useful for 
improving our general understanding of the symbolic exchanges between the living and 
the dead, however, overemphasizing the politics of these places erases the true historical 
meaning of war monuments and cemeteries.  Nations, communities, and individuals 
erected such sites of memory for mourning.  Above all else, they served as places the 
grieving could visit and confront the “brutal facts of death in war.”35  This is a fair 
assessment.  Too much emphasis on the politics of sites of memory does potentially 
mask the impetus for their creation.  But, from an American perspective there is 
arguably more political motivation behind erection of its commemorative sites abroad 
than the pragmatic explanation of mourning.  The number of Europeans killed and 
affected by the World Wars dwarfs the United States.  Europeans also live much closer 
                                                             





to the actual killing fields.  War memorials and cemeteries for European nations surely 
witnessed larger volumes of grievers.  For many Europeans, these pilgrimages are day 
trips.  American cemeteries and memorials abroad harbored and continue to harbor 
mourners.  These sites of mourning are thousands-of-miles away from most grieving 
Americans, however.  Critical analysis of American military cemeteries abroad—from 
inception to uses—brings Winter’s dismissal of political analysis into question.  It seems 
that, while mourning certainly factored into the creation of American cemeteries in 
Europe, the resources devoted to sites of memory so far from home indicate other 
motivations.  This work acknowledges the mourning factor of American cemeteries, but 

















I. Becoming Instruments of Foreign Policy:  Utility of American WWI 
Remains in France 
  
 
“These women of France he came to save 
 Had never known his face or heard his name, 




Photo1.1: Memorial Day at Suresnes Cemetery, May 30, 1919.  Source: Bibliothèque nationale de 
France, département Estampes et photographie, online archives.   
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On Memorial Day 1919, United States President Woodrow Wilson stepped to the 
speaker’s podium erected at a small American military cemetery in the Parisian suburb 
of Suresnes cut into Mount Valerien to the city’s west.  Behind him stood ancient ruins 
of a French fortress that once defended Paris from invading forces.  In the far distance 
ahead, Wilson saw the Sacré-Cœur Basilica on the heights above Montmartre and the 
prominent Eiffel far to its right.  This commanding view of the city on America’s 
Memorial Day likely seemed fitting to Wilson.  He was Commander-in-Chief of the 
American Expeditionary Forces that tipped the military balance in favor of the Allies 
and he was the first president to step foot on European soil while in office.  Large crowds 
welcomed him as a hero as he toured the country between meetings with leaders from 
France and Great Britain to ensure that his Fourteen Point plan might pave the way for 
a liberal world order of collective security, free trade, and democratically elected 
governments.  Having ended just six months ago, remnants of the Great War remained 
fresh in the minds of those present.  Reminders stood all around. A metallic looking 
observation balloon used on the Western Front floated nearby; armed French soldiers 
on horseback formed a perimeter around the ceremony, American doughboys created a 
sea of khaki before Wilson, and French mothers who found solace caring for American 
graves wept in the crowd.  The most important reminder, however, were the thousand 
neatly organized white wooden crosses marking American war remains.  These 
dominated the space.2 
A summer sun, hot enough to cause several female spectators to faint during the 
ceremony, beat down on Wilson’s bare head as he delivered his well-honed thirty-
                                                             




minute speech.3   It is possible that the deeply religious and idealistic Wilson felt that 
this was his foreign policy pulpit to deliver a modern Sermon on the Mount.   In the 
moments before taking the podium, Premier of France George Clemenceau promised 
the sea of spectators that the French would never forget the memory of Americans who 
sacrificed all for their country, and that the French would take care of Americans’ final 
resting places “as piously and gratefully as the tombs of our own soldiers.”4  This 
commitment to remembering American dead was central to Wilson’s oration.  The site 
of this speech and presence of American remains held particular significance to Wilson’s 
message.  Just days before, the official covenant of Wilson’s beloved League of Nations 
was finalized.  It seemed, at last, that the great nations of the world finally established 
willingness to unite in collective security and enter an era of peace.  American remains 
buried at Suresnes gave Wilson the capital he needed to defend the ideals of the League 
to the world for the first time. 
Throughout Wilson’s speech, American remains and the memory of their 
sacrifices drove his argument for a League of Nations and continued partnership with 
Western Europe.  His speech began by casting the American bodies before him as 
selfless warriors who entered into a noble crusade, not for the benefit of America, but for 
all of humanity.  He acknowledged Premier Clemenceau’s promise and affirmed his 
belief that “though buried in a foreign land, they [American remains] are not buried in 
alien soil.  They are at home, sleeping with the spirits of those who thought the same 
thoughts and entertained the same aspirations.”5  He explained that American 
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servicemen died to give the world the foreign policy “instrument” of the League of 
Nations to deter future conflicts.  Wilson then figuratively called upon the souls of dead 
Americans to leave their bones and mingle in the audience to pass on an understanding 
that they sacrificed for “continued liberty and peace.”6  The speech ended with great 
applause and flowing tears, but initiated a firestorm of controversy within the United 
States that foretold the ultimate failure of the League.  Americans at the time questioned 
if their soldiers really died for the cause Wilson defined, and if America had any place in 
the future affairs of France.  Even in the present, historians still ponder if the abstract 
ideas of friendship and shared culture between France and the United States justified an 
entrance into a conflict that took thousands of American lives. 
 
Photo 1.2: Wilson Delivers Suresnes Speech], May 30, 1919.  Source: Bibliothèque nationale de 
France, département Estampes et photographie, online archives.   
 





On the same day as Wilson’s speech, Secretary of War Newton Baker, similarly 
addressed newly returned American service members at Camp Merritt, New Jersey.  
Baker also resurrected American bodies buried abroad.  He informed the gathered 
veterans that Memorial Day was partially theirs’, but belonged more so to those who 
remained only as memories.  On this first Memorial Day after the Great War, Baker 
stressed that the dominant characteristic of sacrifice for Americans came from a love for 
liberty.  The prime example of sacrifice was encapsulated by the remains “scattered over 
the hillsides of France” who, according to Baker, “surrendered their lives gladly and with 
a smile” for a cause “as high and bold as any man ever died for.”7  Baker clarified this 
cause more clearly as the League of Nations in the upcoming months, telling an 
audience that if the American dead in isolated graves on the front lines might walk the 
earth they would surely “march in solid phalanx to Versailles and demand that 
arrangements be made to forever prevent the possibility of their children ever having to 
make the same sacrifice as them.”8  The decision of Wilson and Baker to tie the 
controversial League of Nations so closely with sacred military dead revealed their 
feelings that the dead possessed the ability to draw support to important foreign policy 
initiatives. 
  Republican politicians at home, under the leadership of Senator Henry Cabot 
Lodge, resented Wilson for excluding them from the Paris peace talks and felt that it was 
in the best interest of the United States to maintain an isolationist foreign policy.  To 
them, Wilson’s League of Nations was a dangerous engagement and not the cause for 
                                                             
7 Newton D. Baker, “Memorial Day Address at Camp Merritt, NJ,” May 30, 1919, Speech Files, Baker 
Papers, Box 245, Library of Congress (hereafter LOC).    
8 Newton D. Baker, “A League of Nations:  The Demand of the World’s Fighting Men” (Chicago:  League to 
Enforce Peace), 10-11.  Quoting, “Address of Newton D. Baker at League of Nations Mass Meeting, 




which American soldiers died.  Wilson incorrigibly stood up to this opposition, however, 
and brought the ghosts of Suresnes back to the United States.  In a whirlwind national 
speaking tour from late 1919 through early 1920 Wilson tried to pull American support 
toward the League by recalling to audiences the presence of the American ghosts in 
cemeteries abroad.9  Wilson’s stubbornness to compromise, coupled with a debilitating 
stroke, dashed all hope of swaying the public and America failed to join his League.  
Still, the tactics of Wilson’s administration opened up a discourse of American sacrifice 
abroad that entwined France and the United States for the foreseeable future.  This 
discourse of the dead defined American remains as sacred and set the parameters for 
how American and foreigners should engage with the dead.  American military dead 
became an official symbol, and constant reminder, of America’s commitment to France 
and Western Europe.  American and French leaders affirmed this discourse of the dead 
throughout the interwar years, constantly strengthening it.  By the mid 1920s, the 
discourse was a viable means for activists to level attacks against the governments of 
France and the United States.  American military remains in France, and their memory, 
seemed forevermore attached to international relations. 
Woodrow Wilson’s choice to deliver his first public speech defending the League 
of Nations in an American military cemetery revealed the emergence of collective 
memory as a serious diplomatic tool, the role of the federal government in 
commemoration, and new American strategies for creating cultural ties between 
nations.    His remarks at Suresnes initiated a complicated century long relationship 
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between the United States and nations that held its dead. The ways that both Wilson 
and Clemenceau mutually flaunted their care for the legacy of war dead demonstrated 
the ability of corpses to link nations together culturally.  American soldiers defended 
France because of shared cultural values—democracy, capitalism, liberty, equality, and 
Christianity.  French soil therefore could hold American military dead because it 
fostered the same ideologies as America.    Mustering support for the League of Nations 
was the primary objective of Wilson’s Suresnes speech.  This small moment also 
provided an effective snapshot of how the United States would place its war remains at 
the center of commemorative plans and use them as vehicles of foreign policy ideology 
in the upcoming century. 
The scene at Suresnes demonstrates several key elements of this work.  First, the 
event was not wholly American.  It was a ceremony rife with cultural transfers—
requiring participation of both French and Americans.  French cavalry created a 
perimeter and formalized the event while French mothers mourned in the crowd 
alongside Americans.  One Frenchwoman approached Wilson as he laid a 
commemorative wreath at the close of his speech and asked him if she might lay her 
flowers on top of his “as a tribute to the American dead, who, in sacrificing their lives, 
saved the lives of thousands of Frenchmen.”10  Wilson obliged this request while Field 
Marshal Foch stood by his side visibly moved by the woman’s request.11 These strong 
symbols gave validity to French Prime Minister Clemenceau’s promise that the French 
would care for all American military graves as their own.  President Wilson then 
acknowledged this promise on behalf of the predominately American crowd.  He went 
                                                             





on to articulate how a strong French-American relationship might look in the upcoming 
years.  The ceremony established the idea that American military cemeteries acted as 
sites that bound both countries together.  Second, and most importantly, the message 
delivered by Woodrow Wilson at Suresnes reanimated the American bodies interred in 
French soil.  Wilson’s words did not allow the remains to rest in a symbolic void.  He 
resurrected their ghosts and assigned his own meaning to their sacrifice.  In Wilson’s 
interpretation, all Americans buried in French soil sacrificed for collective security and 
love for democracy.  Thus, it was the mission of WWI’s victors to honor their sacrifice 
and work together to make sure it was not fruitless.  American leaders after Wilson 
continually assigned meaning to American military dead, as did the French. 
Wilson’s reanimation of bodies at Suresnes revealed the necessity of 
manipulating reality for his message to resonate.  Familiarity with the Suresnes 
cemetery shows the artificiality of Wilson’s story.   He only spoke of the men who rested 
before him and sacrifices made in the popularly remembered trench fighting.  In 
actuality, Suresnes was one of the worst cemeteries to narrate in this manner.  The 
American remains in Suresnes were the most varied composition of any American 
military cemetery in Europe.  Many were not battle casualties, but victims of Spanish 
influenza convalescing in hospitals around Paris before ever stepping foot onto the front 
lines.  Among the dead were nurses, civilians, infants, and even suicides.  Perhaps the 
most notable example being twin sisters Dorothy and Gladys Cromwell.  Heiresses to 
millions, the Cromwell sisters forfeited their high society New York City lives to serve as 
Red Cross nurses in the Great War.  Unable to mentally recover from continuous 
months of service in some of the war’s worst battles, the twenty-eight year old sisters 




home.12   Wilson completely overlooked the mixture of stories present and created a 
homogenous narrative of manly combat sacrifice in a holy crusade. 13   This 
manipulation of memory, and use of remains, foreshadowed policies that the U.S. 
government established as it asserted itself within a new international system.  The U.S. 
government meticulously constructed the American commemorative system in which 
overseas remains eventually went to tell one story of American sacrifice.  Ultimately, the 
memory of U.S. remains abroad reflected aspirations of U.S. foreign policy more so than 
real international power.  This memory would transform from a reflection of aspiration 
to real power as the century progressed. 
 
 
Origins of Memory as a Diplomatic Tool 
Assurance that the federal government had American war dead to vocalize 
required several phases of Congressional legislation.  First, the American public needed 
to decide if they wanted their soldiers’ bodies left in Europe.  This phase involved heated 
political and public debate among the many factions within America’s diverse 
democratic society.  In this “Progressive Era,” a period of broad social reform, the 
expansion of democratic participation, and government regulation—the final disposition 
of American bodies was not a unilateral decision of the federal government.    Within 
this debate, some of the biggest issues came down to intentions of the French, economic 
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costs of repatriation, tourism, and the role of the American and French governments in 
commemoration.  Once evident that considerable numbers of American war remains 
were staying abroad, an official commemorative plan took shape.  Multiple plans came 
before Congress prior to the creation of an official vision. 
For American bodies to retain the symbolic importance that Wilson alluded to in 
his 1919 Memorial Day address, they needed to remain in France.  This was not a 
foregone conclusion at the time Wilson spoke.  Americans who sent loved ones abroad 
to make the world safe for democracy fully understood that they might not survive the 
endeavor.  Worried families found some solace in the fact that Americans killed on 
islands of the Caribbean and Pacific Basin during the War of 1898, in the Filipino 
Insurrection, and the Boxer Rebellion came home for burial.  Even more comforting was 
a promise by Secretary of War Newtown Baker in September 1918 that the United States 
government would ensure a home burial to all who died in its foreign service.14  Baker 
surely did not anticipate the heated debate that his promise eventually brought.  
American participation in the Great War dwarfed all other American foreign 
engagements.  Dead American service members quickly became a problem for high 
command.  Filling up precious cargo space with corpses, caskets, and burial equipment 
on the transatlantic voyage while waging war was not feasible.  To the likely dismay of 
many American families, General Pershing ordered the interment of all dead Americans 
in European soil until hostilities ended. 15  The end of hostilities still did not bring a 
quick return of remains.  Because most of France’s infrastructure and industry was 
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destroyed in the war, and from fear of spreading infectious diseases, the French 
government passed a law prohibiting all exhumations of war dead in France for three 
years.  Many Americans viewed the French denial of their loved one’s remains as the 
ultimate treachery and threatened Washington of taking repatriation matters into their 
own hands unless immediate action was taken.  A mother from Brooklyn made the 
following demand to the State Department in 1920:  “No matter what happens I want 
my dead son brought home to me at once even if I have to go over and get my son 
myself.”16  Other mothers took the opposite stance and felt that their deceased bodies 
should continue to serve America.  Mathilda Burling, a grieving New York mother and 
vocal advocate for state sponsored pilgrimages for mothers to visit their son’s graves, 
took a stance quite opposite of the Brooklyn mother.  Burling initially wanted her son’s 
remains brought back from France, but claimed that former President Theodore 
Roosevelt swayed her opinion by personally writing her with a plea to “leave your boy 
where he fell” because that is what all soldiers wanted.17   
The forced delay of repatriation had profound effects on both the French and 
Americans.  In the aftermath of World War I, American sentiment divided on the 
question of repatriation.  Many Americans held Newton Baker to his promise and waited 
for the return of their loved one so they might find closure.  Yet, as time passed and the 
American government assessed its repatriation policy, feasible alternatives to total 
repatriation emerged.  Removing all American soldier dead from Europe was a logistical 
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nightmare projected to cost the United States millions of dollars.18  The high cost of 
repatriation was not the only cause of reconsidered policy.  American leaders, backed by 
the views of General Pershing, realized that the repatriation of all American dead meant 
the possible erasure of American sacrifice from mankind’s memory of the Great War.  
France’s hero of Verdun, Marshal Pétain, helped show Pershing a vision of American 
military cemeteries shortly after the war when he wrote to Pershing that American 
“fields of honor” should be established in France and that “France would be happy and 
proud to retain the bodies of American victims who had fallen on her soil.”19  Pershing 
knew that, although of great importance, American participation in the war dwindled in 
comparison to European nations.  He also saw the unfolding British policy of leaving all 
its soldier dead in battlefield cemeteries, and the French erection of national cemeteries.  
Physical reminders needed to stand alongside those of associated partners if the world 
was to remember American sacrifice in WWI.  Not long after the war Pershing cabled 
Washington with his thoughts on where his soldiers should rest.  If the dead Americans 
“could speak for themselves, they would wish to be left undisturbed with their 
comrades,” Pershing opined.20 He added that remains could serve as “a perpetual 
reminder to our allies of the liberty and ideals upon which the greatness of America 
rests.”21  The final recommendation from the victorious general was that “none of our 
dead be removed from Europe.”22  Immediately following the war Pershing assigned 
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members of his staff to begin recording the official history of America’s part in the Great 
War, and ordered them to begin forming an American commemorative plan.23 
Pershing understood the power that physical reminders played in securing the 
legacy of sacrifice in war.  He envisioned a memorial landscape in the immediate 
aftermath of the war characterized by European and American sites of memory standing 
side-by-side.  Pershing was dismayed to see American units haphazardly placing their 
own rudimentary memorials on the French landscape.  He often felt that these 
memorials overly exaggerated the role that small units played in combat, diminished the 
memory of a unified American military effort, and offended local inhabitants.  To 
combat this, Pershing wrote the U.S. Army Chief of Staff in 1919 asking that the federal 
government take steps to control designs of U.S. monuments so that they not risk giving 
“diplomatic offense.”24  Diplomatic offense was a very real concern.  In 1921, a private 
American organization raised funds to purchase thirty-square feet of Parisian realty 
across from the Arc de Triomphe for the purpose of placing a billboard with the words, 
“We are it.”25  This American arrogance and “belittling” of a sacred French site 
thankfully never reached fruition.26  Ironically, evidence shows that Pershing’s 
draconian measures actually offended the French more than the memorials themselves.  
As the American government, through the War Department initially, attempted to 
control American commemoration in France, French communities often protested.   The 
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removal of American monuments that Washington deemed undesirable to the national 
narrative from small French towns often angered inhabitants.  A small village in the 
Meuse region of France protested against General Pershing in 1930 when he ordered the 
removal of a memorial placed by the American 361st Regiment in their town.  The 
villagers lodged a complaint with the French government to resist Pershing’s demands 
because they felt pride for their memorial and their American comrades.27  Episodes like 
this were common and often complicated.  Many French towns came to view their small 
American memorials fondly and felt a duty to maintain them, even long after memorial 
maintenance funds from privately backed monuments waned.  
The notion of diplomacy in the construction of memorials is not empty rhetoric.  
A key element of good monumentation is its ability to withstand the rigors of time.  The 
men assigned to General Pershing’s initial Battle Board, which became the American 
Battle Monuments Commission, understood the permanency of monuments and the 
reality that Americans would engage with the monuments on tours, but the French 
would live among them.  Therefore, careful thought needed to go into the selection of 
each American monument.  The monuments had to tell a balanced story of all American 
participants in the war, needed to show the unity of the American people, and needed to 
be inoffensive to the French.  Different perspectives on these sentiments came in the 
Congressional hearings leading up to the creation of the ABMC.   
Much of the testimony before Congress from proponents of a permanent 
memorial commission addressed the need to stop states and private individuals from 
working with the French outside of official American diplomatic channels to place 
                                                             





monuments on American battlefields.  These monuments created an unbalanced 
interpretation of American service in WWI—one that mainly reflected the depth of one’s 
pocketbook.  In this modern era, the federal government possessed the ability to stop 
the oversaturation of memorials in France.  American battlefields of the future would 
not resemble the monument fields of Antietam or Gettysburg.  Members of Pershing’s 
commemoration board extensively toured Antietam battlefield in Sharpsburg, Maryland 
to learn what to avoid on America’s WWI battlefields.  Going even further, Congress felt 
that, in modern America, “the public should not be bothered” about erecting 
monuments because it was now “clearly the duty of the Government to erect suitable 
memorials to its soldiers.”28  This sentiment reflects the gradual increase in power of the 
federal government following the Civil War into the industrial age. 
Another prominent feature of testimony for a monuments commission dealt with 
the international nature of such a commission’s work.  Many of the participants in the 
hearings stressed Pershing’s early view that monumentation of the Great War was 
primarily a diplomatic undertaking.  In order to prevent American donors from creating 
“disreputable, belittling, or hideous” monuments, the new commission needed among 
its membership at least one individual with an understanding of French culture.29  
Several speakers in the Congressional hearings called on Congress to show prescience 
and accept the inevitability of “contentions” between France and the United States as 
lengthy memorial construction projects began.30  Fear of contentious periods compelled 
several testifiers to call for inclusion of the Secretary of State Robert Lansing and the 
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American ambassador to France, Hugh Wallace to work on the commission.  These men 
had the best chance of understanding French tastes and knew how to engage in the 
diplomatic negotiations required in the acquisition of French land, labor, partnerships, 
and approval.31   
These prominent diplomatic officials never joined the commission.  Their 
absence is likely explained by Pershing’s chairmanship of the commission.  Being a 
career soldier, Pershing kept membership primarily in the realm of veterans.  Also, 
Pershing was as a Francophile who spent nearly half of each year of his retirement in 
France socializing with the country’s premier citizens and his much younger French 
companion.  Pershing’s commission also maintained a Paris office in the interwar years 
that was first within the American embassy itself, and then in property owned by the 
embassy.  This arrangement kept the ABMC in close contact with American diplomatic 
channels.  By all accounts, the ABMC’s World War I memorial plan succeeded at not 
offending French sensibilities.  The Commission worked closely with the Commission of 
Fine Arts to contract reputable American architectural firms, who appointed trusted 
sculptors.  Among the ABMC’s closest advisors during World War I construction was 
respected American architect Paul Cret.32  ABMC commissioners, Cret, and the 
Commission of Fine Arts reviewed the plans of all architects, voted their approval, and 
offered their revisions.   The ABMC’s sites of memory and shrines to the dead indeed 
“impressed, but did not annoy” foreign hosts.33  Some argue, however, that the ABMC’s 
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efforts to erect diplomatically suitable shrines masked the true United States. Instead of 
depicting a diverse, politically fractured, industrialized, and mass culture society, the 
ABMC put forth a representation of an anachronistic, preindustrial, and traditional 
America unrecognizable to Americans almost immediately after construction ended.34  
Shortly after WWI it was discovered that the most effective monuments, in terms 
of emotional power and desirability to visit, were the dead themselves.  The testimony of 
Walter McCoy, Chief Justice of D.C.’s Supreme Court, demonstrated the importance of 
American remains in the Congressional hearings to establish the ABMC.  McCoy 
accurately foretold the centrality of U.S. cemeteries in the war commemoration effort 
and warned Congress that present care for military cemeteries lagged far behind other 
allied powers.  Citing a recent report from the U.S. Commission of Fine Arts regarding 
the state of U.S. cemeteries in Europe, McCoy brought focus to the importance of 
cemeteries in commemoration.  The report told of the flagging condition of U.S. soldiers’ 
final resting places in France.  As it were, cemeteries appeared as “handkerchief’s spread 
out on the grass to dry,” their small white spot making no “vital relation to the great 
expanse of rolling country.”35  Visitors to American cemeteries, thus, had no chance of 
putting context to the visual sacrifice before them.  The cemeteries lacked connection to 
their nearest towns, the white cross tombstones sat in dull squares, and the cemeteries 
possessed a feeling of temporariness.36  McCoy urged the future ABMC to catch up with 
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Great Britain and France in regards to worthy commemoration.37  Cemeteries, not 
battlefield memorials needed to be the priority of the U.S. government.  Judge McCoy 
offered great foresight, stating that if “there is any monument in France that can ever be 
erected on the battlefields to compare for sentiment with a cemetery, then it will take a 
greater genius in art than I believe the world possesses.  Those are the monuments in 
France, those cemeteries that will stand for most and be visited by the most people from 
this country.”38   
Justice McCoy’s friend, and gold star father, attorney Fred Bentley from Chicago 
furthered McCoy’s cause during the next day’s hearings.  Bentley presented to the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs amendments to the ABMC legislation framed on McCoy’s 
argument.  These amendments explicitly categorized “military cemeteries on foreign soil 
as battle monuments” in themselves.39  As memorials, it ultimately fell upon the ABMC 
to “inspire in the people of Europe” the lofty and unselfish purpose of America in waging 
war” on their soil.40   Bentley went on to explain the evolution of cemeteries in the years 
immediately following the war.  Some 52,000 Americans stimulated by “the fire of war” 
and patriotism chose to give the “ashes” of their fallen Americans to a “great European 
monument.”41     Americans initially believed that all of the sacrificed remains were 
going to a single European cemetery—Suresnes was the likely frontrunner.  Early 
reports from U.S. bureaucrats assessing permanent burial sites noted that the Suresnes 
cemetery was one of the “most conspicuous landmarks in the environs of Paris” and that 
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it was “to be the gem among the American cemeteries.”42  Wilson had already shown the 
political uses a cemetery so close to Paris offered.   Pershing’s military team and 
Secretary of War Baker abandoned the single cemetery model rather quickly.  A single 
depository of American dead slighted American military sacrifices in countries other 
than France.  Cemeteries brought visitors, and the dead physically showed them 
American sacrifice.  Cemeteries became the primary monuments of major battlefields 
and American remains were accordingly exhumed and distributed through eight 
cemeteries—six in France, one in Belgium, and one in England.43  
 Classifying American military cemeteries as monuments is an important 
distinction.  America’s cemeteries from the Great War were, from the very beginning, 
considered monuments to mark battlefields.  The resting places of American soldiers in 
Europe were certainly cemeteries, but it was the intention of the federal government for 
them to quickly elevate to more.  Cemeteries often connote feelings of active spaces.  
Humans continually die and the living place them in cemeteries.  The death of 
Americans abroad from wounds received in the Great War was more-or-less over within 
a year after the armistice.  Additionally, once families decided on final resting places, 
interments ended.  These factors made American military cemeteries completed 
projects.  The placement of the final tombstone and planting of the final greenery 
transformed American resting places from cemeteries to monuments.  Any person 
unfamiliar with the American Battle Monuments Commission likely has no idea what 
function they actually perform on behalf of the American public because their name is a 
misnomer.  It is suggested nowhere in their name that remains or graves are cared for.  
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That is, unless it is understood that cemeteries are considered monuments. Although 
never explicitly stated, ABMC cemeteries are monuments, so are the graves that 
compose the cemetery. 
 
American Bodies in French Soil? 
The final disposition of American remains was not settled neatly when the ink on 
a military order or piece of legislation dried.  Nor was the debate exclusively limited to 
Americans.  French President Clemenceau’s 1919 Memorial Day promise that opened 
this chapter indicated that American sacrifices would live in perpetuity in French minds, 
and that they would take care of Americans’ final resting places “as piously and 
gratefully as the tombs of their own soldiers.” 44 This might sound to some like the 
hollow rhetoric of a political leader looking for favorable treatment by America in a time 
of great French need.  Yet, evidence shows more sincerity than emptiness in French 
hearts in the years immediately following war.  Many French citizens living close to 
battlefields desired having small American memorials in their towns, but their reverence 
for American military remains dwarfed this.  During the war, immediately after, and 
through much of the interwar period, a large portion of France venerated American 
graves.  Numerous accounts exist in news stories and personal reminisces about how the 
French demonstrated their gratitude for American sacrifice through care for American 
remains.  Americans frequently read stories of French school children visiting American 
military graves, or French women adopting graves and placing cards on American tombs 
                                                             




that read “Adoptee par Madame . . .”45  Even when French animosity towards America 
and Americans increased during the interwar years, as the next chapter shows, most of 
the French easily saw that dead American veterans had little to do with contemporary 
American policies—despite American officials’ attempts to animate them to do so. 
Ample evidence of French reverence towards American remains exists in records 
left by grateful Americans serving in various capacities overseas.  They witnessed 
firsthand French adoration for American dead.  Woodrow Wilson is himself an example 
of this. Upon returning from the Paris Peace talks, he frequently used his observations 
about French reverence for American dead as justification to leave remains abroad and 
as evidence that the U.S. belonged in the League of Nations.  Wilson told crowds of a 
common practice he witnessed of Frenchwomen adopting American graves and making 
themselves “mothers of those dear ghosts by putting flowers everyday upon those 
graves, taking them as their own sons.”46  He reassured crowds that if Americans could 
see such care and allow the “thought that comes out of those graves to penetrate their 
consciousness,” they would feel a moral obligation to take a place alongside other 
nations in a new world order.47  According to the first American cemetery 
superintendent at Suresnes, “the weather never became sufficiently stormy to stop the 
coming of the townsfolk, or their caring for the grave plots of Americans.”48 
A similar observation came from Mary Watkins, an American nurse in wartime 
France.  Watkins cited her firsthand experiences in Europe to The New York Times 
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urging mourning Americans to consider leaving their fallen to the care of the French.  
While travelling through small French towns on the Western Front she witnessed an old 
man who returned to his ruined home to find the grave of three Americans in his 
garden.  The impoverished farmer considered the Americans honored guests, decorated 
their gravestone with his rosary (the only possession he kept during his flight to safety), 
and prayed over their graves daily in thanks of their help liberating his small plot of 
land.  He was devastated when the Graves Registration Service removed the bodies to 
another burial site.  Similarly, Watkins told of a comrade who returned to one of her old 
aide stations the Memorial Day after the war to find a hillside of American graves 
looking like “one mass of blossoms” because the entire town uprooted every flower in 
their gardens to place on American graves.49  French children similarly showed 
veneration for American dead through their school curriculum.  French schools 
submitted essays their children wrote to the Fraternite Franco-Americaine who then 
published them in America and France.  A seven-year old French girl’s essay appeared 
in the American press.  She told of walking in the cemetery with her mother on Sundays 
and putting bouquets of flowers on American graves and pulling out any weeds she 
encountered.”50 
In the final month of World War I, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker recounted 
to an audience of prospective American war loan buyers interviews with French children 
that he recently read in the magazine The Independent.  Interviewers questioned French 
children about their feelings towards American soldiers for this article.  Baker reported 
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the following glowing examples of amicability:  “he is large and brave…very generous, he 
helps cut the kindling wood, he draws water for us at our house, they are learning 
French from us, they have come across the water to help our country and we love 
them.”51  Baker saw the viewpoint of a French child as the unfiltered and genuine view of 
all French people towards Americans.  Baker obviously chose these example in hopes of 
selling war bonds, but the continuation of this perception from Baker after the war 
suggests genuine belief in Franco-American camaraderie.  If the French showed such 
reverence for American doughboys in life, surely these sentiments could only grow in 
death. 
 
Photo1.3: French Children with American Flags in Suresnes American Cemetery, May 1921.  Source: 
Bibliothèque nationale de France, département Estampes et photographie, online archives.   
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Some French historians argue that anti-Americanism went through its “golden 
age” during the interwar years.52  Evidenced by the fact that the “wreaths woven for the 
boys of the Argonne and Saint-Mihiel had hardly wilted when reproaches and 
accusations began shooting off in France.”53  The spirit of cooperation to defeat the 
Central Powers gave way to transatlantic misunderstandings before the blood of the 
Western Front dried.54  This assessment holds some truth, although it needs slight 
amendment.  Evidence shows that major animosities between the two countries did not 
take place until later in the 1920s when unpopular American war debt policies and 
radicalized political protest became the norm in Paris.  In the years immediately 
following the Great War, as America constructed its national memory and discourse of 
military dead on French soil, misunderstandings between nations remained minor.  
Misunderstandings that did exist frequently dealt with the remarkably different war 
experience of each country. 
  The devastation that World War I brought to France cannot be overstated.  The 
most fighting was on French soil and France lost nearly five times the soldier dead in its 
lengthy battle of Verdun than the United States lost in the entirety of its WWI 
experience.  The French economy was ravaged, the populous collectively grieving, and 
the government anxious to protect its borders from future invasion in the immediate 
aftermath of the war.  Secretary of War Baker captured the melancholy of France in 
observations he made during his visit to the country in 1918 as the final offensive 
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launched, “all the women wear mourning, and even the girls wear mourning, from about 
ten years old up.  The country is draped in black.  I cannot now remember that I saw a 
single dress of white, or any color, except black.”55  Still, he went on to note that “the 
spirit of the country is wholly unbroken.”56  It is in this atmosphere of unremitting grief 
that the French government faced bombardment from Americans over their “56,000 
human lives instead of our 1,356,000.”57  France’s most pressing goal was not to focus 
on the dead, but the living.  President Paul Deschanel summed up his answer to France’s 
post-war problems in 1920, “in order to solve our social, constitutional, educational, 
economic, and diplomatic problems, before anything else, we must live.  Hence, France 
should fight against her low birth rate.  Youth, happy youth, must lead the way.” 58  The 
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way to lift the black shroud covering the country was through living.
 
Figure1.4: French Soldier annotating cross at Cemetery de Villers-aux-Bois, 1915. Source:  Bibliothèque 
nationale de France, département Estampes et photographie, online archives.   
 
Looking at the French perspective in this light shows the rationality behind the 
nation’s late 1918 decision to prohibit all exhumations from its soil for three years.  The 
French government, at the war’s conclusion, estimated that the bodies of some 4.5 
million soldiers decomposed in its soil.  French officials opted to keep these bodies 
where they rested for three years following January 1, 1919 for several reasons.  First, 
after four years of French mourning throughout WWI, the immediate exhumation of 
corpses would only prolong emotional depression and prohibit reconstruction.  French 
leaders felt that the constant movement of exhumation materials eastward and corpses 




removal of fresh corpses posed immediate threat of epidemic and pestilence.  And 
finally, it seemed unfair to French mourners to allow foreign nations to return their 
dead while France was in no position to do so itself.59  France was, however, willing to 
help other nations obtain permanent cemeteries for its dead on their soil while the three 
year ban existed.  Accounts from ABMC officials showed a willingness of French 
landowners to give the ABMC fair land prices for monuments, even though negotiations 
required bribery with barrels of wine in some instances.60  France’s reasoning for 
exhumation restrictions seems completely logical.  Nevertheless, the reception of this 
news initiated outrage in many American households.61 
Americans attacked France’s exhumation policies vehemently and often with a 
complete lack of humility.  How could the French nation, which owed its very survival to 
the American soldier, deny Americans their bodies?  Enough American protest reached 
the departments of State and War to force Washington to direct American diplomats to 
sway the minds of French representatives.  American diplomats appealed to the French 
government with tact.  They argued that, unlike European belligerents, American 
mourners lacked easy access to battlefields and cemeteries.  A grieving European 
mother’s trip to a grave was a short ride by train or automobile, while a grieving 
American’s involved weeks of expensive travel.62   American diplomats also offered the 
French government an explanation it might give to its people to rationalize repatriation 
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of American bodies. Of the 5,000,000 military dead in France, only a “small number 
were American soldiers.”63  Allowing the removal of this small segment of dead surely 
could not “seriously embarrass the French government.”64  America’s appeals eventually 
swayed the French legislature and the three year exhumation ban was shortened. 
Episodes of French care for American graves was already not adequate 
justification to many Americans for leaving war dead in alien soil even before France 
restricted exhumations.  Some Americans bitterly opposed any attempts to keep 
American dead abroad and formed groups like the “Bring Home Our Soldier Dead 
League.”  These associations viewed the French negatively and saw French anti-
exhumation legislation as despicable.  Where proponents of leaving remains abroad saw 
genuine care, groups who wanted remains brought home saw exploitation.  Members of 
the Bring Home the Soldier Dead League bombarded Secretary of State Robert Lansing 
with letters demanding the arrangement of return for all American dead.  Ella Boyd of 
Pittsburgh attested that she only demanded “what rightfully belonged to her [her son’s 
corpse]” and that their fallen soldiers should rest in the “country they fought so bravely 
for” not “France, where they never thought to lay.” Mrs. Boyd lamented to Secretary 
Lansing that she could rest only when her son was home.65  Another mother from 
Pennsylvania provided a similar plea, “It is not so [that] they would wish their remains 
to lie on foreign soil could they speak for themselves.  My own dear son who was but 17 
years of age wrote (Mother, I’ll be glad when we’re all together again, just wait patiently, 
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I’ll be home).”66  The State Department was inundated with similar letters following 
France’s exhumation stoppage.  The standardized response to these parents was 
sympathy and assurance that Secretary Lansing had initiated “diplomatic negotiations” 
with Paris to get the corpses moving again.67 
Many parents writing to the State Department requested only that their family 
member return home, providing no impetus.  Perhaps just as many went a step further 
and vocalized their main motivation for repatriation.  Many parents viewed France’s 
exhumation stoppage as nothing more than an economically motivated measure to hold 
American corpses hostage as tourist traps.  The mother of Lee Ackerman, a runner for 
the 319th Infantry, wrote from Homestead , PA that her son had done all a human can do 
for his country.  She begged the United States to “not allow France to make them 
[soldier dead] the attractions of tourists,” and cruelly turn her son’s resting place into a 
means to make money.68  In the same year, a grieving widow from Beardstown, Illinois 
castigated the State Department for bending to France’s will.  She informed Secretary of 
State Robert Lansing that it was “America’s sacred duty” to keep the promise made to 
bring home all bodies and added that it was “not for France to dictate to America” the 
policy of their own soldier dead.69  Another Pennsylvania mother begged Lansing to “not 
allow France to have her Paul’s body for sightseeing.”  She put her “trust in God that 
America may soon receive the bodies of our boys.”70 
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Multiple aspects of American animosity towards leaving American soldier dead 
abroad came from W.A. Beunle, a father from Pittsburgh.  Beunle rhetorically posed the 
following question to Secretary Lansing, “he was an American with American blood 
running through his veins, why should he be deserted by us and our government and left 
sleeping on the other side?”  He then indicted that American social inequality as the 
reason his son’s body was stuck in France.  It was wealthy Americans who sacrificed 
nothing in the war that wanted American corpses left abroad in Buenle’s mind.  “As the 
old saying of some of these birds (not men) who did not lose anybody in the war goes, 
‘Let them sleep where they fell.’  This saying is not the truth.”  Finally, Buenle’s wrath 
turned to the greedy French.  From his assessment, “the majority of the bodies have 
been removed and placed in a large plot where hotels are being built to accommodate 
the tourists.”  The majority of tourists being “the rich people who lost none but just for 
curiosity sake [go to France] to see the ruins and brave boys who lost their lives.”  In the 
meantime, Americans like Buenle, “the poor people (yes the poor) can stay at home and 
look at the picture and never have an opportunity to lay one flower on his or her 
grave.”71  This is a truly heartbreaking assessment of the repatriation issue that shows 
reverberations in people’s lives.  His letter reveals that Buenle felt helpless from his self-
described position as a poor man in a seemingly unforgiving domestic and international 
system.  Thankfully, a coffin eventually made its way back to the Buenle’s in Pittsburgh. 
As moving as some of these American petitions to the State Department are, 
many of their attacks appear misplaced and driven by more emotion than rationality.  It 
is certain that American corpses in French soil would bring Yankee dollars.  A study by 
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the War Department acknowledged the certainty that “extortion and profiteering might 
be found among merchants and innkeepers in the vicinity of some of the hundreds of 
American burial places in France.”72  The desire to make money when an opportunity 
showed itself was inherent in human nature.  However, on the whole, the War 
Department found that it was “not true that there exists now in France any generally 
prevalent effort to capitalize financially on American burial places.”73  If anything, the 
French had shown opposition to American tourism to battlefields and cemeteries 
because those excursions wasted coal and gasoline that was in short supply throughout 
France.74   Archival evidence suggests that, if anyone was tying tourism to American 
cemeteries, it was the American government.  American parents wary of having their 
boy’s or daughter’s body frequented by tourists largely had policies of their own 




Bodies as Tourist Attractions 
The desire to draw Americans into France to experience the sacrifice displayed in 
their military cemeteries commonly revealed itself in the early commemorative plans.   
The emergence of America as a modern-nation state largely explains this.  
Industrialization in the United States brought rapid technological advancements.  These 
advancements drastically altered traditional American culture.  At the start of the 
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twentieth century, America rapidly evolved from a land of island communities into an 
integrated nation with a mass culture.75  Tourism emerged as an integral piece of this 
new culture.  Throughout the early twentieth century a more powerful federal 
government, prosperity, and transportation developments brought improved 
infrastructure that drastically shrank Americans’ world.  Some consider the interwar 
years the birth of the modern American tourist industry.  Tourism in this period went 
far beyond the modern phenomenon of paying for an experience that not everyone has 
access to.  Americans viewed touring an essential part of discovering their nation and 
understanding their place within it.  Touring was a “patriotic duty.”76  The demand to 
experience America through travel led to the creation of tourists’ towns and attractions 
built around major highways and railways.  Through tourism, Americans began to 
associate their democratic freedom with the ability to travel and experience all that their 
nation offered.77  The nature of this new tourism was not as democratic as it appeared.  
It primarily was an experience created by private and public promoters for white, 
native-born, middle to upper middle class Americans to reaffirm American-ness 
through carefully produced landscapes.78 
Many Americans during this period chose to experience their own country rather 
than travelling abroad.  Multiple factors led to this decision.  Foreign travel required 
considerable financial resources and large amounts of time—luxuries that the average 
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American did not have.  Perhaps more important than finances, there was an 
overwhelming sense of American exceptionalism in the period.  Americans wanted to 
see their own country.  Why see the old world in Europe when you could see true roots 
of human civilization at home?  Ancient remnants of native cultures, natural wonders, 
American battlefields, and sites where famous Americans lived and died were more 
sacred to a red-blooded American than anything available overseas.   
American involvement in the Great War not only pushed America into the 
political world stage, but also increased the spread of Americans and their culture 
throughout the world.  France particularly saw an influx of Americans following the 
Great War, specifically Paris.  When American troops returned home from European 
battlefields the number of Americans permanently living in Paris stood at around 8,000.  
Through the early to mid-1920s, this swelled to between thirty and forty-thousand.79  
Americans went to Paris for different reasons and were a far more varied group than the 
mythologized “lost generation” authors like Ernest Hemingway or F. Scott Fitzgerald.  
Some American intellectuals certainly did go to escape the choking hold of mindless 
American mass culture.  A thriving African American community also embraced Paris 
for its social openness, creating a Harlem in Montmartre.80  Paris offered African 
Americans the ability to live as full citizens, something Jim Crow America did not.  
Others simply saw Paris as a place where their dollars bought more, alcohol flowed, and 
sex was readily available.  By-and-large, Americans in Paris lived their lives as 
Americans.  Although immersed in a different culture, they retained their own as well—
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celebrating their own holidays, joining American clubs, frequenting American themed 
bars, and enrolling their kids in the organizations like the Boy Scouts.81   
It is within this unique post-war environment that the American Battle 
Monuments Commission initiated its commemoration efforts.  Its possession of military 
remains gave the commission pieces of home that Americans abroad could travel to, 
fulfilling the same patriotic duty that domestic tourism presented at home.  Leaders in 
the commission envisioned their sites in Europe as locations that Americans, and 
foreigners, alike would choose as the destination for travel plans.  Attention to creating a 
tourist industry appeared in the initial testimony to establish the ABMC and came 
through in its early work. 
 A bill proposed to Congress as an alternative to what became the American Battle 
Monuments Commission encapsulates the tourism element of commemoration.  Backed 
by members of the American Scenic and Historic Preservation Society from New York, 
the American Memorial Highway Commission proposed a WWI commemorative plan 
built around memorial highways in France and Belgium.82 This commission advocated 
working with the governments of France and Belgium to construct new, or use existing, 
highways in these nations that followed American military advances.  These highways 
themselves would serve as memorials to American participation in the war, but also 
allow Americans to follow the advances of the American Expeditionary Forces from the 
comfort of an automobile.  The commission also proposed to allow veterans groups to 
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erect their own monuments along each road.  The commission would do its part by 
placing interpretive markers at appropriate waysides.83  This bill failed, largely because 
of diplomatic concerns.  Congress felt that America had no authority to dictate to France 
and Belgium where to build their own roads and how to use them.  The upkeep of the 
memorial highways also seemed likely to generate significant financial burdens.  
Additionally, the likelihood of the French embracing major highways called “Lincoln 
Highway” or “Roosevelt Highway” through their country bordered on insanity.  
Representative Cockran from New York asked testifiers how Americans would feel if 
France or England came to the United States and demanded commemorative roads be 
built on their behalf?84 Another glaring absence in this bill was a plan for military 
cemeteries, which was featured prominently in the ABMC bill.  Although the highway 
bill never passed, many of the ABMC’s commemorative plans for WWI enticed pilgrims 
with highway tourism while en route to the cemeteries. 
 The officers of General Pershing’s staff that pitched the idea of the ABMC to 
Congress felt that roads existed in France already sufficient for Americans to travel to 
battlefields.  A colonel testified in 1922 that he assumed an “enormous number of 
Americans would visit the battle fields of France.”85  French roads already permitted 
these Americans to travel from “Paris to the Rhine in a day and see all these things on 
the battle roads.”86  The ABMC envisioned travel to these battlefields functioning much 
like trails through National Parks in the United States.87  As stated earlier, the predicted 
increase in tourists correlated with expectations of visitations to remains.  Cemeteries 
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were the top priority of the U.S. government, but it was forecast that the “people of 
America will not be satisfied merely with providing a God’s acre for the bodies of the 
dead.”88  When Americans came, which they would, the ABMC felt they had to stand 
ready with an accurate history to share and travel suggestions.  Finished American 
monuments in France would not be completed until the 1930s, but already Americans 
came to see graves and experience the battlefields where doughboys died.  The only 
guidance these Americans had in most cases came from the guidebooks written from the 
perspective of the French and English.  According to Pershing’s men, “without accusing 
them [foreign guidebooks] of prejudice, they do not tell the correct details of what went 
on and what actually happened because of ignorance.”89  American passenger ship lines 
were similarly hiring French officers as tour guides for Americans seeking to visit the 
battlefields.  These French guides often “regaled tourists with misinformation.”90 Major 
Xenophon Price, who became the ABMC’s first secretary, recommended that funding for 
accurate historical research to begin “as soon as possible” so that American participants 
of World War I, and their families, have an American narrative on hand for battlefield 
visits in their lifetime.91 
Much of the rush for an American perspective of the battlefields came from 
ongoing American tourist trips and from anticipation of large American tour groups 
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travelling to cemeteries in the future.  In 1927, the American Legion planned a massive 
gathering in Paris, and in 1930, federally funded pilgrimages to cemeteries began for an 
estimated 17,000 Gold Star Mothers.92  The man tasked to write the ABMC’s first 
guidebook was Dwight D. Eisenhower, a young major who had just missed overseas 
service during World War I.  Eisenhower’s job was to prepare a brief history of the 
A.E.F., provide information on American monuments, and to place detailed battlefield 
tours in the hands of American pilgrims.  Eisenhower wrote in his preface that his work 
was “for the convenience of the tourists” and almost exclusively dealt with American 
forces (although he tactfully acknowledged the importance of allies).93  The guidebook 
offered not only a history, but also denoted a feeling of “pleasure touring,” suggesting 
lodging, necessity of packing lunch, how to break up the day into manageable outings, 
travel times, and suggested priority for stops.94  Eisenhower’s guidebook was an instant 
success.  The 20,000 copies printed sold out in less than a year—about three-percent of 
them purchased on American ships sailing to Europe.95  Demand remained so high for 
the guidebook that an expanded and more widely circulated version was released several 
years after the original.  In preparation of the updated guidebook, the ABMC’s 
administrative secretary, Xenophon Price, tested the accuracy of information the ABMC 
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provided tourists in 1927.  Price personally followed the itineraries provided and was 
wholly disappointed with the product the ABMC offered tourists.  He wrote to Pershing 
in 1928 that road directions needed to be completely re-written and that “errors were 
the rule rather than the exception.”  Many of the mistakes he found inexcusable.  Among 
the most glaring was the guidebook’s marking of a German cemetery.  Price travelled to 
the point on the road where the German cemetery should have been, but only saw a 
French “vineyard with clearly placed black posts.”  He was “highly suspicious” that the 
ABMC staffer who penned the itinerary lazily accepted grape vine stakes as headstones 
without close inspection.96  This instance shows the lack of attention initially shown to 
graves of former enemies.  
 
                                                             





Photo 1.5: General Pershing giving ABMC Commissioners personal tour of Fort de la Pompelle in the early 
1920s.  Source:  Thomas North Papers, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA. 
 
Despite Price’s criticisms of the early American guidebook, it gave American 
tourists an invaluable travel companion for World War I battlefield touring.  It also 
stayed true to the goal of getting visitors to the American remains.  Even though the 
cemeteries remained works in progress as tourists came to Europe, the guidebook 
reminded Americans of their patriotic duty.  Everyone enjoyed leisurely tours, but “no 
American who travels to Europe should fail to visit” the sacred sites.  If this message was 
not enough to incite guilt in Americans considering not going the cemeteries, the 




government “conveniently located the cemeteries near routes most tourists naturally 
follow.”97  Suresnes proved to be a veritable tourist magnet.  The Washington Star 
reported in 1927 that 26,000 Americans visited Suresnes as of September of that year.  
The paper concluded that the American military cemetery in Suresnes was an 
“attraction for American tourists which vies with the cabarets of Montmartre” and 
“shows how strong is the drawing power of this field of honor against the gay attractions 
of Paris.”98 ABMC sites further away from Paris apparently drew less visitors—surely 
because of difficulties securing travel and lodging.  General Pershing likely felt little 
sympathy for American tourists complaining about ease of travel to more distant ABMC 
sites because cemetery pilgrimages were a patriotic duty.  Apparently a duty which was 
not one to which sufficient Americans jumped to fulfill.  In a 1934 National Geographic 
Magazine article attributed to General Pershing, he urged Americans to come see 
America’s fallen and promised wary tourists of the “beautiful and comfortable” 
reception rooms built for the “convenience of visitors” that awaited them.99  Pershing’s 
plea indicates that his ABMC’s shrines to American remains were not drawing the 
visitors anticipated.  One possible explanation for this is that the ABMC’s commitment 
to diplomacy created commemoration much too traditional to capture the sensibility of 
a rapidly modernizing American society.100  The economic hardships suffered by 
Americans during the Great Depression also severely limited the ability for the average 
American to travel abroad. 
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In addition to the attempts to bring American tourists abroad to visit American 
remains, the ABMC also sought to forge a specific memory of World War I by writing its 
official history.  While a staff of Army officers worked to write the official guidebook and 
history for the ABMC throughout the 1920s, the ABMC also maintained a staff of 
historians to write official unit histories for each American combat division in World 
War I.  The archival remnants of this project offers historians one of the richest 
collections of World War I memories in existence.  The chief architect of the official 
histories was the ABMC’s secretary Xenophon Price.  Price was a scholarly man with 
intimate knowledge of all major A.E.F. military operations during World War I—he 
served as Pershing’s chief mapmaker.  The guidebook and unit histories were ABMC 
monuments in themselves, intended to stand the test of time and be the definitive 
sources for information in the future.  Just as Price accepted no mistakes in the 
guidebook, and was angered when he found them, the unit histories needed the upmost 
accuracy.   
Price and his team of historians acted as gatekeepers of memory when putting 
together the guidebook and unit histories.101  The ABMC’s historical team used after 
action reports and other primary source documents to piece together as much of the 
complicated history of American combat operations as possible.  The massive scale of 
American offensives in the Great War, and the near constant shifting of ground required 
the ABMC historians to go beyond the official reports.  Correspondence with officers 
present during specific engagements became a necessity.  As fragile as memories of 
chaotic fighting were, Price’s team had to rely on veterans memories to verify their 
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interpretations and fill in analytical gaps.   When Price corresponded with A.E.F. 
veterans to receive their recollections, he took steps to guide their memories towards the 
heroic and controlled narrative of the Great War that the ABMC desired—the same 
narrative visible on its commemorative landscape in Europe.  This was a narrative of 
order, control, and unified sacrifice.  Price’s historical team initiated a correspondence 
with veterans in a regimented fashion.  They sent American veterans a standardized 
form letter that asked basic tactical questions.  If the ABMC historian had already 
written a narrative of the event and only wanted confirmation, the completed narrative 
would be included along with a map of the terrain for the veteran to mark his 
movements on the field.    A letter to Lieutenant Colonel Frank Burnett, an American 
officer who was present for the first German raid on American troops in the Great War, 
gives a good example of the ABMC’s tactics.  In this letter, Price included an essay 
written by ABMC historians entitled “The First Raid on American Troops” for the officer 
to read and comment upon.102  Burnett was “personally engaged in the encounter” and 
the ABMC wanted him to give “any comments or criticisms” the he cared to share about 
their essay.103  The ABMC also wanted him to make any appropriate marks on their 
“photostatic copy of the trench system present during the raid.”104  Burnett was assured 
by Price that “no comment or criticism” would be “unimportant or not of interest in 
[their] research.”105 
Price’s team corresponded with veterans with total respect, but took effort to 
keep his memory in the ABMC’s realm.  By including a written narrative of the 
                                                             







engagement, the historians at the ABMC gave the veteran something that would interact 
with his memories and keep them on track.  The inclusion of a map of Burnett’s trench 
system helped bind his memory to one small section of one battlefield.  Upon receiving 
the ABMC’s inquiry Burnett immediately doubted his memory of events nearly a decade 
past and forwarded the ABMC inquiry to comrades for their memories and recollections 
so he could test the accuracy of his own memories.  In the end those individuals that 
Burnett shared his memories with agreed that “in short, your memory serves you 
correctly. . .”106  This affirmation allowed Burnett to confidently make very slight 
alterations to specifics of company designations made in the ABMC’s report, but 
ultimately confirm to Price that he “found no other errors in the summary.”107  This 
exchange shows a very efficient process adopted by the ABMC history section, but also 
gives some indication that the ABMC was pushing their own interpretation on veterans 
they spoke with. 
Sometimes the ABMC’s inquiries brought forth memories that did not remain 
within the framework that the government wanted.  Other officers, involved in the same 
raid that Burnett was, chose to go into much more detail with their responses to Price.  
William McLaughlin, another participant of the raid, provided an incredibly detailed 
account that highlighted the inherent confusion of trench warfare and the lack of glory 
in battle.  McLaughlin began his account of the German raid by describing their initial 
shelling of the American position:  “the first shell came in. . .it was followed by two more 
in quick succession and these two were followed by three more, and then—CHAOS.”108  
The concussion of these exploding shells knocked McLaughlin to the ground and he 
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admitted to experiencing “violent spells of nausea.”109  Once he was able to regain his 
composure he remembered becoming alert and “squirming out from under Corporal 
Gresham who had been killed by being shot between the eyes. . .,” after this he took a 
drink from his canteen “which seemed to be the most important thing in the world at 
the time.”110  He then began moving through the trench system to assess the situation, 
walking over American casualties.  His memory then focused vividly on the violent scene 
in the trench.  He recollected a stairway “red with blood, and American and German 
equipment scattered all over the place.”111  One of the American rifles was broken at the 
stock and partially covered “with blood and hair.”112  
 This account recreated the chaos of war effectively, and it appeared to be 
extremely accurate.  McLaughlin still had his field message book from the night in his 
possession, and demonstrated in his narrative that he had communicated with other 
Americans involved in the raid to verify his memories.  He also submitted a photograph 
of the American soldiers that the German’s captured in the raid.  This version of warfare 
was not totally represented in the ABMC’s cemeteries—they acted more as shrines to 
peace than representations of actual warfare.  While historically important, 
McLaughlin’s account had little value to the ABMC’s official history.  They were 
courteous of his response nonetheless, stating that “your extremely interesting 
comments will make a valuable addition to the files [emphasis added] of the 
Commission and will be of material assistance in making final decisions on this 
matter.”113  McLaughlin’s message was both useful and powerful, but it strayed from the 









established discourse of the dead.  American tourists would not find McLaughin’s 




Photo 1.6: General Pershing giving ABMC Commissioners personal tour of ruins at Monfaucon in the 
early 1920s.  Source:   Thomas North Papers, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA. 
 
Conclusion 
All combatants of the Great War possessed large numbers of military dead at the 




among combatants as a unique case for the commemoration of its dead.114  When 
American families said their goodbyes to service members going overseas they expected 
to see them again someday, hopefully alive, but possibly as corpses.  The wholesale 
return of American soldier dead never happened, however.  Not wanting American 
sacrifice for Europe to be forgotten, American military and political leaders formulated 
ways to mark American exploits on European soil.  Most of these plans involved the 
addition of military remains.  Only with American bodies could a powerful vocalization 
of American sacrifice and plans for future relations be articulated.  As American 
commemorative plans evolved, the modern American government asserted itself as the 
official architect of American memory.  Demands of U.S. citizens forced the government 
to offer all grieving families a choice of final disposition of their dead.  After final 
decisions, the American government maintained possession of approximately 31,000 
bodies.  These remains became a precious commodity distributed in ways deemed 
appropriate for commemorating the American war effort in its entirety.  Cemeteries 
became indistinguishable from other monuments.  The cemeteries and the bodies within 
served as the lure to attract visitors and stand as sites of diplomatic memory for the 
future. 
The burial of American military remains abroad is not a story capable of telling 
with only Americans.  American cemeteries and memorials on French soil required 
French assistance.  The French played a major role in the establishment of these 
cemeteries.  French promises to care for and respect American remains in their soil for 
the remainder of time, coupled with real displays of French care for American graves, 
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moved many Americans to leave their bodies overseas.  French reverence for American 
dead similarly gave American decision makers a platform to articulate diplomatic 
aspirations.  Many Americans viewed French promises as hollow, however.  
Organizations formed in the United States in response to widespread beliefs that France 
only wanted American dead for their own benefit.  Dead American soldiers might bring 
tourists’ money and ensure that if attacked again, the American military would not wait 
until the final hour to come to France’s aid.  American distrust of France seems 
somewhat displaced in this period.  It was the American government that pushed for 
control of remains more so than the French.  It was also the American commemorative 
machine that placed its WWI bodies at the center of tourism plans.   
 Once the permanency of American military cemeteries was established and a 
discourse of American sacrifice present in France, politicians in both France and the 
United States engaged the discourse to confront one another as relations changed 
throughout the twentieth century.   The mid 1920s through the start of WWII saw some 
of the highest tensions between the two nations. During this period, both French and 
American politicians frequently navigated the discourse of American sacrifice created by 
American war remains to strengthen their arguments against one another and to 
demonstrate friendship.  Foreign policy objectives and relationships between nations 
are not static and move through good times and bad.  Corpses do not have the luxury of 
self-mobility, however.  They remain interred whatever the current circumstance.  The 
interwar years in France placed American war dead in one of the most chaotic and 
unfriendly periods in the Franco-American relationship.  Wilson’s death brought pause 
to the liberal world order he dreamed of achieving.  Conservatives led the United States 




came to serve more as an aggressive means to combat the rising tide of socialist political 





II. Politicizing God’s Acres in 1920s France 
And wheresoe’er these white-cross shadows fall, 
There are our “Fields of Honor”; for when’er 
Earth drew our dying soldiers to herself 
Soldiers enlisted in Earth’s cause of right 
She gave the ground they touched to their own land: 
White acres added to America1 
 
Once the final disposition of American military remains took place, and the 
erection of the official U.S. WWI commemorative program began, these sacred sites 
underwent further politicization. This chapter demonstrates the early political uses of 
American World War I dead in France through the volatile 1920s.  It assesses the uses of 
American memory as a diplomatic tool by analyzing the utility of memory during times 
of anti-American protest.  Looking at the way American memory was used to by leaders 
to address protest surrounding war debt and communist protest in France through the 
1920s ultimately shows that the liberal memory that Wilson crafted for American dead 
evolved into a more proactive weapon for conservatives to wield in the 1920s. 
Throughout the 1920s various iterations of political protest thrived in France, 
most of them directed against the United States.  When war reparation policies of the 
United States and Great Britain seemingly benefitted Germany more so than France, 
right-wing veterans groups in France mobilized in protest of the United States.  These 
French veteran’s groups occupied their sacred spaces in Paris in an effort to inspire 
American veterans to appeal to the leaders to change policies.  The extreme right fascists 
groups in France engaged in less restrained protest and blatantly attacked Americans in 
Paris.  Some leaders in the United States fabricated stories of French desecration of 
                                                             




American graves in order to illicit more aggressive Congressional policies towards 
France. 
In the first month of the Great War’s final year, America’s Consul in Paris, Tracy 
Hollingsworth Lay, telegraphed Washington his assessment of France’s political and 
economic situation.  Lay’s analysis focused primarily on the different French political 
factions and the future stability of the nation.  Nearing his conclusion, he aptly 
summarized the way America needed to approach France diplomatically moving 
forward.  “Their country is the strategic heart of the allied cause and must be nurtured 
with corresponding tenderness and care,” Lay said.    Furthermore, the turmoil of war 
and recent Russian political upheaval created momentous changes in all segments of 
French society.  Lay warned Washington that it would be unwise “should the allies fail to 
realize that they must in subtle ways so shape their acts as to win their cause before the 
unknown offspring of the spirit now germinating in the debris, rises forth to proclaim its 
birth” in France.2  Consul Lay saw the inevitability of significant changes in Europe 
following the Great War.  French support for America was a prerequisite if Washington 
wished to involve itself in European affairs after aiding in victory.  France was the 
gateway to continental Europe and there was little chance, from an American 
perspective, of sustaining a positive Franco-American diplomatic relationship if 
communist revolutionaries took control of Paris.  Lay’s plan to “shape their [French] 
acts through subtle ways” sums up America’s diplomatic strategy towards France 
throughout the twentieth century.3   
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The transfer of America’s memory of its sacrifice for Europe through military 
remains would fulfill Lay’s hopes for subtle diplomacy in France.4  Memory proved itself 
a cultural product capable of transfer much less obtrusive to foreigners than other forms 
of culture such as consumerism or popular culture. While a concerted effort came from 
Washington to create a specific memory of American sacrifice on sites of memory 
abroad, there was also an organic draw to these cemeteries.  American political and 
military leaders did not force French women to visit its military cemeteries and decorate 
graves.  Nor were French spectators made to attend American memorial ceremonies.  
French came to these sites voluntarily to show thanks for American support in the war.  
It was reported on Memorial Day in 1921 that the “French took part in every ceremony, 
and in places where there was only a single grave.”5  Often American delegations could 
only send one representative to isolated burial sites, but in these instances, the French 
seemingly always supplied a crowd of mourners.  In one French village a local priest led 
“the school children to an isolated American grave” that they had guarded and cared for 
as if it belonged to them.”6  This kind of account replayed frequently throughout the 
twentieth century in France—and still does to this day.  The natural draw of these 
cemeteries made them suitable locations for restrained diplomacy.   American military 
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remains tempered French perceptions of Uncle Sam by utilizing the positive memories 
most French assigned to the American soldiers who sacrificed to save their nation. The 
continued presence of American military dead in French soil demanded treatment with 
the utmost tenderness and care.  American military dead represented a fighting force 
when alive, but transformed into more peaceful representations in death.  The 
aggressive memory of a fighting force was resurrected at times in the 1920s.  
 A Memorial Day ceremony on the grounds of Suresnes in 1921 showed the 
positive bond that American military dead forged in the early interwar period.  It also 
confirmed understanding from an American diplomat that remains fulfilled the kind of 
bond that consular Lay espoused. American Ambassador Hugh Wallace, and France’s 
heralded Marshal Pétain, concentrated most of their commemorative remarks on where 
American military dead should rest.  The reason for this focus was the ongoing 
finalization of American repatriation decisions.  This was Wallace’s final Memorial Day 
speech abroad before Ohio politician Myron T. Herrick took over as his replacement.  
Wallace held little back in his address to an international audience.   He lamented on the 
“mistake” America had made in allowing families to pull soldier dead from their “sleep 
in the soil of France.”7  He understood a mother’s desire to want her son back, however, 
feared that most chose repatriation out of grief without fully considering the larger 
implications of overseas burial.  Could the mothers see France’s willingness to 
perpetually keep American graves green through their love, they no doubt would leave 
them resting in France’s “fields of honor.”8  Marshal Pétain reiterated Wallace’s 
sentiments, expressing his “infinite regret” in seeing “American graves depart one by 
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one from the soil of France.”9  It was the American remains, according to Pétain, that 
created the “basis of an eternal friendship.”10  Without graves to perpetually visit, the 
French could only guard fleeting memories of the common hope and fighting spirit they 
shared with America during the Great War.11  Physical corpses offered a reminder more 
tangible than lingering memories. The rhetoric of these two influential diplomatic 
figures bordered on the overdramatic. The cemetery was not emptying before their eyes 
and not all American bodies in the ground at Suresnes had a trans-Atlantic ticket tacked 
to their headstone.  Still, the prospect of a future without American dead in French soil 
was undesirable to these influential speakers.  On this Memorial Day, mourning took 
place not just for the dead, but for the loss of the dead.  The words of Ambassador 
Wallace and Marshal Pétain showed that American corpses in France offered both 
nations a feeling of security.  The presence of the dead indicated to Pétain an American 
investment in France’s future.  To Wallace, France’s desire to entomb Americans 
verified an acceptance of America’s presence in Europe.   
French news indicates that many French attended American memorial 
ceremonies, but did not fully understand these aggressive foreign commemorative 
efforts. France itself was a culture that highly valued its past and dead, evident from its 
own post-war commemorative practices and in the overwhelming acceptance of 
American war dead.12   French news reporters covering the Suresnes ceremony, 
nonetheless, related the foreignness of America’s Memorial Day practices.  Conservative 
newspaper La Gaulois reported that Americans had the “highest degree of a cult of 
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remembrance,” devoting an entire day to “the worship of their dead soldiers” each 
year.13  This practice was not new, Americans had worshiped military dead for half a 
century.  It was perfectly reasonable for Americans to fervently participate in such a 
somber day in their own country. Yet, strangely, in the twentieth century this cultish 
ceremony appeared to be “celebrated with as deep a fervor” in France as in America.14 
Americans had gone from a tourist presence to major cultural force in France in less 
than a decade.  American devotion to its soldier dead seemed infectious to the French.  
Alongside the entire “American colony in Paris” that traveled to Suresnes to mourn each 
year stood countless French.15  French and American soldiers served in the honor guard, 
French and American flags adorned the American graves, and bands played both 
national anthems. It was clear why Americans traveled to these ceremonies, but more 
difficult to understand French participation.  French reporters discerned that something 
about these ceremonies seemed to help French participants place themselves in the 
modern world. The resting places of American soldiers acted as spaces to espouse both 
Americanism and Frenchness.  The two powerful democracies found common ground in 
the memory of American dead despite political or social differences. 
 Weekly reports from America’s Paris embassy reveal that American holidays 
aside from Memorial Day broke into French culture also.  It was reported that the first 
Fourth of July after the war was “celebrated in France with a brilliancy which is said had 
never before marked a foreign anniversary commemorated on French soil.” 16  
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Ceremonies in honor of America’s birthday took place throughout Paris including the 
review of France-American troops by President Poincare on the Place De la Concorde. 
Several celebrations concluded with “pilgrimages to the tombs of Americans.”17  
American embassy officials saw French celebrating another nation’s birthday as a 
“remarkable demonstration of French official and popular friendship for America.”18 
Although massive in itself, the French July 4th celebration served mainly as a “prelude to 
the French celebration of victory on July 14th to which 4 million francs had been 
appropriated for festivities.”19   
 Interacting with World War I memory in France was not wholly an American 
experience.  A receptive audience of foreigners engaged with American sites of memory, 
and Americans engaged frequently with French sites of memory. Reciprocation was a 
crucial element of the commemorative machine.   Americans also participated in French 
commemoration and venerated French soldier dead.  American tourists, veterans, and 
government officials frequently laid wreaths at the Arc de Triomphe in respect of 
France’s unknown poilu.  American ambassadors participated in dedication ceremonies 
of French war monuments.  France’s Trench of Bayonets memorial to the 3rd Company, 
137th French Infantry Regiment, a group of men collectively buried alive within an 
imploded trench during the Battle of Verdun, showed the functionality of memory in 
diplomatic relations.  Private American banker, George F. Rand donated to the French 
government 500,000 francs to erect a fitting monument after he visited the French 
mass grave and saw that relic hunters had already begun looting the site.20  To Rand, 
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and the French, the remains at this site captured the essence of France’s war experience.  
At the crucial hour of combat, France was not broken.  The French soldiers killed in this 
trench stood forever ready to jump into battle.  The bayonets of their still shouldered 
rifles sprung from the soil as proof.  Although a French monument, American financial 
support made the site somewhat Franco-American. When the large, yet minimalist, 
monument protecting the burial trench underwent dedication in December 1920 many 
American dignitaries participated.  
 Ambassador Wallace served as America’s primary representative during the day.  
Wallace’s dedicatory address acknowledged that Verdun was France’s own battlefield, 
that she “faced the Hun alone,” and that the civilization saving victory could be “shared 
by none.”21  Wallace continued his praise of France, yet humbly placed a token of 
America on the field in thanks—a memorial stone from America symbolizing “gratitude 
and eternal national friendship.”22  This was the type of subtle gesture to nurture 
relations Consul Lay hinted to in the years prior.  America could assert itself on the 
French memorial landscape in a respectful and non-threatening manner.  French 
reporters indicated an understanding of the newness of dual Franco-American 
participation in each other’s’ memorial practices.23  The diplomacy of memory offered 
nations a medium to show powerful connections without the dominant undertones 
found in economic or military relations. The memory of war dead found at the Trench of 
Bayonets functioned as one type of diplomatic glue between the two nations, just as 
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American dead had in Suresnes.  As tensions between the United States and France 
increased over the following years sites of memory remained places to comment on 
mutual threats to their security.
 
Photo 2.1: Ambassador Hugh Wallace delivering address at Trench of Bayonets, 1920.  Source: 
Bibliothèque nationale de France, département Estampes et photographie, online archives. 
 
 
Rising Tensions:  War Debt and American Enslavers 
American leaders, like Wilson, frequently cited the friendliness of French soil as 
justification for leaving American soldier dead abroad and maintaining positive 
relations.  This idealistic comprehension of soil’s friendliness in 1919 did not come with 




contributions to the World Wars, cultural misunderstanding and political disagreement 
dominated Franco-American relations.  France’s top diplomat in the United States 
during World War I, André Tardieu, dispelled the myth of American friendship in a 1927 
publication. Tardieu wrote of the Franco-American relationship as one with “short 
periods of political cooperation—less than ten years in all, out of one hundred and 
forty—[that] were the result not of sentiment, but of interest; and that as soon as 
interest lapsed, sentiment did not suffice to maintain cooperation.”24  Both countries 
turned to one another for support only when their livelihood depended on it.  Between 
brief interludes of friendship, a distrust festered between the nations that frequently 
erupted into heightened periods of anti-Americanism in France brought about by 
“exceptional” events.25    It is during the exceptional periods of heightened Franco-
American tensions that the soft power of memory became more of a necessity in 
diplomatic relations.   
 Public memories of American military remains offered French and American 
leaders opportunities to rhetorically frame commitments to one another following 
World War I.  Yet, the memory of remains proved somewhat apolitical in the years 
immediately succeeding the Great War.  The rhetoric of the dead found an audience, but 
the relationship between France and the United States was stable enough that the 
memory of American dead served more as an articulation of foreign policy hopes and 
less as a weapon.  Growing French anti-Americanism in the mid to late 1920s regarding 
war debt and treatment of left-wing ideology made U.S. leaders forcefully wield the 
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memory of U.S. sacrifice for France. A battle for a future of Old World or New World 
domination had begun.  Because Americans represented the New World belligerent in 
the battle, all things American took on symbolic meaning, including the dead.  Both 
American and French war dead turned into ways to engage with the other’s culture.  
Perceived insults to the living was acceptable, because the living maintained an ability to 
defend themselves and right the wrong.  The dead, however, had no capacity to defend 
themselves from desecration. 
The interwar period in France was a period of political transformation and 
extremes.  The initial problem for France was how to shift from mourning back to the 
realm of living.  The millions of dead buried in their soil, broken families, along with 
countless veterans shattered both physically and mentally served as constant reminders 
of war losses.26 Alleviation of these burdens of grief required reconstruction of the 
economy and infrastructure.  A large portion of working-class Parisians struggled to 
make ends meet, despite being on the winning side of the war.27  The United States 
stood in the best position to assist in France’s recovery.  Among the Allied powers, it 
emerged from the war almost totally unscathed.  Consequently, the loans it distributed 
to its partners made it the main international creditor. American consular Tracy Lay 
predicted before the Great War ended that the “great weapon of the present war is 
economic power” and “the United States sits in control over the destinies of her 
Allies.”28  Europeans had little power to control the outcome of their own war by time 
Americans entered in 1918.  The United States could likely force any of its Allies “into 
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immediate capitulation through an embargo which the President is empowered to 
proclaim.”29  Although this notion was an undiplomatic way to conceptualize America’s 
relationship with France, it was a realistic assessment.  This unbalanced power 
relationship stood as a main point of contention between France and the United States 
following the war.  Parisians struggling to live on incomes significantly less than pre-war 
came to resent spend-thrift Americans.  A Parisian woman wrote the American 
ambassador the she felt “irritated and impatient” as well as “vanquished” when she saw  
everywhere “Americans filling restaurants and the hotels. . .”invading all France, you 
who are so rich and prosperous and smiling.”30 
By 1929 all Parisians realized that their lives forevermore would include 
Americans.  Americans frolicked all around them, its soldiers came and went, and its 
dead remained in their soil.  France’s future, no doubt, included Americans.  A thriving 
community of Americans resided in Paris, and visited France immediately following 
WWI.   Paris was the tourist destination for Americans wishing to see Europe.  It was a 
place to escape restrictive social policies in America, spend money freely, and consume 
high culture. The influx of Americans helped put money into the French economy and 
rebuild following the war.  French businesses in areas frequented by Americans catered 
to the tourists embracing the use of English to lure them to their doors.31  Yet, this also 
created resentment among many French.  The value of the American dollar in 
comparison to the franc was significantly higher, giving Americans access to excesses in 
France at the expense of the locals.  By the mid-1920s, anti-Americanism sentiments 
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reached a point so high in Paris that Americans needed to “sink into a state of denial” to 
not see it.32   Many of the Americans spending time in Paris acted as ungracious guests.  
American arrogance, drunkenness, recklessness, and ignorance proved themselves as 
consistent stereotypes. From the perspective of many Americans, being French meant 
ungraciousness, greed, deceit, and weakness. 33  Warrington Dawson, a writer and 
special assistant at the American Embassy in Paris wrote to the State Department in 
Washington that the rise of anti-Americanism was not as prevalent as indicated in the 
press.  He reported that French newspapers were entirely biased, representing only the 
radicals and whatever party happened to be in power.  Dawson assured Washington that 
the anti-Americanism was primarily a façade “since the mass of the French people have 
the most affectionate feeling towards America, and perfectly realize all that they owe to 
the United States in general and to President Wilson in particular.”34 
The attitude of many Americans was that France owed them a debt of gratitude 
for sacrificing American blood on their behalf.  This sentiment was seen in the previous 
chapter from correspondence of the Bring Home Our Soldier Dead League.  Americans 
who lost family members on the Western Front felt that France had no right to dictate 
any terms to Americans regarding its own war dead.  The debt of gratitude that France 
owed was not as pressing of a debt as the monetary one, however.  Had America shown 
its physical investment in France’s future by joining the League of Nations and 
becoming part of France’s security, French sentiments towards U.S. interwar policies 
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might have been less severe.  To get Europe on the path to economic recovery American 
investors realized that Germany needed assistance, not harsh punishment.  If Germany 
failed to readjust its economy in the post-war and defaulted on its reparation 
obligations, America and the rest of Western Europe could fall to communist 
revolutionaries.35   Avoiding economic panic in Europe required America to enact a 
series of unpopular debt repayment plans.   The 1924 Dawes Plan became the most well-
known American repayment plan.   The goal of this policy was to “revitalize the German 
economy with loans while withholding capital from allies to force them into a payment 
schedule for their war debts.” 36 In practical terms, the plan only required Germany to 
pay France seventeen billion gold marks, yet required France to pay the United States 
twenty-seven billion.37  Many French felt that while Americans “fought the war with us; 
they make the peace against us.”38 As the plan went into effect, it faced major protest 
from the French. July 1926 brought some of the most violent anti-American displays in 
France during the interwar period.  This was due in part to the exchange rate reaching 
its highest point since the war.39     
One of the most politically vocal groups in France were working class laborers, 
among which many were veterans.40  This group had sacrificed most for France’s victory 
in the Great War.  They carried with them the baggage of war and felt unjustly 
victimized by America’s policy.  These soldier laborers, with exposure to violence, called 
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upon the “fourteen national bodies” of veterans and war victims to collectively 
demonstrate against the United States in Paris on July 4, 1926.41  This event on 
America’s birthday was a stark contrast to festive July 4th celebrations the year after the 
war. The French government stepped in to save the American holiday and postponed 
the veterans’ movement for two weeks.   When the protest took place, reports estimated 
that twenty-thousand French veterans mobilized.42   Once mobilized, the veterans 
placed a wreath on their tomb of the Unknown and then collectively gathered at the 
statue of George Washington in silence while holding memorial flags from veterans 
groups all over France.43  The protest did not take on a violent tone, yet they hoped the 
strong showing might be enough to move the American people, particularly, their 
American “comrades at arms” to stop Washington from “enslaving” France with 
impossible debt obligations.44  This movement did not include a pilgrimage to American 
graves at Suresnes.  It did, however, begin before French war remains and finish before 
the form of George Washington—the European symbol of the American Revolution. The 
obvious goal of French veterans was to improve Franco-American relations through 
shared memories of American and French soldiers who sacrificed similarly in combat. 
Anti-American sentiments increased in France in the days following the veterans’ 
protest.  On the night of July 23, over one hundred right-wing French “Fascisti” 
descended a tourist company’s convoy of six open topped charabancs filled with 
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American, German, and English tourists paying to see “Paris by Night.”45  The mob 
attacked the cars near the Paris Opera forcefully removing passengers to specifically 
“berate the Americans.”46  The mob rapidly grew and Parisian police arrived.  Unable to 
disperse the mob to get the cars moving again, they advised the Americans to 
“disappear” on foot.47  The fascists remained well into the night “shouting against 
Americans and hurling epithets at passers-by whom they took for citizens of the United 
States.”48  A few fistfights broke out, but for the most part the American tourists 
remained reserved in the face of a large hostile crowd.  An Italian fascist newspaper 
reported that the likely motive for their French counterparts was retaliation for 
American Senator William Borah’s reaction to the veterans’ march in the days before.  
Senator Borah dismissed the veterans protest against the United States as misplaced 
and blamed the French government’s “domestic policy and imperialistic schemes” as the 
reason for economic hardship.49  Italian fascists felt that the French veterans’ “austere 
and touching plea” deserved more than the “cynical and arid words” of a United States 
Senator.50  The United States was attempting to enslave the whole of European 
continent by “manipulating loans” from behind the safe “teller’s window of banks.”51  
Italians believed that American tourists thus deserved what the fascisti delivered. 
The reports of anti-Americanism in Paris alarmed President Calvin Coolidge 
enough to elicit an official statement to American tourists in the New York Times.  
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Coolidge wanted the French to know that he did not consider American tourists 
“blameless” in the recent incidents.  Coolidge felt that there were two types of American 
tourists spending time in Paris, “bumptious uneducated” and “appreciative.”52  The 
former failed to recognize that the French had gone through “a very dark and trying 
period and were even now facing serious difficulties” with mourning and economic 
hardship.53  The bumptious Americans often showed the French disrespect that 
justifiably caused resentment.  Coolidge urged all American tourists to show greater 
reserve when interacting with the French.  He also hoped that the French did not 
consider the few bad Americans as a representation of the “real America” because he did 
not take the manifestations of a few hostile French as a reflection of the French as a 
whole. 54   
The 1926 protests did not specifically involve American military remains as 
means to prove French discontent with American policies.  American politicians did 
turn to American military remains as weapons to respond to French protest, however.    
In the months following the veterans’ and fascists’ demonstrations against America, 
Arkansas Senator Thaddeus Caraway made incriminating comments against the French 
in the New York Times.  Caraway was an ardent Wilson supporter, who happened to be 
travelling through Europe at the time of the July protests. Caraway reported to 
Americans that French protestors crossed sacred lines in their manifestations and 
attacked American dead.  He explained that French hatred towards their former allies 
had reached despicable levels.  According to Caraway, French protestors had left the 
                                                             







streets of Paris, entered into American cemeteries, and vandalized the tombstones of 
American soldiers with phrases like “To Hell With America.”55  The only respectable 
solution Caraway formulated as a remedy was extreme.  He pushed Congress for the 
immediate passage of legislation funding the repatriation of the 30,000 American dead 
that the French had taken to insult on a daily basis.56  The dead once served as symbols 
of friendship, but now they represented a soured relationship.  Caraway saw removal of 
American bodies as the ultimate punishment against France. 
Senator Caraway’s claims stirred emotions in Americans and the French.  The 
problem with his assertion was its total lack of evidence. The day after his allegations 
against the French, the U.S. War Department publicly rebutted the Senator. The War 
Department assured Americans that the officers assigned to each American cemetery in 
France never reported any form of desecration to American graves.57  Additional public 
counters to Caraway came in the following days, the most powerful of them from 
Pennsylvania Senator, and ABMC commissioner, David Reed.  Reed heard of Caraway’s 
remarks while vacationing in Paris and reported to the American public that he had just 
toured the American cemeteries and witnessed no vandalism whatsoever.  Reed 
suspected that in order to make a powerful political statement, Caraway opted to stretch 
the truth and cite a comment Reed himself had made the previous year about 
“irresponsible” French children disfiguring a private monument erected by the U.S. 
Twenty-Seventh Division.58  Reed went on to assure the American public that despite 
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recent anti-American protest, the French showed “nothing but respect and sympathy” 
for the dead Americans.59  Reed’s overall assessment of the French was that, as a whole, 
they “make respect for their dead a veritable cult” and that he witnessed firsthand the 
shocked reaction the French had to Caraway’s claims.60 
Reed’s assertion of French shock toward Caraway’s attack against them was 
correct.   The French government denied any such vandalism and demanded that 
Caraway offer proof before leveling such insults.61  Furthermore, a French native 
travelling on Caraway’s boat during his return voyage wrote on op-ed for the New York 
Times discrediting the Senator.   The Frenchman explained that, through multiple 
conversations with Caraway, he learned that the Senator spoke and read no French and 
exhibited total confusion toward French culture.62  As a French native, he felt betrayed 
by Caraway’s remarks and explained to Americans that no matter how some French may 
feel toward living Americans; no matter how irritated they may get with American 
tourists, the French people respected and venerated the American soldiers who died in 
battle just as they do their own dead.63  Caraway’s assertions undoubtedly represented 
assumption, not fact, in the Frenchman’s assessment. 
Caraway’s commentary about the French desecration of American graves, and the 
heated reactions, reveals much about the sacredness of the memory surrounding 
American war remains and their sacrifice.  Woodrow Wilson chose to frame his 
argument for collective security with his own memory of American war dead, and 
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Caraway similarly used their memory to make a stand against French war debt protest.  
Caraway publicly acknowledged afterwards that his claims of French desecration came 
from no personal observation.64  His choice to package anti-French sentiment in a 
baseless claim about disrespect for American soldier dead demonstrated how powerful 
the symbolism of American war dead was at the time.  Caraway likely understood the 
deep convictions Americans held for their war dead and felt that a French breach of 
trust might push Congress to be tougher on the French regarding financial policies.  
Conversely, the overwhelming French feeling of insult towards Caraway’s comments 
showed the high level of esteem and sacredness they felt towards American war dead.  
Clearly, French respect for American sacrifice defined by war remains was not 
challengeable, even during a time of great protest against the United States.  This 
episode demonstrated how both France and the United States used the American dead 
to define their culture to the other.  The United States viewed itself as a proud nation 
who sacrificed for another and thus demanded respect.   Similarly, France portrayed 
itself as an honorable and grateful nation that understood the importance of sacred 
boundaries and self-control.    
A 1929 article in The National Geographic Magazine written by France’s former 
ambassador to the United States, J.J. Jusserand, addressed the French protest towards 
America regarding war debts that had garnered headlines for several years.  Jusserand 
showed assurance to Americans that France remembered American sacrifice by quoting 
famed statesman Aristide Briand’s address to the French Chamber over debt issues.  
Briand told the Chamber that it was their duty to “cry out to that great friendly people 
                                                             





beyond the sea who played their part in an especially dolorous hours that France does 
not forget.”  Furthermore, Briand promised Americans that “in spite of untoward 
remarks about the debts, France’s gratitude remains intact, deep-seated in her heart.”65 
 
Using Memory to Address the Red Menace 
 The anti-American protest in the previous section involved French veterans and 
right-wing fascists groups.  These groups certainly posed a threat to American 
dominance in Europe and the possible safety of American tourists.  Still, the biggest 
perceived threat to Americans during the interwar years was communism.  Fascist 
governments in Italy, and later Germany, eventually seemed too dictatorial and cultish 
to most Americans, yet their effectiveness garnered some respect through their early 
stages.  Corporatist policies and decisive leadership reserved the bad fortunes of both 
Italy and Germany.  During the Great Depression, American intellectuals looked fondly 
on Mussolini and Hitler for rejuvenating their nations while others faltered.  Mussolini 
proved particularly appealing to Americans in the “roaring twenties.”  The theatrics of 
the “strutting dictator” whetted the appetite of Americans engrossed by mass 
spectacle.66  Many in America saw Mussolini’s “determined action” as affirmation of the 
appeal that “traditional American common sense and human drive” had abroad.  
Mussolini was, to Americans, a hero because of his willingness to initiate the same 
“progress and efficiency” that made the United States great.67    
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Towards the end of World War I, the American embassy in Paris took note of a 
“spirit of change in France” in which the “old molds are to be broken.” 68  This break 
would likely come in the form of “rejuvenation, evolution, or revolution.”69  There was 
hope among both French and American diplomats to avoid “serious misunderstandings 
between the two” because they might drive a stake between the nations. 70  Both nations 
needed to take proactive measures to diminish the voice of left-wing supporters and 
“limit discontent against America” to the small pro-Bolshevik supporters who inspired 
it.71  Swift action might assure the continuance of the “real friendliness and community 
of interests which exist in our hearts.”72  The American who primarily shouldered the 
burden of keeping Franco-American relations intact during the interwar years was 
Ambassador Myron T. Herrick.  Herrick’s time as American Ambassador to France 
included frequent engagement with the memory of both French and American war dead.  
He often sounded the bugle for American military dead to rise and teach their lessons to 
the living. 
 Myron Herrick was a Republican politician from Cleveland, Ohio.   Before 
entering public life, he was a successful businessman.  He served as Ohio’s governor 
from 1904-1906.  His next major public service role came in 1912 when President Taft 
appointed him to serve as America’s Ambassador to France.  Herrick resigned from this 
post immediately following Woodrow Wilson’s assumption of the presidency, however, 
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he was not replaced until 1914.  Herrick served in France during the initial stages of the 
Great War and became a symbol of hope to the French that America supported their 
cause.  Herrick unsuccessfully ran for Ohio’s senate seat after returning to the United 
States because of the Republican Party’s inability to supplant Wilson’s democrats.  
President Harding sent Herrick back to France as Ambassador in 1921, were he served 
with distinction until his death in Paris in 1929.   Herrick was one of the most beloved 
American ambassadors to France, despite his service during the height of French anti-
Americanism, being one of the few U.S. ambassadors to have a Parisian street named in 
his honor. 
 Herrick arrived to France on Bastille Day in 1921 to an inordinate amount of 
fanfare for a diplomat.  The French remembered his vocal support for their fight in 1914.  
Witnesses reported that it was as if “the seven terrible years that had intervened since 
his departure had not blurred their memory.”73  Many in France saw in Herrick “a friend 
of France . . . . who will be the well-informed witness of our fears and our desires.”74  
Much of Herrick’s popularity likely came from his uncanny ability to navigate the 
memories of the Great War and pull on French heartstrings through American military 
sacrifice.  Herrick thrived in the role of ambassador.  Despite his old age, he kept up a 
vigorous social schedule.  His assistant reported that American holidays brought 
Herrick the heaviest workload.  With the Great War not so distant a memory, each 
holiday required attention to the dead.  “Memorial Day, the Fourth of July, 
Thanksgiving Day, etc., etc., involved not only a banquet and speech, but visits to our 
cemeteries, to the Unknown Soldier’s grave [and] to the Tomb of Lafayette, according to 
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Herrick’s close associates.”75  Herrick chose not to send a proxy to these events and 
yearly engaged in them “cheerfully, with unfeigned pleasure.”76  His assistant reported 
that it was not only American holidays that demanded Herrick’s attention.  “He 
[Herrick] was asked almost every day of the year to preside at a banquet . . . dedicate a 
monument . . . or be present at some reunion; and always with the expectation that he 
would make a few remarks.”77 It was often during these pilgrimages to the dead that 
Herrick chose to make some of his most powerful speeches on the state of Franco-
American relations.  Herrick seemingly understood that engaging with the sacred 
memory of the dead made for a more powerful message. 
 Herrick served as Ambassador to France for nearly eight years.  Providing a 
complete account of all his commemorations to American dead would be both difficult 
and repetitive.  His autobiography does, however, explicitly show the strategic uses 
Herrick saw in American war remains.  As America’s top diplomat in France during the 
peak of anti-American sentiments, Herrick needed to use every weapon in his arsenal.  
The war debt protest in France greatly disturbed Herrick.  He felt that France was 
“bleeding and impoverished” and that it deserved America’s aid and sympathy.78  At the 
same time, he was revolted anytime the French accused America of “forgetting the war 
and why it entered.”79  Claims that America had “deserted an old friend and turned its 
sympathies towards her enemy” were intolerable.80  Herrick used a 1923 speaking 
engagement at the dedication of a monument to American soldiers killed in Champagne 
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to combat French assertions and awaken Americans of their present role in world 
economics.  Herrick asked his living audience if they, the ones who profited from the 
sacrifice of the dead, could stand on their battlefield and assure them that they 
“faithfully executed the trust” which the dead placed in them?81  He felt that this was 
impossible.  Americans died fighting Germany because it threatened the “commercial 
and physical welfare” of America, France, England, Belgium, and Italy.  Their sacrifice 
was to stabilize the economic system. The current debates over debt repayment created 
a “European mess,” which if assessed using “common sense and business judgment,” 
almost replicated the atmosphere that brought Americans to the battlefields in 1917.82  
Herrick was unanimously speaking for American dead, using them to show the French 
that America had not forgotten and was committed to fixing the problem.  Furthermore, 
the dead in French soil showed Americans that they retained a stake in the European 
situation.  Unwillingness of American politicians to rise above partisan politics and 
address the international economy not only “sullied the memory of American dead,” but 
made their sacrifice in vain.83  He articulated similar sentiments by co-opting the voices 
of American dead in speeches leading up to 1926. 
Issues regarding war debts held the attention of American and French leaders, 
however, communism directed the memory of American dead during the interwar 
period.  A major catalyst for this came from increasing international protest among 
communist, socialist, and anarchist groups throughout Europe over the American 
judicial system’s treatment of Italian immigrants Ferdinando Sacco and Bartolomeo 
Vanzetti.   Sacco and Vanzetti both openly claimed ties to the international anarchist 
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movement and were arrested in 1920 for association with a murder-robbery incident at 
a shoe factory in Braintree, Massachusetts.  The evidence against the two men was 
nowhere near as strong as the Red Scare hysteria sweeping through the United States.  
The Massachusetts judge who tried the two immigrants openly showed bias toward 
them during trial and sentenced them to death.  Supporters of Sacco and Vanzetti in 
France cited a statement by the Massachusetts’ judge to prove American injustice.  The 
judge reasoned that “although not having participated materially, in the crime which 
they are charged, [they] are morally guilty on account of their ideas.”84  A lengthy 
appeals process followed the first trial and the two men remained imprisoned for years 
awaiting their fate.  It was not until August 1927 that their executions by electric chair 
finally took place. Left-wing groups throughout the world sympathized with Sacco and 
Vanzetti.  Violent protest against the injustice shown by America sporadically erupted 
world-wide throughout the ordeal.  The most violent protests came the year of their 
conviction in 1921 and their execution in 1927.  Myron Herrick’s ambassadorship in 
Paris, the location of some of the most heated Sacco-Vanzetti protest, forced him to 
confront the issue directly. 
Herrick first became entangled in the Sacco-Vanzetti case when left-wing 
activists in Paris attempted to assassinate him in his Paris office in October 1921.85  
Infuriated that Sacco and Vanzetti faced imminent death unless the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court granted an appeal, radicals organized demonstrations throughout the 
world to force presidential interference in the trial.  Ambassador Herrick started 
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receiving mail protesting the Boston judge’s verdict in the fall of 1921, but nothing to 
merit fear for his life.  On the morning of October 19, 1921, a package from a well-known 
perfumery arrived at Herrick’s Paris office.  A busy day of meetings followed by an 
afternoon reception for General Pershing at the Hotel de Ville prevented Herrick from 
opening the package at work.  Instead, his staff took Herrick’s mail to his private 
residence.  Herrick’s valet noticed the package of perfume as Herrick arrived home for 
the evening and opened it up due to a recent request from his boss to purchase a similar 
item.  When Herrick’s valet opened the box, the pin of a grenade was pulled. It 
detonated and blew shrapnel into the valet’s leg and severely damaged several rooms.  It 
failed to kill its mark, however.  American reporters immediately picked up the story 
and categorized the assassination attempt as a communist plot.  A message from the 
leader of the French Communists in L’Humanité the following day calling for continued 
“protestation more and more vigorous on behalf of the two un-fortunates who have only 
a few days more to live if the proletariats of all the world do not come to their rescue” 
caused many to blame communists for the murder attempt.86   Herrick himself never 
explicitly targeted the communists as the guilty party, yet his public contestation of 
Bolshevism grew throughout his ambassadorship.   Ultimately, the first Sacco-Vanzetti 
verdict underwent a lengthy appeals process that culminated with the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the original sentence.  The rejected appeal 
unleashed a second surge of anti-Americanism abroad years later.   
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When the Italian anarchists’ appeal was denied, the New York Times reported 
that Herrick received multiple death threats from anarchists.87 Protest letters from 
various French organizations also inundated Herrick.  Ferdinand Buisson, president of 
France’s Human Rights League appealed to Herrick to speak with his government to 
overturn the injustice.  Buisson believed that after five years in prison Sacco and 
Vanzetti had suffered enough, their case was forgotten, and such a delayed execution 
unnecessarily cruel.88  Herrick defended his government to Buisson, highlighting the 
Frenchman’s ignorance of the American judicial system and appeals process.  Sacco and 
Vanzetti faced a fair trial and had the best legal team available to them.89  As for the 
delay in their execution, Herrick attributed this to decisions made by the defense team 
and Sacco-Vanzetti supporters.  Herrick also reminded Buisson that he was perhaps the 
wrong man to contact because Sacco-Vanzetti supporters had attempted to kill him not 
so long ago.90  The French government and Myron Herrick took steps to prevent more 
violence against American diplomats in Paris once the inevitability of Sacco and 
Vanzetti’s death became clear in 1926.  Herrick put all embassy staff on alert and 
warned them not to leave embassy grounds in times of visible communist protest.91  
Parisian police also sent extra men to guard the embassy throughout the hostile period.  
Herrick followed his common practice of using America military remains to take 
his strongest stance against communism.  Since 1926, French and Americans had 
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engaged in “periods of petulant nagging and quarreling.”92  In May of 1927, “providence 
imposed” and the charismatic Charles Lindbergh dropped from the sky.93  Within hours 
after Lindbergh’s groundbreaking trans-Atlantic landing in Paris, French sentiments 
towards America improved dramatically.  For the first time in quite a while, it seemed 
that more American flags adorned French buildings than Sacco-Vanzetti posters.  
Herrick capitalized on the spontaneous calming of the storm and delivered a frontal 
assault on communism during his Memorial Day address at the Suresnes American 
Cemetery on May 30, 1927, just over a month after the finalization of Sacco and 
Vanzetti’s fate.94  Herrick’s address repackaged and redefined the sacrifice of American 
soldiers in World War I.  The same soldiers that Wilson once claimed had sacrificed all 
for collective security, now represented sacrifice against the “sinister” Bolshevik 
movement coming from Russia.95  Herrick perceived these radicals as France’s primary 
social disturbance. 
Herrick’s 1927 address aimed to undermine the rhetoric of Russian communist 
leaders and take legitimacy away from their revolution.  “Either we believe in orderly 
society—or don’t, “Herrick told his audience.96  Every nation of the world was at the 
point of choosing between “order and anarchy, between honesty and thievery, and 
between virtue and crime.”97  The United States and France chose order, honesty, and 
virtue.  The American graves at Suresnes, coupled with a large French audience, proved 
                                                             
92 Mott, Friend of France, 352. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Lindbergh was not present because he participated in Memorial Day ceremonies in England the same 
day.   
95 “Urges the World to Fight Against Red ‘Peril’,” New York Times, May 31, 1927, in Proquest Historical 
Newspapers. 






to Herrick that both nations had shared past committed to stopping “tyranny.”98  Both 
France and the U.S. demonstrated in World War I that the spirit of their “revolutions” 
started in 1776 and 1789 still lived.99  Both nations still remained willing to fight for 
democracy and freedom, but many citizens in both nations failed to recognize the 
imminent threat of the communist disease within their borders.  Russia’s communist 
revolution promised a government in the “name of the people,” but Herrick saw the 
revolution as a ruse.  Instead of providing freedom of choice and happiness, it created 
the most oppressive government in human history.100  It was Herrick’s hope that both 
France and the United States might see in American graves the sanctity of their 
revolutions, and dismiss the Russian revolutionary fervor as a disease that threatened a 
peaceful future.  American military dead buried in France represented a direct link to 
American colonial militia from the eighteenth century.  The doughboys died to stop 
tyranny just as colonists did, and communism represented the newest iteration of 
tyranny.101  The surge of radical left-wing protest against the United States signified that 
the communist cancer was eroding Franco-American democracy.  Herrick summoned 
the memory of the American ghosts of Suresnes just as Wilson had in 1919.  However, he 
now saw in them not a fight for collective security, but one to suppress cancerous 
revolution.  In this instance, Herrick hoped that the French people might find 
themselves on the side of the Americans once more, and join in an international fight 
against the Red Menace.   









Photo 2.2:  Ambassador Myron Herrick, Suresnes Memorial Day Address, May 1928.  Source: 




In Herrick’s biography, written by his close friend Colonel T. Bentley Mott, and 
based partially on Herrick’s own dictations to Mott, he explained his motivations for the 
speech.  Mott used Herrick’s correspondence with Warren Harding to show Herrick’s 
belief that the Republican Party needed to resist giving the official recognition of the 
new Soviet Union that other allied countries recently had, namely Great Britain and 
France.  Herrick sympathized with the Russian citizens, despite thinking that their 




Russia.  Nevertheless, he felt his country needed to take the ideological high ground.102  
Herrick’s decision to attack communist Russia in his 1927 Memorial Day address was a 
calculated decision according to Mott.  Ambassador Herrick witnessed an alarming 
number of poor working-class Frenchmen turning to communism and desired to do his 
part to reverse this without risking involvement in the French political system.    The 
solution to Herrick’s dilemma was to use the memory of American war dead through his 
station as ambassador.  Herrick determined that if he chose a “strictly American 
occasion, held in an American cemetery” to address his compatriots and the French 
attendees through a message invoking memories of “his own dead,” he could maximize 
the power of his speech.103   
The calculated risk worked.  Herrick’s message created waves in France, the press 
carried excerpts of the speech for days, the French government was pleased about the 
American message, and Great Britain severed relations with the Soviets the following 
day.104  In no way did he succeed at keeping Franco-American relations at their post-
Lindbergh high, however.  While the most visible press coverage of Herrick’s speech 
revealed positive reception, it initiated strong reactions by leftist groups.  In the days 
following Herrick’s speech, socialist French paper L'Humanité showed a strong dislike 
of Herrick.  The paper reported that “the enemies of communism badly chose their 
champions. Myron Herrick, whose stupidity is a laughing stock in diplomatic circles, 
represents the United States in France, especially in the French cemetery where he is 
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accustomed to being photographed smiling.”105  Herrick’s enemies understood his 
tendency to use the dead to achieve a political goal, and particularly resented seeing him 
do so in sacred sites around France. 
The electric chair ended the lives of Sacco and Vanzetti after midnight on August 
23, 1927.  The proactive security measures taken by Herrick and the Parisian police 
proved necessary.  Leftists groups in Paris initiated the biggest riots of all major cities 
world-wide.  They marched en-masse to sites well associated with Americans, including 
the embassy where police waited to push them back.   The right-wing led police met the 
rioters with armed guards and large scale violence took place throughout the night.  
Police arrested hundreds of rioters and assaulted many more.106  At dawn the next 
morning, parts of Paris looked like a war zone with over 10,000,000 francs worth of 
damage recorded and over two hundred police officers recovering from wounds received 
during the rioting.107  The Sacco-Vanzetti riots of 1927 were widespread throughout 
Paris, but leftist groups traditionally faced difficulty trying to protest.  Throughout the 
1920s, the French government attempted to maintain order by limiting left-wing 
political manifestations.  All processions within Paris except holiday celebrations, 
national holidays, or commemorations needed prior approval from the government.108  
This policy specifically targeted leftist groups.  The few permits granted went to right-
wing organizations because these often included veterans’ groups or other patriotic 
leagues.109  Leftist groups usually circumvented the non-protesting policies by staging 
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their movements in the suburbs of Paris where the government had less concern.  The 
Sacco-Vanzetti riots openly challenged French laws and left-wing supporters and the 
conservative right fought for their public ground.  In continued leftist protests after the 
initial night of riots, American sites remained a main target.  Parisian police anticipated 
the inevitable anti-Americanism in the execution protests.  In addition to providing 
extra security at the embassy, they also posted guards at American banks and other 
formal institutions.110  Leftists understood this obstacle and targeted more abstract 
American sites in Paris than tangible sites—primarily places where Americans spent 
money.111 
Leftist protestors severely damaged their cause during the riots when they 
desecrated the French memory of their own fallen son.   During the first night of 
violence, French communists were pushed from the American Embassy and marched to 
the nearby Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Arc-de-Triomphe.   They occupied the 
space, sang the Internationale, disturbed wreaths, and overturned the chained 
barrier.112  This attack was likely based more on resentment of the leniency the 
government showed right-wing veterans groups than disrespect for the French 
unknown.  Regardless of the motive, the communist protestors who attacked the resting 
place of France’s most sacred body made a mistake.  Over 10,000 French veterans 
reoccupied the space in silence the next day.  Police did not involve themselves in this 
movement, hoping that the communist demonstrators might be rash enough to stand up 
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to the war veterans.113  Americans viewed French veterans somewhat negatively due to 
their large Fourth of July protest the previous year, however, desecration of the Tomb of 
the Unknown prompted major support across the Atlantic.  The American press widely 
circulated a report that the first person on the scene after communists desecrated the 
tomb was an American.  According to the New York Times, an American veteran 
happened to be nearby while the communists engaged in their profanity.  He “stood 
watching, his blood boiling, unable to intervene in the face of overwhelming 
numbers.”114  He went to work replacing the wreaths and effacing the work of the 
communists as soon as they left.  When French police arrived on the scene, he stopped 
his work long enough to report only that he “was a friend of France.”115    
  In such massive riot against the United States, no damage happened at 
American military cemeteries in France, even at Suresnes on the outskirts of Paris.  A 
couple of factors might explain the sparing of American cemeteries from the protest.  It 
is quite possible that communist protestors anticipated a strong police presence at such 
a visible American site near Paris.  Thomas North, an ABMC administrator in Paris 
during the riots, reported in his memoirs that much work went into distancing 
American cemeteries and memorials from political strife.  North wrote that in dealing 
with local communities it was almost always pointed out to locals that the sites 
“concerned the host of American veterans who had nothing whatever to do with the 
Sacco-Vanzetti trials, and very little with the war debts.”116 This preemptive branding of 
cemeteries as non-aggressive possibly made local protestors turn elsewhere to make a 
                                                             








message.  The advert political speeches that Myron Herrick gave at Suresnes during this 
period makes this explanation less satisfying.   Another possible explanation is the 
strength of the discourse emanating from these sacred sites.  The sacred divide 
separating the living and the dead of the Great War, American or French, was a line 
generally not crossed.  The lack of reported vandalism in such a large protest is telling of 
the symbolic power of these sites. 
American military cemeteries escaped communist protest unscathed and showed 
the power of the discourse that American policy makers had methodically bolstered 
since the closing of the Great War.  Consequently, the communist attack on French 
military remains created a means for Americans to reciprocate French respect for their 
remains.  In this period of great unrest, the diplomacy of American military memory 
thrived.  Thousands more veterans joined the lone American who first arrived on the 
scene of the communist vandalism in the upcoming days. The day after the communist 
protest at the Arc, an American present for the French veterans’ rebuttal reported that 
“those who saw the ceremony will not soon forget the impressive manner in which 
patriotic Paris repaired the insult to its unknown poilu.”117   Large contingents of 
American Legion members stood in the crowd watching French veterans protect the 
tomb.  The French press reported that the French felt honored that American veterans 
paid them such respect.  American Legionnaires, present in France for a month long 
convention, furthered America’s commitment to French memory by participating in the 
“purification ceremony” of the Arc and initiating a daily ritual of having American 
                                                             





legionnaires place flowers on the Tomb of the Unknown. 118  The unified Franco-
American response to the communist defamation of the sacred memory brought the two 
cultures together and reaffirmed their commitment to shared democratic values.  These 
reciprocal actions further advance the powerful bonds that war remains can perpetuate 
between nations.   
Communist leaders also spoke out against the French communists actions at the 
Tomb of the Unknown.  It was reported that Soviet chiefs in Moscow were quite 
disappointed in French communist leaders for allowing such a desecration to take place 
in the name of anti-Americanism.  The displeasure stemmed from ongoing oil 
agreements between American companies and Russia.  Moscow reportedly directed 
leaders in other nations to do “anything they liked against their own Government,” so 
long as “no anti-American bias” was given in the protest.119  French communists failed 
this mission.  Even though they attacked the memory of their own soldier, the 
manifestation was seen as an attack on the United States.  The result of the protest was a 
more united front between the governments of France and the United States.  A strong 
presences of French and American Great War memory around Paris provided both 
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The Second A.E.F. 
The Sacco-Vanzetti riots came at an opportune time for American and French 
veterans to interact with each other through similar memories.  The riots took place in 
August 1927.  A few weeks later, on September 16, the start of the first large scale 
international meeting of American Legionnaires began in Paris.  Many eager American 
veterans already walked the streets of Paris during the August riots.  When the meeting 
commenced, some ten to twenty-four thousand American veterans descended on Paris 
representing every state in the Union.  Although sacred, the pilgrimage certainly 
possessed elements of a leisurely vacation.  American newspapers reported French 
preparations:  “The Opera Comique and a dose of other theaters had gala performances 
for the former doughboys.  Montmartre had laid in thousands of extra bottles of 
champagne and the more modest dancing establishments of the Latin Quarter were 
prepared for a record ten days.”120 The most important aspect of the meeting, however, 
was its spiritual and diplomatic meanings.   
American soldiers fought with French and Italian veterans on European 
battlefields against Germans.  French and American forces also united to fight Russian 
Bolsheviks in the Polar Bear Expedition at the conclusion of the Great War.    Veterans 
groups shared a similar experience and similarly felt disillusionment at the outcome of 
their war.  They also felt a continued obligation to protect their countries should a threat 
rise.  This bond is evident in hopes of French veterans during their July 1926 protest 
that their American comrades in arms might come to their cause.  The American 
                                                             
120 “France Welcomes Pershing at Head of Second A.E.F.,” The New York Times, September 17, 1927, in 




Legion’s massive 1927 international meeting in Paris was a time when the bonds 
between veterans was strengthened.   
American veterans planned to rekindle old friendships, visit battlefields, find 
comrades’ graves, and also to show support to the French veterans they fought with 
during their 1927 meeting.  France and America touted the event as the coming of the 
“Second A.E.F.”121  Quite literally, former American doughboys came to reunite with 
those left behind.  Howard Savage, the American Legion’s National Commander, talked 
of the significance of the event after his warm reception in Paris.  “When we [American 
veterans] go back France we will count among us Americans millions of friends whose 
friendship has been given that new life which all friendships need after the parties 
involved have been separated nearly ten years.”122  Savage felt that the Legion’s presence 
in France would remedy the sweeping anti-American sentiments of late.  Savage had 
reason to believe that Legionnaires might find a positive experience.  Throughout 1926, 
conservative voices in France assured Americans of their welcome in 1927, despite the 
negative press.  Respect for the dead often acted as the vehicle to make this promise.  
French veterans groups largely looked forward to the pilgrimage.  In 1926, the President 
of a disabled French veterans group called the “Broken Jaws,” visited the United States 
to place a wreath on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington.  Afterwards he 
invited all American veterans to make the pilgrimage next year “to the graves of our 
dead on the battlefields, to tell them not to believe lying tongues which say my country 
has received Americans badly and that peace henceforth will put an end to the 
                                                             





admirable comradeship of the war.”123  Days later, French Minister of the Interior, 
Albert Sarraut, responded to inquiries from the Indianapolis News about the type of 
reception American veteran should expect in the upcoming pilgrimage.  “The welcome 
they will receive will be as spontaneous and as enthusiastic as can be conceived,” Sarraut 
assured.  He went on to note that the recent anti-Americanism regarding debt and 
Sacco-Vanzetti was “entirely apart from our affection and admiration for the American 
soldier.”124  Anti-Americanism was “transitory,” but respect for America’s role in the 
Great War “permanent.”125 Sarraut ended his interview responding to “abominable 
fables” from “hostile propagandists” alleging the “desecration of the tombs of American 
soldiers in France.”126  When legionnaires visited American tombs in the upcoming 
years, Sarraut expected their experience to coincide with his personal observations in 
American cemeteries at Suresnes and Meuse-Argonne.  “Frenchmen respect American 
graves to such an extent that they do not even walk on the grass, they visit with their 
heads uncovered and speak in whispers.”127 
The Great War dead of both France and the United States certainly served as a 
primary medium for the nations to engage one another during the Legion’s 1927 
pilgrimage.  Within hours of arriving in Paris the leaders of the American Legionnaires, 
General Pershing, and Commander Savage, traveled to Arc de Triomphe to pay respects 
to France’s Unknown Soldier.  This moment was highly symbolic.  The American 
delegation converged on the sacred French site to show that America had not forgotten 
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its ally.  Pershing and Savage walked around the site in silence for several minutes after 
placing a bronze wreath on the tomb.   This was a stark contrast to the communist 
protest that had taken place at the same spot only weeks ago.  Thousands of French men 
and women surrounded the Americans throughout the somber moment.128   
 
Photo 2.3: Foch, Pershing and Savage at Suresnes in September 1927, Source: Bibliothèque nationale de 
France, département Estampes et photographie, online archives. 
 
Pershing, Savage and Marshal Foch then led the delegation to the American 
cemetery at Suresnes the following day to similarly pay respect for American remains 
prior to the commencement of festivities that marked the reunion’s start.  Pershing 
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began the ceremony, honoring the remains which he had commanded.  Speaking as a 
soldier, and for his soldiers, Pershing noted that they could not “ask for a sweeter resting 
place than on the field of glory where they fell.”  He explained to the dead that they had 
“become a symbol of mutual gratitude” with “the people of two nations watching over 
them.”129  Marshal Foch followed, addressing the crowd on behalf of France.  His voice 
cracking with emotion, Foch stressed that thanks that France held for these young men 
who abandoned their lives to stand with France “defending an ideal which was alike 
their and ours.”130  The most moving speech of the day from Commander Savage 
followed.  After several moments of fighting back tears, Savage began by telling the 
crowd his words were not for them.  He addressed “his comrades in death,” all 30,000 
spread throughout France.131  Savage felt regret that he survived and left them for “nine 
years,” albeit it “in the tender care of a sister nation.132  Savage then outlined that the 
Legion was in France to commune with the dead.  American veterans should interact 
with the dead and reflect on their own lives.   Through this introspection, each veteran 
could determine if their dead comrades approved of the life they lived.  Savage felt 
assurance when he looked at the crosses.  The dead wanted their grieving families cared 
for, a powerful nation able to stand up for mankind, and a just nation that retained 
international confidence.133  International events since the Great War showed that 
fulfilment of these wishes still had far to go.  Nonetheless, he felt that the dead 
understood that their living “buddies” were doing all they could and “fighting the good 
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fight.”134  At the conclusion of the speech, Savage led the delegation back to the Tomb of 
the Unknown where he trimmed the wick of the eternal flame.  This was a coveted 
assignment in French culture, and that he was allowed to perform it showed the 
“greatest token of friendship and confidence.”135 
The opening communions with military dead set a tone for the event.  The 
American veterans’ primary task was to serve as the face of American memory.  In the 
upcoming days, they were supposed to keep in mind the comrades who could not join in 
the festivities.  Likewise, their actions should respect the memory of the dead and 
improve relationships with the living.  This proved somewhat difficult, however, because 
much of France divided on the American assembly.  The split in France primarily 
coincided with political leanings.  Right leaning French, namely veterans associations, 
welcomed their American counterparts.  The American Legion’s response to the attack 
on the Tomb of the Unknown improved this sentiment.  Those French who supported 
the left, primarily communists, resented the American presence.  Only weeks ago, they 
engaged in destructive anti-American protest.  Parisian police had barred them from 
protesting in the public spaces of their own city and violently repelled them, yet they 
allowed the American foreigners to occupy the same space closed to them.136  Ideologies 
split Parisian perceptions on the American veterans, still apprehension likely resided in 
almost all French.  The tone of the American presence was inherently militaristic.  The 
veterans heralded themselves the second American Army, they literally intended to take 
over the city.  The New York Times reported that “the city of Paris, the pride of all 
Frenchmen, is literally being given over to the American veterans for the next ten 
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days.”137  Parisians had not forgotten animosity towards American debt policy and 
feared the encroachment of American culture.  They also anticipated the inevitable 
American drunkenness, ignorance of French customs, arrogance, and advances on 
French women.  The headline event of Legion’s pilgrimage, a military style parade would 
be the ultimate test of French tolerance for the event. 
The Legion’s parade was set for the day after the speeches at Suresnes.  The 
American veterans split based on their home states and marched through the most 
notable locations of Paris going through the Arc de Triomphe, and passing a review 
stand manned by Pershing, Foch, and Savage.  At the end, they congregated near George 
Washington’s statue and the American Embassy. 138  The notion of such a political 
display infuriated communists.  The French government continually denied them this 
type of manifestation to the left.  Additionally, it seemed eerily reminiscent to the 
French veteran protests that the French government frequently allowed to take place.  
The communists’ newspaper L'Humanité provided a scathing critique of the American 
parade.  The communists viewed the legionnaires as a “Puritan and alcoholic fascist 
Legion,” “a band of lynchers from the South,” and “fascist ASSASSINS OF SACCO AND 
VANZETTI.”139  The 30,000 American veterans would likely see great support and 
American flags during their parade, but only because they “concentrated in a few 
middle-class neighborhoods in the boulevards” of Paris where “work has no place.”140  
The paper warned French communists to control their impulse to seek revenge for the 
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Sacco-Vanzetti executions.  The right-wing French government wanted this to happen, 
and was using the parade to set up a “deadly ambush” of French workers.  The American 
veterans marched through Paris “under the protection of batons, guns, and armored 
cars.”141 
The predictions in L'Humanité proved true.  No major disturbances took place 
during the parade.  Communists avoided the perceived ambush and set aside their own 
day in the future for protest. American flags did saturate the streets, even adorning the 
Eifel Tower.142  The biggest problem raised by the parade was the tone of the 
legionnaires.  Instead of assuming the role of militant fascists, they thoroughly enjoyed 
the day and treated it as a celebration. 143  Parisians stood shocked as American veterans 
embraced the uniqueness of their states and displayed local symbols.  There were 
women dressed as the statues of liberty, Native Americans, cowboys, and sombrero clad 
veterans.144  The American memory diplomats marching in the parade showed the 
French their innocence, fun loving nature, and individuality.  This likely had a 
somewhat negative effect on the French due to their own memory of the war.  The Great 
War “had not been a grand parade or a circus in motion” and some found the lightness 
projected by Americans offensive.145  Still, in the turbulent 1920s, memory and care for 
Great War dead proved itself a viable means for France and America to interact. 
Although the Legionnaires indulged in too much festivity at times during their 
occupation of Paris, the convention successfully continued the positive relations 
between the two nations—particularly between national governments and veterans’ 
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groups.146 The New York Times reported that the “visit seems to have completely wiped 
out the anti-American sentiment which arose from the Sacco-Vanzetti agitation.”147 
Many French at the start of the convention felt confused when the somber pilgrimages 
to U.S. graves that started the convention transformed into a “more joyous excursion” as 
the month progressed.148 The festive spirit of American veterans eventually won the 
French over and lifted the spirits of Paris. American veterans representing their 
government, and Parisians not associated with leftist groups, related to one another 
during the pilgrimage through their shared memories.  Left-wing protest that attacked 
the memory of French soldier dead during the Sacco-Vanzetti riots actually served to 
bind the veterans from each nation. The success of the Legion’s pilgrimage caused an 
international surge in battlefield visits to France.  Part of this is surely due to the warm 
reception American veterans received abroad.  Antics of American veterans also 
generated hostility among the French.149  The fun loving nature of Americans veterans 
in Paris stirred many Europeans into believing that memories of the war “were 
weakening or had become tainted by” American “cultural lightheartedness.”150 
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Photo 2.4: West Virginia’s Delegation Marching in American Legion Parade, September 19, 1927.  
Source: West Virginia Regional History Collection, West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV.  




 Interaction with sites of French and American military dead allowed both nations 
to engage with each other during the first decade of the interwar.  During this period of 
high anti-Americanism in France due to resentment over war debt policies and total 
disdain for leftist politics, sites of memory became platforms to assert future 
aspirations. American leaders used their sites of the dead to remind France that even 
though times were hard, America was committed to their longevity and France still 




American remains became a way for the government and average French person to 
distance themselves from radicalism.  Care and reverence for American remains showed 
Americans that the French too were committed to a sustained relationship in the future. 
 It is telling that no real French desecration of American military graves or protest 
at American military cemeteries took place in France during this highly volatile period.  
Instead, French radicals chose to use the memory of their own military remains to make 
political statements.  This in turn, allowed Americans to stand with French veterans and 
right-minded French to reciprocate amicable feelings.  American and French military 
dead served as a bridge between a deep political gulfs between nations. 
 The French feared the repercussions of American culture coming to their shores.  
A future of a diminished Old World and powerful New World was a scary prospect.  
While American military remains represented that type of future in France, they 
somehow represented a less frightening part of that future.  And, in the second portion 
of the interwar years, the future these remains represented provided a sense of comfort.  
The far from fascist American legion that some Parisians feared in 1927 was 
overshadowed by very real fascists legions from Italy and Germany in the 1930s.  As the 
stability of the Treaty of Versailles eroded quickly though the 1930s, American military 
remains in France showed a shared commitment to preserving peace and offered the 





III. Remains of Peace:  U.S. Remains and the Coming of World War II 
 
 
The companionship of sorrow is more enduring than the comradeship of victory.1 
 
  
The aggressive domestic and foreign policy of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany in 
the 1930s forced American memory abroad to return to a more liberal Wilsonian vision 
of peace.  The completion of American military cemeteries in France, and subsequent 
dedication ceremonies, coincided with the rise of European political unrest. Completed 
ABMC cemeteries became locations where the United States and France could invoke 
peaceful messages as needed. Finalization of ABMC cemeteries also coincided with 
increased drive from Washington to find new means to conduct international relations.  
Through the 1930s, it was evident that one of the most viable mediums for the United 
States to engage with other nations was through “public participation;” or letting ordinary 
citizens travel abroad and project America onto other landscapes.2  A visible example of 
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this was the three-year long Congressional sponsored program that sent American 
mothers and widows of deceased doughboys abroad to visit their graves.  These women 
effectively mobilized their new political power to gain not only a government sponsored 
mourning trip, but also a chance to serve their nation as public diplomats.  Mathilda 
Burling, the mother of George Burling Jr., a deceased soldier from New York buried in St. 
Mihiel American cemetery, was one of the most vocal lobbyists for Gold Star Pilgrimages.   
Mrs. Burling pleaded with U.S. Senators in May 1928 to give her a visit the grave of her 
only son.3  Burling grieved for her son and understood that nothing could replace him.  
Still, she felt that she could serve her government through her son’s memory.  “What a 
wonderful peace mission it would be if such a group of mothers could be sent abroad. . . I 
believe it would bring the countries closer together than any act that could ever be 
suggested,” offered Burling.4  As international stability deteriorated through the 1930s, 
U.S. bodies in Europe morphed into beacons of peace more so than ever before. 
 Getting Americans abroad to visit U.S. military remains served as only one 
example of working for peace.  As the United States constructed a peaceful message of 
memory in France through pilgrims and dedications, it navigated a more sensitive 
memory situation with the Soviet Union.  From the mid-1920s through the 1930s, officials 
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and France aggressively projected messages of their culture abroad to colonial populations.  Germany and 
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revolution. Vocal propaganda from international players forced the United States increase its own efforts 
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War II.  This conflict ultimately served as a watershed event for America’s cultural transfer programs.  
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Europe in the nascent period of public diplomacy.   Washington’s treatment of its World War I remains 
abroad in the interwar period helped focus the new effort to improve the American image in the build up 
to World War II.   
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in Washington maneuvered to get U.S. Army personnel on the ground in the Russian sub-
Arctic to remove the remains of American soldiers killed fighting Bolsheviks during the 
Polar Bear expedition of 1918-1919.  While the presence of American bodies in French soil 
showed friendship, the strong desire to remove American bodies from Russian soil 
showed animosity.  French soil was conceptualized as friendly, Russian soil as diseased.  
The final expedition to remove American remains from Russian earth in the 1930s 
illustrated the strained relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.  Yet, 
it also signaled some improvement in relations.  Removing the bodies of American 
invaders from Soviet soil would help erase a negative memory from the Russian 
landscape.  The mere fact that the governments in Moscow and Washington opened a 
dialogue to remove American bodies also showed improvement from the diplomatic 
silence of the 1920s.  The final section of this chapter examines the diplomatic uses of this 
more negative U.S. memories in foreign countries.  This is a useful contrast to the 






Photo 3.1: French Laborers completing masonry work on Meuse Argonne American Cemetery 
flagpole, November 1928.  Source:  RG 117 National Archives. 
 
 
Diplomatic Pilgrims  
 The 1927 American Legion pilgrimage was not the only one of its kind that 
Americans partook in through the interwar years—although it was the one that 
incorporated considerable elements of martial manliness.  From 1930 through 1933, 
contingents of American female mourners arrived in France on federally sponsored 
pilgrimages.  At a cost of over five-million dollars, approximately 7,000 American 




to their government.5  These Gold Star Mother pilgrimages stand out in American history.  
After no other American military conflict, including WWII, did the federal government 
take on the financial burden of sending American women to the graves of their sons, 
daughters, and husbands.  The pilgrimages also happened during the height of the Great 
Depression.  This was indicative of the importance that American society placed on 
catering to the needs of grieving American women.  In this nascent period of female 
suffrage, American women effectively mobilized their political power to make their 
pilgrimages happen.  Support for the pilgrimages rested mainly on long standing notions 
of republican motherhood present in the United States—meaning that the sacrifices of 
American women for their republic fostered national preservation just as much as martial 
manhood.6  
 Historians have analyzed the Gold Star pilgrimages primarily through the lens of 
gender and race.  At their most basic level, the pilgrimages do highlight the stereotypical 
twentieth century conceptions of female fragility and need for masculine care. Notions 
that grieving women, not men, deserved a pilgrimage to graves abroad showed the 
perceived delicacy of their sex. Male leaders in Washington planned for the female 
pilgrims’ care at every step.  Invitations went to the women the government deemed 
eligible, their travel was taken care of, and the month-long trip took place in luxury the 
majority of women had no experience with.  Each pilgrim also had access to a team of 
nurses and guided tours by Army officers.  American Gold Star Mothers received vigilant 
care, but certainly were not complacent in the pilgrimage process.  They proved 
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particularly adept at equating the sacrifice their sons made to the sacrifice they made by 
allowing their son to fight.  It was not merely that female mourners required a pilgrimage 
for closure more so than men, but they effectively argued that maternal loss garnered a 
“privileged status,” deserving more empathy than sacrifices made by fathers, or even 
widows.7 It was the pilgrims themselves that mobilized the political momentum to make 
the trips happen.  
Race also played a visible role in the Gold Star pilgrimages.  The American Battle 
Monuments Commission adopted desegregated burial practices, but American women 
visited those graves under the prevailing customs of Jim Crow.  Congress ultimately 
decided that white pilgrims and black pilgrims should not travel together, but promised 
that “no discrimination whatsoever” would be made and that “each group would receive 
equal accommodations, care, and consideration.”8  This was primarily justified by the 
cultural inability of American passenger ships to accommodate both races equally on the 
same voyage.  African Americans did receive hospitable treatment throughout their 
voyages, but it was far from equal.  They traveled on less luxurious vessels, were kept off 
of white train cars in France (American policy), assigned special black nurses and guides, 
and inundated with white American typecastss—like being greeted by black jazz 
musicians and fed meals of fried chicken and imported watermelon.9  Of the 
approximately 1,600 African American women possibly eligible for the trip, only a few 
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hundred met the requirements established requirements for the trip.10  Among the select 
few, even fewer opted to make the segregated pilgrimage.   
Many refused to go because of the blatant racism and hypocrisy of the government. 
A petition from African American mothers to President Hoover stated that they felt “Jim 
Crowed, separated and insulted” by the “implication that we are not fit persons to travel 
with other bereaved ones.”11 It made no sense that black and white soldiers sacrificed 
equally on the field, but American mothers with different shades of skin could not mourn 
over graves together.12 An African American soldier of Great War wrote the War 
Department to protest the segregation of Gold Star mothers.  He asked “is not your dead 
colored soldier’s grave worth as much as the white?  Do you believe the Lord admitted 
these boys’ souls into heave thru separate gates?”13  The ex-soldier feared what his 
government’s racist segregationist pilgrimages might do to his country’s international 
image.  “When our country shows no respect towards us, what does she expect other 
countries to show towards us and our gold star mothers?”14  Despite this veteran’s fears 
that black mothers might face racism abroad, African American mothers only 
encountered Jim Crow in France through the policies of their own government.  Not all 
African American pilgrims felt hostility towards the segregated policies.  Ellen Slaughter, 
a mother from Texas felt not shame towards her government, but “pride” that Congress 
allowed her to travel in “comfort,” treated her “courteously,” and maintained her son’s 
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grave.15 Slaughter’s gratitude toward her country could not even be contained until she 
returned home from the trip.  She wrote her thanks while at sea, eagerly waiting to reunite 
with her son. 
 
 
Photo 3.2: Passport Photograph of Gold Star Mother Ellen Slaughter.  Source:  RG 92, NARA. (From 
burial file of Jim Hughett, files now at National Personnel Records Center, NPRC, in St. Louis, Missouri).  
Gold Star Mothers who participated in the War Department’s pilgrimages typically have a passport 
photograph like this included in their son’s or husband’s burial file. 
 
From all accounts, the French treated black American mothers as equals, just as 
they had welcomed African American veterans following the Great War.16 When the 
African American Gold Star Mothers arrived at the Arc de Triomphe they were greeted by 
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a large crowd of French spectators and hundreds of African American expatriates from 
the United States.  Despite the racism of their country, influential American leaders such 
as Ambassador Edge and General Pershing often dined with the black pilgrims after their 
arrival to Paris.17 African American pilgrims kept the memory alive of their sacred 
remains just as white women.  The experience that they took from the European trip was 
fundamentally different than that of their white counterparts, however.  In Europe, most 
African American women experienced their first taste of “true freedom.”18  One African 
American mother returned home with an understanding that blacks could “live in the 
same hotels, eat in the same restaurants, travel in the same conveyances, and get along 
when they will with the same tranquility and the colored and the white dead laying side 
by side in the cemeteries they visited.”19  In the upcoming decades, American racism 
increasingly became an international issue.  Some historians go so far to argue that the 
changes brought by the civil rights movements of the 1960s moved more rapidly because 
of government fear of negative foreign perceptions of a hypocritical United States.20 
The Gold Star Pilgrimages represent more in American history than an early 
example of American women asserting themselves politically.  Furthermore, they were 
not just a case study of the fractured democratic American society in the interwar era.  
Taking a step back from these important issues and analyzing the basic function of the 
pilgrimages reveals diplomatic undertones.  Part of the American government’s intent 
with the pilgrimages was to get American women on the soil of Europe to mourn.  This is 
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yet another example of memory as a diplomatic tool started immediately after the Great 
War.  American women travelling on a gift from their government served the national 
interest of their country.  The final destination for each pilgrim was a shrine of memory 
that the federal government had created.  The participation of American women in a 
standardized pilgrimage validated these sites and demonstrated to the French that 
presence of American soldier dead in their soil indeed meant an everlasting bond.  
American dead demanded continued Franco-American respect despite anti-
Americanism, economic depression, and growing European militarism.  The Gold Star 
Pilgrims contributed to this narrative of diplomacy, which required continual attention.  
Public statements from French Prime Minister Édouard Marie Herriot at the end of 1932 
showed the timeliness of the Gold Star Pilgrimages.   
By the 1930s, French leaders started to question if they sufficiently paid their debt 
of gratitude owed to America in the two decades after the war.  In an address to France’s 
Chamber of Deputies regarding war debt, Herriot noted from the outset that his country 
would never forget America’s contribution to victory.  Nor would France forget their 
emotional dues because of the “silent testimony of those 75,000 [American] graves” 
serving as constant reminders.21  Although the reminder of the dead demanded thanks 
from the French, “gratitude for the past” should not “prevent free men from speaking 
frankly to free citizens,” in Herriot’s opinion.22  Herriot indicated that American leaders, 
and previous French leaders, hid behind the comfortable discourse of the dead instead of 
engaging in frank talk.23  The presence of American Gold Star mothers brought a renewed 
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focus on the discourse of the dead at a time when French leaders attempted to move 
beyond its strict parameters. 
Testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Military Affairs about passage of 
Gold Star Pilgrimage legislation revealed an understanding among leading women that 
their mission had foreign policy merit.  New York mother Mathilda Burling’s 
diplomatically slanted appeal for pilgrimages opened this chapter24  Another Gold Star 
Mother, Ethel Nock, similarly saw any pilgrimage she might make to her sons grave as a 
mission.  She urged the Senate to reconsider allowing the American Red Cross to 
administrate the pilgrimages.  Nock saw the proposed voyages as “sacred pilgrimages” 
that ought to be carried out on “a high plane” as a “crusade that would not only benefit 
mothers but make better relations between France and America.”25  While the Red Cross 
did excellent work, Nock feared that the organization lacked the power to give the 
pilgrimages legitimacy.  Nock worried that if the Red Cross handled the pilgrimages the 
likelihood of them becoming a “junket” increased dramatically.26  Nock felt that the 
pilgrims should only include mothers because the majority of widows sought only a 
“pleasure trip” with thoughts only of Paris.27  In Nock’s assessment, the best way to 
preserve the sacredness of the pilgrimages was to relegate them to U.S. Army 
Quartermaster supervision.  The pilgrimages were strictly a government endeavor and 
the most efficient government entity to move people was the U.S. Quartermaster.  The 
Graves Registration Service that had handled all of the burials also fell under the 
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Quartermaster Department.  Therefore, it could best get mothers to the right graves.  
Nock acknowledged that if the uniformed officers handled the pilgrimages they would 
likely be more spartan than a Red Cross run voyage.  This was a good thing.  A true 
American pilgrim did not need comfort and luxury.  She needed a “high type of courage” 
reflective of a mother who birthed the courageous heroes buried in Europe.28  These 
women planned to go abroad, engage with the memory of their dead child, and use the 
universal language of motherhood to improve international relations. 
The rhetoric of these leading Gold Star Mothers clearly alluded to an 
understanding that their pilgrimages represented more than the fulfillment of a mother’s 
needs.  New York Congressman Fiorello La Guardia, who reached the height of his 
political fame as New York’s mayor during the New Deal, aided the Gold Star Mothers’ 
cause by further articulating the diplomatic importance of the proposed pilgrimages.  La 
Guardia had served in Italy during World War I and cared deeply about the preservation 
of American memory abroad. He proposed funding pilgrimages shortly after the war, 
however, the heated battle over repatriation stifled his bill.  With the growing support for 
pilgrimages evident in May 1928, La Guardia saw an opportunity for the United States 
Government to “not only give mothers relief,” but also to “do a great deal of good for world 
peace.”29  America had not ratified the Treaty of Versailles and never joined the League of 
Nations, but did support the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact.  America’s mothers could do 
more for international peace than any formal agreement the United States had accepted 
since the Great War ended.  In La Guardia’s assessment, American mothers would come 
in contact with Gold Star mothers of France while abroad.  Together, they would create a 
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“common understanding that would be far more lasting than any peace treaty.”30  The 
pilgrimages transformed mothers of France and the United States into public diplomats.  
During this period of international turmoil, La Guardia felt that mothers going to visit 
remains would be “the best representatives that the United States could send to France” 
because they alone could help the international community realize the “uselessness of 
war.”31  La Guardia aptly summed up the diplomatic uses of memory at the end of his 
testimony.  The “companionship of sorrow is more enduring than the comradeship of 
victory.”32  The American remains left in France represented the nations’ collective 
sorrow.  The American memory of the dead united with the French memory to create an 
everlasting bond that the arrogance of victory could only fog.  
Members of the Senate Committee of Military Affairs debated the diplomatic 
implications sending grieving Americans to France, and attempted organize them in the 
most beneficial way for the United States.  Senator Hiram Bingham from Connecticut 
feared that if too many mourning American mothers arrived to France in one large group 
the effect would be negative.  Americans living in France wrote Congress opposing such 
large excursions.  They feared that the French would “totally misunderstand” massive 
pilgrimages.33  Instead of improving relations, large pilgrimages would sour them.  The 
French would see the “flaunting of grief,” and “displays of celebration” instead of genuine 
American mourning.34  To avoid the risk of insulting the French, small contingents of 
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American woman traveled abroad.35  This hopefully would make the French less skeptical 
of American intentions, and spread out the time period in which American mothers would 
be a presence on the European memorial landscape.   
The federal government spent considerable money to send these women abroad to 
interact with sites of memory and serve as public diplomats.  The intent was not for the 
women to stand out as individuals, but to represent American sacrifice as a whole—the 
same as the graves they visited.  American remains had been in France for over a decade 
by the time the first pilgrims arrived on French soil.  The standardization and formality 
of pilgrimages helped revamp memories of American soldier dead.  For three years, the 
French saw a continuous flow of American women among them.  They stood out among 
the crowd: wearing purple arm bands monographed with ‘pilgrim’, riding in large touring 
buses, and following uniformed officers.  The presence of American women signified that 
America really had not forgotten the commitments promised through the discourse of the 
dead.  It was not desired for Gold Star pilgrimages to function like the legionnaires’ 1927 
reunion in Paris.  No “display of celebration” or “flaunting of grief” should come from 
Gold Star women, said U.S. Congressmen in deliberations for funding.36  America’s 
friends in France needed to understand these excursions, and not feel the confusion of 
the 1927 Legionnaires strange mix of mourning and festival.  “The ranks of mothers and 
sweethearts” might remedy the memory of the 1927 veterans.37  New York Senator Robert 
Wagner imparted his hopes of the pilgrimage to fellow New Yorker, Congressman John 
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Boylan.  Wagner envisioned the Gold Star trips as “holy pilgrimages” of a “new 
expeditionary force” defending peace and recasting French perceptions of Americans.  
Gold Star women would show France that America was not “fighting doughboys” or 
“gallant legionnaires,” but a “nation of homes and families whose members were capable 
of the most pious sentiments.”38   
 The regimented nature of the Gold Star Pilgrimages causes some to dismiss their 
ability to project true American culture abroad.  The female participants had their 
itinerary planned for them, and found limited “opportunities to mingle socially and 
challenge national stereotypes.”39 Pilgrims’ exposure to France was certainly more 
insulated than an independent traveler.40  Still, the pilgrimage of a Gold Star Mother 
lasted approximately a month, giving them considerable time in a foreign culture.  After 
a weeklong trans-Atlantic voyage, female pilgrims underwent a briefing by a male Army 
officer in Paris and then collectively traveled to France’s Tomb of the Unknown where one 
woman laid a ceremonial wreath.  This respect for French soldier dead initiated every 
pilgrimage. They then spent three days in Paris going on guided tours and shopping trips.  
Following the initial touring and acclimation to France, the women divided up according 
the burial location of their family member and traveled together to the appropriate 
cemetery.  The American government gave the women four days for the actual pilgrimage 
part of their trip.  On each day of the mourning expedition, they made visits to the graves 
and engaged in whatever local sightseeing was available.  This often included visits to the 
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nearby battlefields to put the sacrifice in context.41  Congressmen feared that the 
assemblage of “large groups of grief-afflicted women” would produce dangerous mental 
effects.42 To prevent excessive “morbidness or hysteria” and protect what the U.S. 
government viewed as the fragile emotions of female pilgrims, the government took 
precautionary measures.  The Army forbid elaborate ceremonies from taking place at 
cemeteries where women visited and reduced the somberness of the event by adopting 
three key features:  a “prompt and accurate” trip to the grave, distribution of flowers, and 
a complementary photograph of the woman at the tombstone.”43  The government also 
planned for the physical and mental comfort of the women travelling to cemeteries in the 
countryside of France far away from the comforts of Paris.  At several remote cemeteries, 
the Army constructed temporary “rest houses” decorated like an American parlor.  These 
houses offered seating, refreshments, and restroom facilities.  The purpose of the rest 
houses was to offer grieving women respite.  Before, and after their trip to the graves, they 
could reflect in a comfortable space reminiscent of home.44 
Sources illustrating the French perspective of the pilgrimages show that the 
importance of the American pilgrimage transcended the spiritual well-being of American 
women.  The Gold Star Pilgrimages contributed to the Franco-American exchange of 
memory started at the end of the Great War.  Both American and French newspapers 
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carried accounts of the pilgrimages that took place over a three-year span.  The accounts 
from both nations relayed similar stories. French newspapers with more conservative 
leanings covered the pilgrimages extensively.45   L'Ouest-Éclair reported positive 
impressions of the “beautifully organized” American pilgrimages, and showed awe of the 
“unimaginable care and kindness” the U.S. government provided its women.  It was clear 
to this paper that when it came to the memory of its fallen soldiers, Americans truthfully 
would “stop at no expense.”46  The same paper was also pleased to report to its French 
readers that the American women imparted “gratitude for the way they were received and 
for all the attention they were surrounded [with].”47  In an era where many Americans 
seemed ungrateful to the French, it was surely refreshing to receive humble guests.  The 
American women did not know what to expect from the French prior to their voyage, but 
left knowing a people “truly hospitable and friendly” to their American homeland.48  Two 
years into the pilgrimages, coverage of them still found favorable space in the French 
papers.  A 1932 article conveyed the sentiments of the American officer accompanying a 
group of Gold Star Mothers to the people of France.  As the American mothers first 
stepped foot on French soil, their leader, Colonel Jordan, expressed thanks for the 
“beautiful expression of friendship” that the French organized.  He assured the French 
audience that if they got a chance to speak with American mothers or widows they would 
find reciprocating feelings of friendship.  He sincerely hoped that “one day maybe a few 
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of you will visit the United States” and see the same generous courtesy.”49  American 
military dead and Franco-American respect for their memory created possibilities for 
reciprocating positive relations.  Colonel Jordan’s speech imparted a feeling that no 
matter how tense relations got between France and the United States, travelers from both 
nations would face little animosity abroad if they respected the memories of the dead. 
A vibrant example of the diplomatic undercurrents of the Gold Start Pilgrimages 
was visible in speech given to American mothers recently arrived in France by General J. 
Pagezy, Artillery Commander of the Paris Region.  In his address to American women, 
General Pagezy praised the heroic and ferocious American fighting man that suffered the 
“cruel losses” of battle.50  He acknowledged that American women deserved as much 
reverence from the French as American soldier dead did, because “they were your 
husbands, they were your sons.”51  He took this admiration further by placing the sacrifice 
of American women on a higher pedestal than French women because their American 
sons crossed the Atlantic to “help a friendly nation unjustly attacked.”52  When American 
women departed to visit “their tombs” the following day he hoped that through their deep 
emotion they see what how thankful France was that they left their bodies entombed in 
France.  Speaking for France, he promised perpetual upkeep of the sacred trust, only this 
could prove “the eternal friendship that has always existed and will always exist between 
our two nations.”53  A similar sentiment came from a Parisian women’s group that sent 
American mothers home with French dirt held in a sack made of united French and 
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American flags.  It was the French group’s hope that the French soil was just as sacred to 
the American mother as their own.54  Regardless of the political disagreements between 
France and the United States the past several years, American mothers and their dead 
sons could rest easy knowing that “our countries are still closely united for the defense of 
the common idea, for which they sacrificed their lives.”55 
  The Gold Star Pilgrimages were unique form of commemoration representing “a 
point of intersection between individual loss and national community.”56  They 
simultaneously brought together groups of individuals to share and reformulate 
memories.  This in turn created a “common identity” that crafted an official narrative 
blurring the lines of American diversity.57  The thousands of Gold Star women 
participating in these pilgrimages shared a standardized experience and returned home 
with similar memories of the event.  This is evident from the plethora of “thank you” 
letters that the mothers sent to the federal government upon their return to the United 
States.  The elderly mother of a combat doctor from Charleston, WV wrote to the War 
Department after her trip.  She spoke of her “satisfaction and pleasure” regarding her 
son’s grave and thanked the federal government for its “generosity” and willingness to “do 
so much more than any of the other countries.”58  A Wisconsin mother similarly wrote to 
“the best government in the world,” offering thanks that her son rested on the “beautiful 
hill sides of France.”  The tender care given to her dead son brought her peace.59  A final 
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example of the common memory formed by mothers during this pilgrimage comes from 
the mother of Dorothy Millman, a nurse from Youngstown, Ohio who died of influenza 
on the Western Front.  Millman’s mother accepted her government’s pilgrimage offer to 
travel to the “cemetery in Europe where the remains of my daughter are interred.”  Like 
the other mothers, the “beautiful cemetery” brought to her a “peace” that words failed to 
express.60   
These letters are not mere products of women thankful for an all-expense paid trip 
to visit remains.   They also exhibit the devoutness of the federal government to keep the 
memory of a mother’s, and America’s, sacrifice alive in Europe. Additionally, the positive 
experiences of the mothers affirmed that the choice to leave their bodies in France was a 
good one.  Americans periodically questioned French interactions with American dead 
since the end of the war.  This ranged from the initial distrust of French motives for 
wanting American dead in their soil to claims of desecration after the bodies were 
permanently placed.  The positive feedback of America’s female pilgrims created a more 
positive image of France.    The standardization of participants’ reactions to the trip 
validated, at least partially, the program’s effectiveness.  Uniformity of experience showed 
that the federal funding for the pilgrimages successfully made American women content 
with their choice to relinquish remains to Uncle Sam.  Their success also exposed the 
French to a positive aspect of American culture when the international situation seemed 
bleak. 
                                                             





    
Photo 3.3: Officer giving an illustrated talk to Pilgrims at the Rest House at St. Mihiel Cemetery, undated. 
Source:  RG 92, NARA, Records of the Office of the Quartermaster General; Photographic Albums 











Photo 3.4: Gold Star Mother Elisabeth Anderson signing guest log at the Arch de Triomphe.  
Source: Bibliothèque nationale de France, département Estampes et photographie, online 
archives.   
 












The Discourse of Peace 
 The idea that Gold Star Pilgrimages to American graves might contribute to 
sustained international peace was reflective of the transitioning discourse of the dead 
through the 1930s.  From the end of the Great War, through the 1920s, much of the 
rhetoric of memory diplomacy possessed visible hostility towards communist 
revolution.  It also offered a means to respond against anti-Americanism.  American 
leaders used the dead to make powerful statements about growing anti-Americanism in 
France and increased left-wing radicalism throughout the world.  Through all of the 
aggressive uses of American dead, hopes of peace remained prevalent theme.  Starting 
in the 1930s, peace increasingly became the focus of messages assigned to American 
dead in foreign soil. 
 The heightened anti-Americanism in France throughout the 1920s diminished 
some by the 1930s, but the French Third Republic faced instability.  From 1932 to 1940, 
a dozen prime ministers led the French parliament.  This is not the place to discuss how 
each of these leaders engaged with the memories of American military remains.   The 
following section focuses on the period of William C. Bullitt’s ambassadorship to France 
and explains the diplomatic uses of memory during this period. Bullitt arrived to France 
in 1936, three years after the pilgrimages ended.  His tenure is a good analytical point of 
entry for a study of memory diplomacy because it coincided with the completion of the 
ABMC’s major commemorative projects and the German occupation of France.  When 
William C. Bullitt took over as America’s Ambassador to France in 1936, he brought to 
the position intimate knowledge of communism, and a strong distaste for the ideology.  




ambassador to the Soviet Union. Still, most of his use of American memory focused on 
how the U.S. and France could use their memories of shared sacrifice to maintain 
harmonious Franco-American relations, not simply to show hatred towards 
communism. 
As Bullitt’s service in France began, André Léon Blum served as France’s Prime 
Minister.  Blum’s tenure highlighted deep political fractures in France.  He represented 
the moderate left branch of the Socialist Party and united parties on the left and centre 
into a Popular Front that opposed right-wing fascists groups gaining momentum with 
Hitler’s rise.  This fragile coalition was short lived as each component differed on its 
ultimate goal.  Communists cared about progressing revolutionary goals, and the leftist 
radicals could not agree with the monetary and social reforms supported by Blum’s 
Socialists.  Despite the brevity of France’s Popular Front, its existence stemmed from the 
violent coalition of powerful right wing groups in France associated with fascist and 
royalist tendencies.  Although fractured, the conservative right wing groups of political 
clubs, university students, and disillusioned veterans successfully mobilized throughout 
the 1930s to disrupt public meetings and riot against the left.  Their most effective 
violent outburst came on January 27, 1934, when radical socialist Édouard Daladier was 
elected as Prime Minister.  Fascists leagues responded to the election with a violent riot 
near the French National Assembly on February 6, 1934.  The rioting spread throughout 
France and turned into a battle between the left and right.  At the end of the riot over a 
dozen protestors died with thousands more wounded.  Daladier stepped down the day 
after the riot to be replaced by a conservative.  The effectiveness of the right, and the 
bloodshed they caused, remained in the political consciousness of French politicians for 




It was in this heated environment that Ambassador Bullitt engaged 
diplomatically with the French.  While anti-Americanism waned, an overthrow of 
America’s greatest democratic partner from within, or from outside, seemed highly 
possible.61  Bullitt’s correspondence in his early tenure as ambassador indicated that he 
feared outward influences on France’s stability more so than domestic riots.  Bullitt 
reminded President Roosevelt in a cablegram that although reports of riots come 
frequently from France, it must be remembered that “they are very French riots, carried 
out in the most pleasant and almost theatrical spirit and are not to be taken seriously—
at least not yet.”  He added that “people forget how politely the French can riot.”62  
Major anti-American demonstrations demanded attention from American ambassadors 
in the earlier interwar period.  Bullitt’s dismissal of French domestic protest showed 
that more of his attention in the mid-thirties went towards events outside of France.  
This outward focus coincided with a new direction in the utility of America’s WWI 
memory abroad.  Instead of using American memory of World War I to effect change 
within France, it was broadened to address bigger international concerns.  The official 
dedication of the ABMC’s World War I cemeteries in 1937 offered American and French 
leaders a platform to articulate broader diplomatic goals.  International problems 
overshadowed domestic issues for leaders from France and the United States when they 
stood on the most spotlighted stages of memory since the Great War’s end. 
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Aggressive actions of the fascist governments that once drew support from the 
United States, brought a shifted American war memory in the late 1930s.  Gold Star 
Mothers spread messages of the pain war caused on their tours of Europe in the early 
1930s.  Perhaps the most prominent example of the peaceful turn in the discourse of the 
dead came on August 1, 1937, years after the female pilgrimages ended.  On this day, a 
very public display of American World War I memory and cultural bonds between 
France and the United States took place when the ABMC dedicated the crown jewel of 
its WWI memorials, a domineering Doric column atop Montfaucon.  This large 
commemorative shaft was visible for miles and oriented everyone in the area to where 
Americans sacrificed on the Meuse-Argonne battlefield.   Mountfaucon represented one 
of America’s most dramatic battles in the Great War and stood just miles away from the 
largest congregation of American military remains in the small village of Romagne-sous-
Montfaucon.  The dedication in mid-summer was an impressive event.  Its list of 
speakers was attention grabbing: General Pershing, General Petain, Ambassador Bullitt, 
French President M. Albert Lebrun, and President Franklin Roosevelt (via radio).  The 
American government chose this site to make its grandest display of American sacrifice 
for a peaceful world order.  No other American site of memory possessed the power that 
fourteen-thousand remains offered.  The ceremony held was elaborate.  It included 
nearly two hours of parade, speeches, patriotic song, and prayer. This was also the most 
public of all American dedications.  American radio broadcasted the entire event live 
throughout America and France with commentators guiding them through the 
proceedings as if it were a sporting event.  This was a chance for leaders in both France 
and the United States to publicly engage the discourse of sacrifice and tell both of their 




There had been plenty of European tension throughout the interwar years, but 
this dedication came during a period of great uncertainty.  The location of the dedication 
was surely bittersweet for the speakers and the audience.  Germany reoccupied the 
Rhineland, only a short distance east, just a year before, signifying renewed militarism 
and a clear break from the Treaty of Versailles. Nazis in Germany represented a force of 
chaos to the United States nearly equivalent to Russian communists.63   Mussolini no 
longer looked like the good dictator that Americans saw following his assumption of 
power in the 1920s.  He openly supported a Berlin-Rome coalition with this dangerous 
party.    In a speech given in Berlin weeks after Montfaucon, Mussolini spoke of 
“Fascism and Nazism” as “two manifestations of parallel historical situations.”64  Both 
nations shared the “same conceptions of life and history” and believed ‘in violence as a 
force determining the life of peoples.”65 Commitment to violence had already been 
proven.  At the time of the Montfaucon dedication Italy had formally annexed Ethiopia. 
It would officially join the Anti-Comintern alliance in months.  In other parts of the 
world, Japan was waging a ruthless war against the Chinese, and Joseph Stalin had just 
began his most brutal phase of purges.   
Woodrow Wilson’s use of war remains as justification for collective security to 
avoid war had made the first of many full revolutions in the twentieth century.  At 
Montfaucon, leaders of France and the United States made their most direct appeal for 
citizens of the world to understand that they sacrificed in the Great War so peace might 
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last.  In all of the speeches delivered that day, there was hope that that American 
remains and soldiers’ memories of war could prevent the outbreak of a new conflict.66  
After several prayers from religious figures, the stage at Montfaucon went to 
Ambassador Bullitt.  He began the ceremony calling upon the audience of hundreds of 
French and Americans to recall the friendship between the two nations stretching from 
Yorktown to the Meuse-Argonne.  In an era of political and social revolutions, it was 
important to focus on memories of the democratic revolutions in both nation’s past. 
Bullitt noted that the French soldiers who died in the American Revolution and the 
Americans who died in the Great War fell as victors.  Their victory meant nothing 
without peace, however.  The fight that Franco-American soldiers faced in this age was 
for “Peace.”67  Bullitt’s comments did not dwell on the internal disruption in the French 
political system or respond to anti-Americanism.  They instead addressed calming 
international tensions.  The rhetoric of violence to regenerate national power prevalent 
in Nazi and Fascist rhetoric was absent here.  Bullitt saw in France and the United States 
an alliance similar to that of Italy and Germany, yet France and America “marched 
together under the flag of peace,” not war.68  Months before, Bullitt delivered a similar 
Memorial Day dedicatory address at the new chapel in the Suresnes American cemetery 
as French airplanes unloaded a rain of flowers on the American graves.69  Bullitt’s 
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message of peace set the tone for what was to come.  More famous speakers followed 
Bullitt and advanced his themes.   
The National Commander of the American Legion, Harry Colmery, told his 
enormous audience that the thousands of Americans “who lie pillowed in glory. . . 
sleeping tenderly secure in the embrace of France” remind the world that the “blessings 
of peace are more fruitful and lasting than the spoils of war.”70  The most explicit anti-
war speech of the day came from General of the Armies, and ABMC Chairman, John 
Pershing.  Pershing used the public occasion to make a political statement regarding the 
current turmoil in Europe.  He noted that the events commemorated ought to bring 
about hatred for war.  He urged the international press to resist printing “sensational 
news that inflamed international antagonisms” and feared that unless a cure to the 
international “madness” was found, western civilization would fall.71  He was sad that 
his “conflict left many questions still unsettled” and that “hatred and suspicions still 
exist while armaments continue to grow.”72 Pershing had pride for the Montfaucon 
memorial his ABMC erected, but felt the best memorial for the “silent millions who lie in 
Europe’s war cemeteries” should be international cooperation and open dialogue among 
nations.73  Evoking the memory of soldier dead, Pershing assured his audience that if 
the dead could speak, they would “with one voice join us in offering an ardent prayer to 
God that there may never be another world war.”74  Montfaucon marked the 
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culmination of Pershing work as the caretaker of American World War I memory, and in 
this, his most heard speech as the ABMC’s leader, the dead soldiers of his A.E.F. 
remained entirely in focus.  Pershing resided in France for much of the interwar period 
and saw the ebb-and-flow of anti-Americanism and left-wing protest.  His words as the 
ABMC spokesman at the end of the interwar era provided insight into his perception of 
the utility of American commemoration.  Pershing’s ABMC sites were certainly meant 
for mourning.  He personally greeted grieving pilgrims, accompanied them to ABMC 
sites, and frequently participated in memorial ceremonies throughout the interwar.  
With the prospect of new conflict looming, Pershing’s words revealed that he also 
viewed his dead soldiers in France as tokens of peace.  He lobbied for their bodies to 
remain behind and hoped that their presence on European soil might contribute to the 
“hopefulness of a future” in which all people “detest war.”75 
President Roosevelt similarly turned to soldier dead as reason to avoid future war 
when he addressed the audience live via radio broadcast.  He reminded spectators 
standing on the massive battlefield that American military men “contributed their lives 
and lie buried on this and other battlefields” and that they died “brothers in arms with 
Frenchmen” as martyrs for the “ideals of democracy.”  The essence of FDR’s speech was 
that both French and American soldiers died for peace, and through their deaths the two 
nations’ “cultures were brought into closer communion” than ever.76  French President 
M. Albert Lebrun provided a similar message of peace.    Lebrun spoke for all of France, 
urging all to remember the remains as symbols assuring “the future of Civilization, and 
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guides to the world for a blessed path of peace, despite the current disturbances.”  
Because of the international “disturbances everywhere,” Lebrun felt that the “two great 
Democracies should remain united” to assure international stability.77 American sites of 
memory served as meeting places for the dead in Lebrun’s imagination.  While standing 
at Montfaucon he expressed the belief that such places acted as “points of assembly for 
the spirits of the victims of war.”78  American spirits, along with French and British 
cohorts met on memorial grounds in the “majesty of peaceful summer nights” in the 
gentle caress of France.79  Visitation to sites of memory allowed the living a chance to 
interact with the dead on a spiritual level and learn how to avoid their “cruel past.”80 
The radio broadcast of this ceremony meant that a larger audience participated in 
this type of commemorative ceremony than ever before.  The Meuse-Argonne dedication 
was the first of its kind to take place in the era of mass communication.  Radio allowed 
French listeners to hear the words of President Roosevelt “brought through the ocean” 
to invoke thoughts of “the great American people.”81  Over the course of the 1930s, the 
United States turned to the new technology of radio to “broadcast in the service of 
peace” and combat Nazi radio programs that purveyed their own interpretation of 
current events to international audiences.82  Radio allowed the governments of the 
United States and France to reach a much larger audience with the Montfaucon 
dedication than ever possible before.  Montfaucon was likely the most listened to 
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example of a memory exchange between France and the United States up to that point 
in the twentieth century.  The broadcast also opened the gates of cultural transfer.  
American and French listeners heard speakers talking in their native tongue and had no 
translation available.  Although a language barrier existed, the raw emotion of the 
speakers still came through.  A reigning feeling of genuineness prevailed.  Listeners 
heard the event just as the live audience did.  They heard French and American patriotic 
songs, and vividly pictured the event through detailed commentary by broadcasters.   
The American soldiers who died in the Meuse nearly two decades were gone, but 
political leaders kept their memory alive, and made them into public symbols of peace.  
President Roosevelt reported to Ambassador Bullitt days after the dedication that “the 
ceremonies at Montfaucon came through splendidly and your voice and what you said 
were excellent.  I am glad to know, too, that my voice got through to all of you who were 
at the field.”83  Participants were pleased that a message of peace, along with the 
commitment of a Franco-American alliance, was disseminated to such a large audience.  
It was unknown if the message of peace at Montfaucon would be fulfilled.  
France’s daily socialist newspaper, L'Humanité  reported to their readers the promise 
speakers offered  at Montfaucon that “peace will be saved by the friendly relations 
existing between the long three great democracies of the world.”84  In the following 
years, France and America continued their attempts to spread messages of peace 
through the memories of the dead.  To maximize the audience, America even moved its 
traditional Memorial Day ceremonies in France from Monday to a weekend, “in 
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expectation that more French people will be able to attend than on a working day in 
France.” This was likely approved by the, returned to power, Socialist Prime Minister 
Édouard Daladier, who represented the French workers.85  Efforts to include French 
workers in American memory indicated a large shift from the anti-Bolshevisk messages 
of Myron Herrick’s 1920s Memorial Days.  Leaders in the American Legion also took 
steps to rehabilitate the image of American veterans in Paris during the period.  An 
ABMC staffer reported to General Pershing in 1936 that steps had been taken to stress 
“more milder forms of indoor sport and entertainment” among American veterans.  
Furthermore, their leaders took steps to “hold down the heavy drinking and ribald” 
elements of their meetings in Paris.86  The sometimes brash and aggressive nature of 
American World War I memory tamed considerably in France during the 1930s.  This 
was a direct response to instability around the world.  The 1927 Legionnaires’ 
convention in Paris was not a public relations disaster, but the tone of American 
memory abroad changed considerably after its conclusion.  Economic depression and 
political revolution did not put the Allies in a position to stoke the fires and project an 
aggressive image of themselves to others.  The more reserved American memory of its 
soldier dead reflected in Gold Star Mother Pilgrimages and 1930s monuments 
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Photo 3.5: Speakers on podium at Montfaucon Dedication, August 1, 1937.  Source:  ABMC Archives, 
Arlington, VA.  Pershing is the elderly uniformed man in the center, to his left is French President Lebrun, 











American Dead in Red Soil 
 Thus far, this chapter has focused on the peaceful message assigned to American 
military dead in France through the 1930s.  It is now worthwhile to shift geographic focus 
to see how the United States government viewed its soldier dead in a European country 
perceived as unfriendly.  While American soldier dead in France became symbols of peace 
and friendship, soldier dead in Soviet Russia were a liability in need of rapid removal.  
American soldier dead in France worked to bolster good relations because they 
represented common sacrifice.  In the Soviet Union, the American dead from the same 
war stood as a reminder to Russians of invasion.  The expedition to remove American 
remains from Russia represented one of the first diplomatic interactions between the 
United States and the Soviet Union.  Repatriation of negative memories also helped keep 
peaceable relations with the Soviets while the international situation elsewhere 
deteriorated. 
  When Ambassador Myron Herrick delivered his attack on Russian communism at 
Suresnes in May 1927 by invoking the memory of American dead at Suresnes, hundreds 
of American remains of the same war rested in the same cancerous Soviet soil he 
reprimanded.  Herrick’s opening declaration to his Parisian audience that “wherever an 
American soldier lies buried in any part of the world his compatriots today lovingly gather 
to honor his memory” was simply not true.87  Nor was his statement that “we have no 
thought of attacking the Soviet regime in Russia; what it does on its own ‘reservation’ is 
                                                             





its own affair.”88  American soldiers had already attacked Soviets between the summers 
of 1918 and 1919 around the Dvina River in Northern Russia.  The “insidious menace” and 
saddest “moral debacle known to history” that he called Russia, did not conduct memorial 
services in 1927 to the thousands of American soldiers who took part in a small invasion 
of their soil.89   
President Wilson sent soldiers from the American 85th Division, primarily natives 
of Michigan, into Russia to join an expeditionary force of British and French soldiers in 
the final year of the Great War.  Their mission was to ensure that allied weapons 
stockpiled in Archangelsk, a White Sea port, did not fall into the hands of the 
revolutionary Bolsheviks.  The recovery mission escalated into an offensive against 
Bolsheviks quickly.  For approximately a year after the Great War ended, American troops 
fought in the subarctic climate.  This “Polar Bear Expedition” grew unpopular in the 
United States.  War ended on the Western Front and Wilson participated in the treaty 
negotiations while speaking of world peace.  All the while, the war continued for American 
soldiers in Russia.  Morale dropped within the ranks of the Polar Bears, and families called 
for their return home.  Approximately 230 Americans died in this fighting, only one-
hundred of these remains departed with living in 1919.90  Reports of the American 
withdraw from Russia revealed a chaotic scene with American and British soldiers 
frantically exhuming corpses as their hour of departure neared.91 The remaining corpses 
laid in frozen soil that their home country would not give official diplomatic recognition 
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to until 1933.  American efforts to recover these remains from communist Russia 
foreshadowed the future relationship of the United States with the Soviet Union and the 
direction that the diplomatic nature of U.S. memory would move in the Cold War.  A 
detailed American account of the recovery in 1934 also indicated cultural differences 
between Americans and Russians regarding care of dead soldiers of memories of past 
conflict. 
Myron Herrick saw communists in Paris as Russian agents secretly sent to spread 
“germs of a loathsome malady.”92  Distrust between Russia and the United States and fear 
of infiltration remained constant themes throughout the twentieth century.  Lack of 
diplomatic relations between the two countries through most of the interwar years even 
made tasks like body recovery espionage missions.  America first made an attempt locate 
its soldier dead from unfriendly communist soil in 1929.  The Russian government did 
not allow American military to be a part of this.  In lieu of the military, they allowed a 
contingent of members from the Veterans of Foreign Wars and Michigan’s Polar Bear 
Association into Archangelsk.  Within this group, the American Graves Registration 
Service imbedded “an army officer” and “a group of civilian employees of the U.S. Army 
masquerading” as VFW members.93  This specialized subgroup did the serious recovery 
work.94  The infiltration mission proved successful.  Before winter weather made the task 
of recovery impossible, they saved all but thirty-nine American remains from communist 
soil.95  The final attempt to recover these remains came after President Franklin Roosevelt 
gave diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union in 1933.   
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Within the first year of recognizing the Soviet Union as a legitimate government, 
the United States asked Moscow for permission to remove the remainder of its bodies 
from the Polar Bear Expedition.  The Soviets granted permission, Congress allocated 
funds, and Russia’s Intourist Company provided a contract to escort the American 
expedition.  Daniel Gibbs, an officer in the Grave Registration Service, led the team of 
Americans on the ground in Russia.  Throughout the expedition, he kept a daily record 
and presented a detailed report to the Quartermaster Department at the conclusion of the 
mission.  Washington undertook the mission not only to satisfy the American need to 
recover its remains, but also to help remedy a “diplomatic problem of considerable 
magnitude.”96  Although the United States and U.S.S.R. never officially entered a state of 
war with one another, the American remains in Soviet soil had been the aggressors.  They 
occupied the country for over a year” destroying “crops, homes, and driving people away 
from towns.”97  Both sides essentially fought a “guerrilla war” and a “great deal of ill 
feeling” lingered in the Russian countryside98  The bodies of British and French soldiers 
would remain in Northern Russia, but America’s would not.  Removal of American bodies 
might erase the memory of American aggression from the Russian landscape.  In France, 
American military bodies represented friendship and shared sacrifice.  In Russia, remains 
from the same army represented invaders whose actions killed civilians.   
Gibbs anticipated Russian animosity towards his team as the prepared to depart 
for Russia in 1934.  His report of the recovery mission revealed a clash of two very 
different cultures and America’s perception of Russian communism in the interwar.  
Gibbs’s account of the expedition read much like an anthropologic journal.  He offered 
                                                             






numerous accounts of the Russian people throughout his report.  American diplomats 
viewed communism in scientific terms.  It was akin to an illness, a poison, or a cancer.  If 
left unchecked, communist ideology could infect healthy democratic capitalist society 
world-wide.99  As one of the most thriving democratic capitalist societies, American 
leaders often assumed the role as the physician most capable of removing the malady.  
Gibbs was in Russia to save American soldier dead from obscurity and remove them from 
a diseased host.  In his capacity as representative of the American government, his 
recovery mission forced the two cultures to engage with one another, informally, in this 
early phase of open diplomacy.   
Gibbs went into Russia with a detailed report of the previous American recovery 
mission and a member of the first expedition.  The North Russian landscape was still 
foreign to Gibbs, however.  He and his team needed communist Russians to aid him in 
the recovery mission.  Russian laborers travelled with Gibbs and Russian peasants offered 
their memories of the Polar Bear’s actions and burials.  Russians helped Gibbs’s team, but 
also hindered them.  Frequently his report indicated that searches for American graves 
stopped early when peasants became angered that their own burial grounds were 
disturbed in the process. Throughout Gibbs’s report, he distinguished between the 
Russian people and communism.  They often did not seem the same to him, and when 
there was an overlap, he saw the Russian people of victims of a broken system.  They had 
no usable infrastructure, no potable drinking water, no personal assets, and corrupt local 
bureaucracy.100    He saw Russians as patriots who loved their country much more than 
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the “abstract principles of communism.”101  They were “honest” and as his primary labor 
force “willing [and] friendly, but not overly quick to grasp ideas and not fast workers.”102   
The Russian peasants often helped Gibbs locate possible American graves.  They 
seemed to respect the American mission, but showed confusion about the great lengths 
taken to recover a few dead.  The nearly two decades that had elapsed since the American 
remains had been buried meant that that American team often dug up many non-
American remains before finding one of the thirty-nine bodies they sought.  The Russians 
had little patience when Gibbs and his team entered into Russian cemeteries and 
mistakenly dug up Russian bodies.103  Often their visible discomfort forced him to cease 
digging.  At one point, American intelligence led Gibbs to a mass grave where an American 
soldier possibly rested.  Gibbs completely abandoned the search when Russian officials 
told him that it primarily contained the bodies of “women and children killed by an Allied 
bomb.”104  As leader of the expedition, Gibbs determined it was in the best interest of 
America’s reputation to not disturb such a sacred spot.  It was not feasible for the 
American mission to dig up the graves of Russian civilians killed by their artillery to find 
the grave of one doughboy.  Gibbs respect for Russian memory signified willingness to 
improve U.S.-Soviet relations on the personal level.  While small, gestures like this surely 
helped improve Russian perceptions of the United States.   Another instance of positive 
relations built during the trip was a rudimentary celebration of July 4th in which Russians 
and Americans took time from their work to celebrate, shared canned goods, and drink 
whisky.105  Removal of American remains represented a diplomatic mission much 
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different than those in Western Europe, it still opened positive cultural exchange 
unavailable otherwise. The American team located 17-19 of their bodies during the trip.106  




Photo 3.7: U.S. Army Signal Corps, Print No. 32053, “Graves of first thee American Soldiers Killed in 
Action on the Northern Russian Front,” September 16, 1918 (L-R Ignacy Kwasniewski, Antony Soczkoski, 
and Phillip Sokol.  Source: University of Michigan Polar Bear Expedition Collection, 
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/polar/921010.0002.012/1?page=root;size=100;view=image.   
 
 
Gibbs saw admirable qualities from Russians during his exhumation mission, but 
he cited much disrespect for their communist government.  Much of this was directed 
toward the disregard communists had for treatment of American remains.  One of the 
most visible examples Gibbs offered of communist indifference towards American dead 
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was the way they treated them before burial.  Gibbs found that all of the American bodies 
buried by the Bolsheviks has been “skinned like rabbits, only leaving underclothes and 
damaged equipment.”108   Once Gibb’s had collected the American remains and placed 
them in individually sealed coffins, it was up to the Soviet escort agency to prepare them 
for shipping.  Gibbs was mortified when he reached the sea port to find that government 
officials had “shipped the bodies as baggage” and “piled them up like freight.”109  He 
determined that the Soviet contractor treated the corpses disrespectfully as freight and 
not bodies as a “cheap trick to save money” in shipping costs.110  Soviets did not trust 
Gibbs and his team either.  They allowed no photography of American burial sites, or sites 
for possible future searches unless a special Soviet official was present.111  Before the 
American bodies left Russia for America or burial in ABMC sites in Europe, Soviet law 
required the opening of the soldered caskets for final inspection.   This was done to ensure 
that Gibbs had not tried to smuggle out “works of art, or valuable furs” along with 
American remains.112  Gibbs was thankful that the customs agents abandoned the search 
after blowtorching open only two caskets and finding nothing but decomposing corpses. 
This detailed account revealed much about the differing ways memory worked 
diplomatically between the United States and other nations.  America’s interment 
decisions indicated its desire for continuance of positive relations.  Allowing the burial of 
American military dead in foreign soil was a token of friendship, as was another country’s 
granting of land for burial plots.  This phenomenon was uniquely American.  For example, 
Great Britain tended to leave its soldier dead where they fell; friend or enemy. British 
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soldiers rested in both Germany and the remote Russian arctic—and all over the world for 
that matter. It was important for the American government to have its dead interred in 
the soil of partners, not in the soil of perceived enemies.  The decision makers in American 
commemoration felt that Americans would only entrust their dead to their government if 
they placed them in the soil of a friendly nation that they could easily access.  This is 
perhaps a flawed policy.  The symbolic importance Americans placed on entrusting their 
military dead to a nation was paramount.  Allowing American soldiers to rest in Russia or 
Germany might have signified faith in the future.  Consider the diplomatic power during 
the Cold War of an American president standing over American graves in Russia and 
acknowledging the faults of the Polar Bear Expedition and seeing in American graves as 
reason to improve relations.  This was not the case, however.  Locations of America’s 
military cemeteries indicate what it takes to be a friend to the United States.  The list 
includes:  a shared history, commitment to individual liberty, a capitalist economic 
system, Judeo-Christianity, and to a certain extent—whiteness.  During the interwar 
years, America could not get its bodies out of Russia quickly enough. 
It is possible that removing American bodies from enemy soil is indicative of 
attempts to forget animosity.  Not having American bodies and monuments on the 
memory landscape makes forgetting easier.  Archangelsk is virtually unknown to 
Americans.  Would this be the case if the American government commemorated 230 
bodies there?  Likely not, because the value that American culture places on care for its 
military dead requires rigorous upkeep and annual ceremonies.  Even the wartime 
alliance of the Soviet Union and the United States failed to make Soviet soil a viable 
depository of American soldier dead.  It is arguable that the alliance crumbled so quickly 




Thomas North, the ABMC’s administrative secretary during the early Cold War, indicated 
that the ABMC did “hope” to put an American cemetery on the soil of their wartime ally.  
However, the “churlish attitude of the Soviet officials discouraged” these wishes.113  
Stories of Soviets ordering Germans to “till cemeteries” to address the food crisis in the 
Soviet zone of Germany highlighted the unsurmountable cultural differences between the 
Soviet Union and United States regarding war dead.114  Soviet soil was unfit for American 
dead from either World War, whether they fell as enemies or allies. 
 The removal of American Polar Bear remains from unfriendly Russian soil 
provided some groups in the United States incentive to lobby the American Battle 
Monuments Commission for more repatriations.  If the federal government had the 
power to allow repatriation of remains from the Polar Bear Expedition, surely it could 
approve the return of dead from other units.    One such request came to the ABMC in 
1934 from the Veteran’s Association of the 42nd Division and Gold Star Father, Edward 
Bird.115  This was a misguided request from the 42nd Division because the remains 
coming out of Russia did not rest in ABMC cemeteries.  Still, the correspondence 
surrounding this request demonstrated the type of responsibility the ABMC felt towards 
the remains it cared for.  It also showed that American remains in Russia represented 
something entirely different to the United States than remains in friendly Europe.  
Letters to the ABMC also indicated the accountability that the general public felt that 
the ABMC needed to display when caring for war dead.  It is evident through this 
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correspondence that the ABMC viewed itself as the official voice of American military 
dead abroad, and their protector.  Understanding of the paternal-like role the ABMC 
saw itself fulfilling for remains abroad helps explain the type of message cemeteries 
projected onto foreign audiences. 
 The repatriation request that the 42nd “Rainbow” Division sent to the ABMC in 
the mid-thirties regarded the remains of Private Dyer Bird, a native of Marion, Ohio, 
and the first man killed from the division during the Great War.116  The Rainbow 
Division Veterans’ Association desired to erect a memorial to the division in Ohio, and 
felt that the remains of their first casualty should rest alongside the monument.  
Veterans of the Rainbow Division listed several reasons for having Private Bird’s 
remains repatriated—his comrades from Marion wanted his body back home, no 
memorial to the 42nd Division existed in the United States, and Bird’s father desired his 
son’s remains.117  “Under all circumstances,” the veterans’ group felt that the ABMC 
“should approve the application” for Bird’s return home.  In order to strengthen their 
claim, the Rainbow Division veterans included in an initial request to the ABMC a 
newspaper clipping that detailed the repatriation of American remains from Russia.  
They reasoned to ABMC Chairman Pershing that in light of these repatriations, it would 
be “discrimination to refuse the return of Bird’s body.”118  Edward Bird, Private Bird’s 
father, involved himself in the attempts to get his son’s remains back to Marion.  Mr. 
Bird wrote to General Pershing informing the ABMC that when he made the initial 
decision to leave his son’s body in France there was some “misapprehension.”  In the 
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present he wanted the body back and felt that if it was “the desire of the closest kin to 
have the body returned, that feeling should have precedent over everything else.”119  Bird 
went on to express his dissatisfaction that Gold Star Mothers had more political clout 
than grieving American fathers stating that “Gold Star Fathers have feelings also,” and 
that the complaints of mothers not wanting their sons burial plots disturbed abroad just 
so one body might go home seemed unfair. 120   
 Media outlets related attempts to get Dyer Bird’s body back to Ohio to a receptive 
public.  Their coverage caused one relative of Dyer to contact the ABMC and let the 
government know what kind of man Dyer’s father was.  Signing only as “relative of Dyer 
Bird,” the author of the ABMC letter reported that Edward Bird was “the father, but not 
a father” to Dyer.121  He reportedly “deserted the poor babe” after his mother died 
months into his life.  After that, he “never done anything for the boy,” and this made the 
relative ponder why “he wants the boys dead and deceased body now” if he “didn’t want 
him alife [sic] or “right after he was killed” to “bury beside his mother.” The anonymous 
relative concluded that Dyer’s father “Drank enough whiskey to support a dozen 
children” and only became involved with the 42nd Division’s attempts to get the body 
back to Ohio because he felt there was “money and credid [sic] that might come with 
it.122  It was the relative’s hope that General Pershing’s ABMC hold firm to its no-
repatriation policy and “let the poor boy rest where he is.”123  This saddening story 
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shows that each body left abroad had a story.  In Private Bird’s case, the story revealed 
that his government, not his family, was likely best suited to care for his remains. 
 The ABMC ultimately decided to not break precedent and left Private Bird in the 
Meuse-Argonne American Cemetery.  It is doubtful that the unknown relative’s sad 
story had much to do with the decision. Notification went out that the 42nd Division that 
the ABMC rejected the quest about a week prior to the arrival of the relative’s letter.  
General Pershing revealed in his denial letter the “responsibility” that his commission 
had to “thousands of parents and other relatives whose loved ones sleep in American 
cemeteries” to “protect the resting places from disturbing and disintegrating 
influences.”124  Pershing’s sentiment indicated a care for the dead that Private Bird’s 
own father seemingly would not have provided.  Evidence suggests that the letter of 
Bird’s concerned relative did reach Pershing’s desk because the almost illegible letter 
was typed and annotated with a note that it was going to Pershing.  The content of the 
letter probably gave added satisfaction to his decision.  This is further validated by the 
fact that Pershing did not write Private Bird’s father back, but instead had his staff do so 
with a rather short note that “adherence” to policy was “essential.”125 
 Dyer Bird’s body rested not in unfriendly Russian soil, but in what the American 
government felt was “the most impressive cemetery in the world.” 126  Bird’s body 
represented something larger than the sacrifice of one man, or one division.  He 
represented the United States and to “remove any body” was “unthinkable” as it would 
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destroy their “state of perfection.”127  The memory the ABMC constructed for the 
remains they protected was rigid and calculated.  It was a memory that served a purpose 
on European soil.  It showed that that United States cared for its dead and would 
continue to do so.  The resources that went into creating this message was not to be 
compromised under any circumstances—even when next-of-kin or vocal advocacy 
groups attempted to try.  The memory of American war dead was to remain on 
European soil for the duration of their country’s life.  At the same time, just as much 




American policy makers spent nearly twenty-years crafting a discourse of 
sacrifice for Europe.  Thus far, this works has shown varying attempts to make the 
discourse relevant by repurposing the memories of war remains to speak to the times.  
They were vehicles of collective security, incentive for debt collection, signs of anti-
Bolshevism, and symbols of peace.  The start of World War II, and eventual entrance of 
America into the conflict, simultaneously paused the discourse of past sacrifice and 
offered the promise of expanding it into the future.  The thirty-thousand American 
remains left in Europe from World War I were joined by millions of living American 
soldiers in World War II, and later nearly a hundred-thousand more dead.  The 
preservation of American World War I cemeteries during war certainly was not a major 
American concern in the fight against fascism.  However, the issue continually received 
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serious attention before, during, and after World War II.  Over a hundred-thousand 
American soldier dead from World War II joined their American WWI counterparts in 
the friendly soil of allies.  The diplomatic situation that the memory of these remains 
entered into was vastly different than the interwar.  The hegemonic position of the 
United States meant that it initially did not have to tread so lightly in its dealing with 
European nations.  Increasing hostilities of the Cold War, and fear of nuclear war, 
reinvigorated cultural diplomacy as an official program more than ever before in U.S. 
history.  Memory of the World Wars fell under the umbrella of cultural diplomacy.  
American leaders struggled to create a discourse of the dead that applied to the Cold 
War.  Many of the same tactics were followed, but new approaches to memory 
diplomacy were implemented as well.  The fluctuations of American popularity from the 
end of World War II through the present forced the repackaging of memories assigned 





IV. Memory Diplomacy and the Second World War 
 
 
‘Today, less than twenty years after the war in which they died, we cannot be sure 
that their graves may not soon be torn by bombs and shells.  A war in Europe would 
be the ultimate defeat of all the hopes for which they went out to die. 1 
 
Corporal Trenton A. Cooper of the 29th Division’s 175th Infantry Regiment 
participated in an early morning assault on July 13, 1944 to capture the strategically 
important junction town of St. Lo in Normandy, France.  This attack was part of the 
allied advance from the D-Day landing beaches.  An artillery shell struck Trenton during 
the advance into the town instantly killing him.  John A. Cooper and his wife Laura 
received a telegram at their modest white farmhouse in eastern West Virginia on August 
2, 1944 informing them that their youngest son had been missing in action since the day 
of the attack.  Confirmation of their worst fears came by telegram a week later with news 
that Trenton died in the engagement. 2  In the months and years that followed this 
horrible news, no closure came.  The Coopers left their farmland and settled in a nearby 
town.  They sporadically received correspondence from their government filling in the 
details of their son’s death and asking them to make decisions about the disposition of 
his remains.  Per the WWI custom, the U.S. government offered to pay the Coopers for 
the return of Trenton’s remains to West Virginia, but also promised to meticulously tend 
his grave for the perpetuity of time should he stay in France.  Trenton’s parents 
ultimately decided to leave their son near the field where he died.  Based on a letter to 
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the Quartermaster General regarding Trenton’s personal possessions at the time of his 
death it is doubtful that this was a decision based upon strong patriotic convictions.  
John wrote as a broken man in the letter, stating that he cared nothing for the “value of 
anything he [Trenton] possessed . . . because the Government hasn’t got money enough 
to pay for the kind of boy we lost.”3  Regardless, the symbolic reimbursement offered 
came in the form of a gravesite in the American Battle Monument Commission’s 
Normandy American Cemetery. 
 The scenario described above repeated over 100,000 times in American 
households following World War II.4  No national battle for American World War II 
bodies ever reached the caliber of the post-WWI debate.  Even so, it is highly unlikely 
that John Cooper, and other next-of-kin who made a similar decision, completely 
understood, or cared, about the symbolic importance that their beloved remains 
embodied in death.  These mourners cared about the brutally created void left for the 
remainder of their lives.  As shown in previous chapters, some families surely 
relinquished their remains because of personal convictions that dead soldiers should 
remain where they fell.  Others saw it as their patriotic duty.  Many, like the Coopers, 
saw the delayed return of a corpse they could never view as only a way to reopen 
emotional wounds.  The desire to not relive the grief influenced their decision to leave 
their dead abroad.  It is arguable that for families whose loved ones died in that war, the 
remains were “frozen in time, in a specific and unchangeable context” that few gestures 
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could alter.5  This assertion might be true on the level of individual loss, but its accuracy 
is questionable on the plane of national commemoration.  The federal government’s 
uses of the remains in the future indicated that they were quite unfrozen in time and 
able to evolve.  As families grappled with their losses differently, the remains of their 
casualties joined others in foreign cemeteries to create a unified message of American 
sacrifice for a new world order, led by the United States.  
 Attempts from American and French leaders to promote European peace 
through memories of American World War I dead in France failed, non-surprisingly.  
This failure did not diminish the utility of American war dead to bolster international 
commitments once war began, however.  American World War I remains in France 
continued to serve as a bond between France and the United States even after Nazi 
occupation of France.  French officials circumvented the Vichy government and cared 
for American remains in the absence of the ABMC.  Once the United States entered into 
WWII, the ABMC was among the first group of Americans to return to the European 
continent.  The ABMC took steps to ensure that the new generation of American military 
dead, like Trenton Cooper, might join the WWI burials in France.  It did so by 
beautifying its World War I sites of memory.  Allied victory in World War II came at a 
high price.  Over one-hundred thousand American dead from World War II stayed in 
France and built on the memory of Great War dead already present.  The new memory 
was markedly different.  Instead of a memory reflecting hope of a powerful U.S. 
presence abroad, the new memory reflected real military power.  The United States 
emerged from World War II as a world superpower.  A more expansive ABMC, and its 
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more assertive memory reflected this hegemonic position going into the Cold War.  
ABMC attempts to erase the memory of dishonorable American military also reflected 
the increasing power of the federal government to construct a specific message through 
its war dead. 6 
 
The ABMC During WWII 
 Following the ABMC’s major dedications in 1937, the United States Congress took 
steps to reorganize the government and save costs.  The ABMC’s esteemed chairman, 
General Pershing, placed his beloved commission on the sacrificial altar.  He wrote 
Secretary of War Harry Woodring in the first days of 1938 that the “duties of the American 
Battle Monuments Commission” should transfer to the War Department and that the 
“ABMC “should cease to exist.”7 Pershing’s only request was to delay the transfer until the 
ABMC’s historical section finalized its revised guidebook and A.E.F. unit histories.8 
President Franklin Roosevelt wrote Pershing a week later thanking him for his 
Commission’s work and his “desire to cooperate.”9  Secretary of War Woodring wrote 
Pershing the same day as Roosevelt to let the aging general know that as soon as the 
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completion of the ABMC’s publication work was reported, terminating “action will be 
taken.”10   
It is unclear what motivated this cooperation from General Pershing.  The ABMC 
had the reputation of being Pershing’s “favorite child,” something that he defended from 
all attacks.11  It is unlikely that the leadership of the ABMC felt that their sites of memory 
actually succeeded in assuring peace. Fascist leaders had revealed aggressive foreign 
policy impulses and a Japanese invasion of China was well underway at this time.  Perhaps 
the transition of the ABMC’s duties back to the War Department signified a fear that that 
the military should once again oversee commemoration because another war seemed 
inevitable.  The most likely explanation for Pershing’s letter was political maneuvering.  
He masked his willingness to cooperate with the open-ended request to keep the ABMC 
in operation until its publication works were finished.  This delay would perhaps give the 
ABMC enough time to weather the reorganization storm and emerge intact.  A letter from 
the ABMC’s administrative secretary, Xenophon Price, indicated stall tactics.  Price 
reported to Pershing that the delay might quell the ABMC’s troubles and “quiet” talk of 
reorganization until the spring after more “opportunity” had been afforded to “take 
further steps in the matter.”12  Termination of the ABMC did not take place before the 
Second World War began.  Most American military dead from the Great War became 
hostages of German aggression before Pearl Harbor brought the United States into the 
war.  In war time, the ABMC remained the caretaker of American memory, although in a 
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limited fashion.  American military bodies continued to strengthen the bond of France 
and America even as more soldiers died.  French officials helped keep American sacred 
sites maintained, and the ABMC took steps to acquire all new American bodies for to 
implant a new generation of American memory on European soil. 
In histories of the Second World War, scholars pay little to no attention to the 
millions of Great War dead spread throughout Europe. This is an understandable 
omission.   The treatment of World War I dead during World War II contributed 
nothing to the outcome of the war.   The far greater number of American dead in World 
War II also contributes to those dead overshadowing Great War remains.    Memories of 
American World War I dead in France stood out on the European landscape as the only 
U.S. military presence in early WWII, however.   Hitler’s invasion of France began in the 
summer of 1940.  As Nazis descended on Paris in early June, American and French 
officials made their ceremonial Memorial Day trips to the graves of Great War dead in 
Paris.  The most prominent French official present was Premier Paul Reynaud, a leader 
who had ardently opposed German militarism through the interwar years.  Within 
weeks of the ceremony, Reynaud found himself a prisoner of war.  The looming 
capitulation of France brought a greater somberness to Memorial Day than usual.  
Ambassador William Bullitt temporarily put his frantic correspondence with 
Washington on hold and attended the American Memorial Day ceremonies.  Despite 
appearing in public with great resolve, Bullitt feared he could “be blown up” before ever 
seeing America again.13  That same day, Bullitt telegraphed President Roosevelt that 
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“Germans may reach Paris very soon.”14   The ambassador feared the actions of French 
communists more than Nazi occupiers.  He warned President Roosevelt of the likelihood 
that “communists of industrial suburbs will seize and loot the city,” and a “cruel, but 
orderly German regime will be installed.”15 Bullitt promised Roosevelt that he would 
remain in Paris and do his best to “save as many lives as possible and keep the flag 
flying.”16  Bullitt generally did not immerse himself in memorial ceremonies nearly as 
much as previous American ambassadors to France had.  He felt that previous 
Ambassadors spent far too much time attending such events because they “spoke no 
French and did no real work.”17  It was “impossible to do real work and handle the 
function side of life as well,” Bullitt ascertained.18  In a period where calculated 
diplomacy was needed to stabilize the international situation, Bullitt chose his social 
obligations carefully.  Memorial Day was one occasion that he did not abandon.  The 
1940 Memorial Day had extra symbolic importance.  He turned to American dead from 
World War I to help the French find hope in a dire situation. 
Memorial Day spectators realized the impending arrival of German troops in 
Paris.  American journalists reported that “services could not be held at some American 
war cemeteries in France today, as they have been under [German] bombardment.”  The 
commander of the American Legion’s Paris Post lamented that “the marble tombstones 
of American war dead were shattered by bombs.”19  Some American World War I 
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cemeteries did indeed suffer damage from Nazi shelling during the blitzkrieg, however, 
the American Legion commander’s accusation that Nazis actively bombed American 
graves was exaggerated.  Still, in one of the darkest hours of France in the twentieth 
century prominent leaders from France and the United States traveled to American 
cemeteries to pay respect to the dead with German occupation looming.  French and 
American citizens did not explicitly write about what American World War I bodies in 
France meant to them as Nazi takeover loomed.  Yet, the consistency of Franco-
American interaction with World War I dead throughout the interwar years offers 
insight into the meanings these bodies had for both nations.  By 1939, the American 
World War I remains had been a part of the French landscape for two decades.  Both the 
French and Americans periodically read of commemorative services at U.S. cemeteries 
each year and considerable numbers from each nation participated in the ceremonies.  
Leaders from each nation contextualized the meanings of American sacrifice and its 
implications for future relations.  American pilgrims to their graves on French soil found 
comfort seeing French reverence.  Up until World War II, the presence of American 
remains in France and consistent commemoration surely brought comfort.  The remains 
showed France continued American support.  French reverence for American dead 
indicated a loyal partner.   The mental image of German artillery churning up American 
dead resting in France was an alarming signal to both nations of what might come.   
The disturbed respite of the dead coincided with broken peace.  Americans who 
had trusted their government to care for their dead overseas worried about the 
condition of cemeteries.  A Pennsylvania father wrote Secretary of State Cordell Hull 
shortly after France fell to the Nazis hoping to find out what happened to American 




much anxiety regarding the condition of his son’s grave in the Meuse-Argonne American 
Cemetery.20   The State Department replied that they received no official information 
regarding destruction of American cemeteries in France, but they would pass on the 
letter to the staff of the ABMC because they remained in “intimate contact” with 
American cemeteries.21  A report to the State Department the following month provided 
answers to concerned families.  During the German blitzkrieg, the most damage done to 
American cemeteries took place at Belleau Wood where “one hundred headstones 
[were] damaged by shell fire, [the] chapel chipped by shell fragments” and at “Romagne 
[where] fifty headstones [were] damaged by shell fire” and a flight of stairs at 
Montfaucon was damaged by a bomb.22  American concern over its World War I sites of 
memory in Europe halted the dissolution of the American Battle Monuments 
Commission discussed in early 1938.  The ABMC remained the caretaker of American 
memory throughout World War II. 
Despite Nazi occupation of Paris, and the absence of a legitimate French 
government there, America retained a strong presence in the French capital.  Instead of 
fleeing alongside French government officials, Ambassador William Bullitt maintained 
America’s Parisian embassy despite the diplomatic withdrawal of most other major 
nations.23  Bullitt found that in this time of crisis “thousands of people of all 
nationalities turned to us in despair for advice and comfort.”24  The Nazi occupation of 
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France made a Franco-American alliance a dangerous liability for the United States.  
Ambassador Bullitt stubbornly remained in Paris in hopes of protecting the capital from 
communist and fascist riots, however.  When the inevitability of France’s fall became 
evident, Bullitt requested that the State Department send him twelve Thompson 
submachine guns with ammunition for use by the Embassy.  He reasoned that “if the 
French Government should be forced to leave Paris, its place would be taken by a 
communist mob.”25  When the French Government evacuated Paris for Bordeaux, Bullitt 
remained because, in his words, “no American Ambassador in history had ever left Paris 
and I had no intention of leaving Paris so long as I thought I could be of use.”26  Days 
later, President Roosevelt “strongly recommended that if all foreign chiefs of mission 
follow the French Government to its temporary Capital, you should do likewise.”27  
Bullitt chose not to comply.   Shortly after the Nazi invasion, he reported that through 
the difficult transition, “France remained friendly with the United States,” and that “all 
American institutions remained open” and that “the American hospital did magnificent 
work in caring for hundreds of wounded” throughout the Battle of France.28   
The American Battle Monuments was one of the organizations that remained 
active in France through the German takeover.  Completion of the ABMC’s final 
construction projects took place just prior to France’s fall.  The concern shown by 
American families about German destruction of graves in its military advance indicated 
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that World War I memory was very much in the public consciousness as a new war 
began.  General Pershing, although aged and in failing health, remained attentive of the 
new World War.  The ABMC’s wartime mission in France was not an easy one.  During 
the German invasion, some ABMC officials went to Dreux, while others worked from the 
U.S. Embassy in Paris. The trip from Paris to Dreux in wartime was not leisurely.  
German aircraft did not distinguish between Americans and French citizens in moving 
convoys.  One ABMC employee fleeing with his family was caught in a group of French 
refugees and “was fired on by German aircraft.”  Physical harm came to nobody in his 
party, yet his son faced a narrow escape when his hat and their car were riddled with 
bullets.29 This type of incident raised fear in Major Charles G. Holle, the ABMC’s 
European officer during the initial stages of German occupation.  In the months after 
the German invasion, Major Holle urged General Pershing to consider an evacuation 
plan for ABMC in the event that the United States became involved in the war.  The 
impetus for Holle’s concern came from German treatment of staff from the ABMC’s 
British equivalent, the Imperial War Graves Commission.  This British memorial 
commission did not bother to form an evacuation plan for its employees before 
declaring war on Germany.  As a result, their employees “had to shift for themselves” 
during the Nazi advance.30  Some escaped, but the rest ended up in German 
concentration camps.  Holle saw no indication that Germans would treat ABMC 
employees differently if the United States declared war.  He was concerned further by 
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the apparent lack of concern the State Department had shown the ABMC throughout the 
occupation.31    
Much of the ABMC correspondence with Washington throughout 1940-41 
revealed that State Department officials placed a low value on the ABMC’s 
commemorative mission during the German invasion.  ABMC officers had to battle for 
office space, rations, approval to travel to their cemeteries in restricted zones, and for 
inclusion in official American evacuation plans.32  American ABMC personnel were in a 
slightly more vulnerable situation than American government workers near Paris 
because of their postings in eastern France.  Holle estimated that it would take 
approximately a week for many ABMC staffers to get to Paris after Washington called 
for an evacuation.  It was Holle’s hope that Pershing could push to State Department to 
place American ABMC employees on the official list of individuals requiring evacuation. 
General Pershing officially recalled all American ABMC employees to Paris on 
May 5, 1941, and then to the United States a week later.33  In June 1941, the final 
American employees left Paris for transport home through Portugal.34  The departure of 
the ABMC did not signal abandonment of America’s World War I dead.  Instead, it again 
opened up avenues of diplomacy through memory and allowed the French to physically 
show their commitment to American through its dead.  Six months after Paris fell, 
French General Désiré-Pierre-Sylvestre Vincensini, Secretariat General des Anciens 
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Combattants informed the ABMC that France would take over all American military 
cemeteries and “place [French] caretakers and laborers in them as rapidly as possible” 
should the ABMC evacuate France.35  General Vincensini had already done this for the 
British, although he was only concerned with upkeep of memorials that included 
cemeteries.36  Before the ABMC left France, its wartime executive in Europe, T. Bentley 
Mott, drafted an official agreement with Vincensini regarding French upkeep.  In the 
days before leaving France, Vincensini agreed to take over the entire operation of the 
ABMC unless absolute necessity arose to stop providing the service.37  Before 
disbanding, the French government created a special account to fund such a project and 
funnel allied money into cemetery upkeep.  France did this to oblige the legal 
convention that they “must continue the maintenance and upkeep of all war graves” of 
allies buried in its national territory.38  With complete trust in France to maintain 
American sacred space, America’s guardians of its World War I memory left France for 
the first time since the end of the Great War.  General Pershing concluded that there was 
“nothing to do at present except to maintain the status quo and await the end of the war 
in Europe.”39  A renewed focus on America’s caretakers of memory increased only after 
America became involved in the war and found success on battlefields.  Then, memory 
served as a morale booster to troops and a means for the government to save money 
with future repatriations.  Despite the ABMC’s difficulty with the State Department, its 
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leaders had the foresight to put policies in place that kept ABMC sites functional enough 
to for easy reactivation as sites for public diplomacy when the government needed them.  
America’s memory keepers would be among the ranks of the liberating armies. 
The ABMC did not wait for the American army liberate France before sending T. 
Bentley Mott to make sure that Vincensini adhered to their agreement.  In May 1942, 
Mott arrived in Vichy, France and attempted to get German permission to travel into 
Paris and visit the U.S. cemeteries.  The Germans denied Mott’s request, but General 
Vincensini maintained a sub-office in Vichy that put Mott in contact with French ABMC 
employees operating out of the former superintendent’s quarters in Suresnes.  Through 
contact with Suresnes, Mott was able to arrange for a French employee to travel through 
France and assess conditions of American cemeteries.  From this Frenchman’s report, 
Mott assured the ABMC’s Washington office that Vincensini’s arrangement had “worked 
out successfully and “there was no hitch, difficulty, or friction.”40  Astonishingly, Mott 
reported to Washington that although Americans had not been present on these sacred 
sites for a year, the “cordial spirit” and resourcefulness of the French had kept the 
American cemeteries in “pleasing appearance—grass cut, shrubbery cared for, and not 
one sign of neglect in any of them.”41   With this peace of mind, Mott traveled to Cannes 
where his wife could recover from an illness in a warmer climate.  There, he was 
captured by the Italian Army and transferred to the Germans who sent him to a prison 
camp in the eastern France town of Vittel.  Mott spent a month in prison where he 
admittedly “was not treated badly” before being sent to Paris for four months awaiting a 
                                                             






prisoner exchange.42  In Paris, Mott again oversaw the work of the ABMC before his 
exchange sent him to New York.  American armies rapidly advanced past the ABMC’s 
World War I cemeteries in the year after Mott’s exchange and erected temporary WWII 
cemeteries near them.   
Within three months of D-Day, General Eisenhower personally wrote to General 
Pershing at Walter Reed Hospital to report on the WWI cemeteries he gained intimate 
knowledge of while writing the ABMC’s first guidebook as a junior office.  Eisenhower’s 
message was a birthday gift to Pershing.  He conveyed greetings from his army, made up 
of the sons of Pershing’s soldiers, who tread the same ground thirty-five years ago.43  
More importantly, he thought it would please the General of the Armies that most of the 
WWI cemeteries had “weathered the misfortunes of the past four years so well, with 
normal depreciation only slightly accelerated.”  Eisenhower attributed this to admirable 
devotion of the French caretakers.44  French care for American dead of WWI and its new 
WWII dead received much attention in initial ABMC correspondence after the war.  
French laborers tended to American graves with little pay (by American standards), and 
French villagers meticulously recorded the names of fallen American aviators and 
provided them Christian burials in local cemeteries before the American ground forces 
liberated France.45  When the ABMC’s Paris office reopened, it planned to reward the 
French employees who faithfully maintained sacred American sites throughout the war.  
                                                             
42 Ibid. 
43 Most U.S. World War Cemeteries in France, Belgium in Good Condition, October 20, 1944, Box 133, 
WWII Maintenance File, ABMC Records, RG 117, NARA. 
44 General Eisenhower to General Pershing, October 13, 1944, Box 133, WWII Maintenance File, ABMC 
Records, RG 117, NARA. 





Reward came in varying forms—salary increases, continued employment, and U.S. 
Government certificates of thanks.46  
Interestingly, German soldiers also displayed considerable respect to American 
cemeteries also.  Few instances of German desecration of American cemeteries exist.  
Most examples of German desecration happened at the superintendents’ houses within 
ABMC cemeteries.  Germans reportedly looted furniture, dismantled automobiles for 
parts, and jokingly wrote “A. Hitler and Mussolini,” in ABMC visitor logbooks.47  
Reports of German desecration of American graves only came from one cemetery during 
the war.  In this case, “some German soldiers broke in one night and knocked over some 
Star of David headstones on Jewish soldiers’ graves.”48  The Frenchman caring for the 
cemetery immediately reported the vandalism to the German officer in charge of the 
region and he remarkably “not only had the headstones replaced but put a guard in the 
cemetery to prevent further vandalism.”49  One of the most publicized episodes of 
German disrespect of American soldier dead came from American reports in 1941 that 
the German military buried one of its dead soldiers in the Meuse-Argonne American 
Cemetery.  Upon hearing this, veterans groups in the U.S. demanded the removal of an 
enemy from “American soil.”50 German respect for American cemeteries likely helped 
the French do their good work, yet received little notation. 
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The powerful discourse of American war dead commanded respect even under 
the most dire of times for France and the United States.  Foresight of the ABMC and 
French care for American remains during World War II allowed American policy 
makers seamlessly to build a new memory of war immediately after German soldiers 
ceded ground.  Thousands more Americans died during World War II and American 
military leaders attempted to circumvent the repatriation debate that took place after 
WWI.  When Colonel Mott returned to his Paris post at the end of the war he hoped to 
create a willingness in Americans to relinquish their dead to the American government 
so that the discourse of sacrifice and memory could continue even stronger than before.  
Colonel Mott wrote his vision of the future he saw for American memory in Europe to 
General Pershing over Christmas of 1944.  Mott was an American with a strong grasp on 
the political uses of sites of memory. He was at the side of Myron Herrick through much 
of the interwar, and played a pivotal role in the ABMC throughout the Second World 
War.   
Mott shared some observations with Washington that he had recently made 
visiting war remains.  He offered recommendations for what he thought the U.S. 
government should do with new American dead.  Mott contended that even though the 
war was not officially over, many soldiers and mourning family members had traveled to 
the battlefields to visit the temporary graves of those killed in action.  He recognized 
that during these trips, most pilgrims also made stops at the ABMC’s WWI cemeteries to 
show their respect for the previous generation of American fallen.     Mott saw this as an 
opportunity the ABMC needed to seize.  These visitors surely would come away from 
their trip with some impression of how America cared for fallen soldiers and likely 




spend money immediately to beautify the cemeteries because the “more beautiful and 
imposing the graveyards” were, the more likely a mourning family member to entrust 
remains with “Uncle Sam.”51  Money spent “now” surely could save repatriation money 
in the future and ensure that the discourse of American sacrifice defined by World War I 
bodies might become even stronger in the post-war world. 52  Mott informed the ABMC 
that he had discussed the matter with General Eisenhower’s staff and that they agreed 
with his assessment and hoped that perceived care for WWI dead would bring “free and 
cheerful acceptance” amongst Americans for leaving “all” bodies buried abroad.53 
This proactive agenda had an objective driven by more than interest in saving 
funds on repatriation.  Mott and Eisenhower’s staff wished to avoid the heated public 
debate about where American war remains should permanently rest that overshadowed 
the years after World War I.   American officers in Europe during World War II 
witnessed firsthand the powerful reactions that the resting places of World War I 
soldiers had on contemporary visitors.  If the U.S. government acted swiftly, and with 
authority, all American bodies from WWII could possibly join those of the Great War 
perpetuating the discourse of sacrifice sanctioned by the dead.  By this stage in the war, 
it appeared that a realization existed among those in power that more bodies present 
meant a stronger memory. 
The number of potential American overseas burials was large, as was American 
exposure to death.  The scope of American combat death in World War II was staggering 
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in comparison to previous U.S. wars.  Nearly 300,000 Americans died fighting the Axis 
Powers. The military made every effort to identify all American dead during the war, but 
countless numbers lay unknown on battlefields of the land and sea.  Those recovered 
rested in approximately 209 temporary cemeteries.54  War correspondent Ernie Pyle 
frequently wrote about his encounters with the dead and burials in his accounts to the 
American public.  In the days following D-Day, he reflected on carnage he saw on the 
beachhead in the aftermath of the Allied landings.  “It was a lovely day for strolling the 
seashore,” after the invasion, Pyle told Americans.  “Men were sleeping on the sand, 
some of them sleeping forever.  Men were floating in the water, but they didn’t know 
they were floating in the water, for they were dead.”55  Combat was not new to Pyle at 
this point, he had imbedded with U.S. forces in Africa and Italy prior to the main 
European invasion.  Pyle volunteered to help soldiers carry American and German 
corpses for burial following D-Day.  He did this “partly because the group needed an 
extra man, and partly because I was forcing myself to get used to it, for you can’t hide 
from death when you’re in war.”56  One young American soldier in the burial party 
showed reluctance carrying a corpse in advanced stages of decomposition.  An older 
soldier urged him to “take hold of him dammit, you might as well get used to it, for you’ll 
be carrying plenty of dead ones from now on.”57  The group enclosed the bodies in 
mattress covers and buried them close together at a depth of five feet.  Eventually a 
white wooden cross marked their presence.  Often the corpses moved multiple times 
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before finally resting in peace.  Sometimes enemy artillery churned them up, more often 
the military moved them to more permanent resting places. 
 
 
Photo 4.1: “American soldiers before burial,”  October 30, 1944, clipping from the scrapbook of 
Hardy Derx. 606th Graves Registration Service.  Source: Derx Papers, USAHEC, Carlisle, PA. 
 
 
Death became something most Americans needed to deal with during the Second 




U.S. military personnel headed for combat suggestions on dealing with death.  
Americans going into combat needed to “accept the possibility of death as a natural part 
of their job.”58  Citizen soldiers possessed a natural horror to the “sight and smell of 
death and bloodshed.”59  Solace was found, and “the repugnance overcome,” by “seeing 
that the body of a friend gets thoughtful care and a decent burial.”60  The U.S. Armed 
Forces adhered to this commitment to the dead.  The study cited care for American dead 
in the Great War as assurance to American World War II soldiers fearing their demise.  
Just as in the Great War, American combat forces would “weld together in a close knit 
group” and do everything possible to bring the body of a comrade back for burial, even if 
it meant going into harm’s way and “gathering the body up in a basket.”61  Psychologists 
preparing the study felt that this commitment to the dead would “make death seem a 
less complete cutting off” because the “tie of comradeship would carry on even then 
[after death].”62  Joseph Shomon, an officer in the 611th Quartermaster Graves 
Registration Company, which buried some 21,000 dead American troops in Europe 
following WWII, verified this level of commitment to the dead.  Shomon intended his 
1947 work, Crosses in the Wind to inform the public about “burial of our casualties and 
their care”63  This was a “little-publicized,” but important aspect of the war.  Shomon 
spent his entire overseas service handling corpses.  Already by 1947, he sensed a “feeling 
of uncertainty and apprehension” regarding the future.64  He decided to relate his 
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experiences with the dead to Americans because he felt they needed a voice.  “War is hell 
on earth—the dead are a silent testimonial.”65  Shomon hoped that by explaining his 
work with the dead and the large scope of burial work, the living might work to prevent 
a future of war. 
The discourse of the dead encountered by participants of the war and the ABMC 
shared similarities.  Themes of comradeship after death, perpetual care, and lessons of 
sacrifice carried into the ABMC’s post-WWII commemorative plans. The remains in 
ABMC cemeteries were not “cut-off” from the living. The U.S. government followed the 
same repatriation policy of WWI and gave American next-of-kin an option for final 
disposition of remains.  Of the approximately 405,000 American dead of WWII, about 
176,000 remained abroad buried in ABMC cemeteries or commemorated on walls of 
missing.66  Perhaps the aggressive policy to avoid a repatriation debate did help.  The 
forty-four percent of corpses that remained abroad following WWII was significantly 
more than the thirty percent of World War I.67 The new remains entered into the same 
commemorative system as their predecessors, and the American discourse of sacrifice 
abroad congealed the two world wars into one.  This discourse took on renewed 
importance as the United States navigated its new hegemonic status in the Cold War.  As 
the United States fought an ideological battle with the Soviet Union, American war 
cemeteries became even more important diplomatic sites than they were in the interwar 
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years.   American memory abroad in this new era underwent continued revision to 
address international situations and growing European feelings of anti-Americanism.  
The ABMC was under new leadership for the first time since its conception during this 
transitional era.  General Pershing died in 1948.  The Commission released a statement 
praising his leadership as a soldier and guardian of U.S. memory.  Members of the 
ABMC did not regard Pershing a mere figurehead, but as the individual “primarily 
responsible” for erecting American cemeteries in Europe.68  The impact of his 
commemorative vision lingered long after his death. 
Robert Woodside, the ABMC’s acting vice-Chairman since 1923, temporarily 
assumed Pershing position and inspected all cemeteries in 1949.  Woodside was 
impressed that in only four years, the ABMC’s European workers erased all scars of 
World War II from the American cemeteries.  In an open letter to all ABMC overseas 
workers, Woodside laid out what he saw as their larger mission.  “The people of our 
country and the spirits of the brave Americans who lie in these cemeteries, look to us to 
see that their sacrifices are fittingly commemorated.”69  Woodside felt that all ABMC 
staff abroad would face challenges to their “patriotism and loyalty” as World War II 
projects moved into the new decade.70  Yet, he felt confidence that the ABMC’s long 
tradition of avoiding scandal would continue and its staff would continue to serve as 
America’s “envoys of good will in a foreign land.”71  Woodside’s remarks reflected 
anticipation that post-WWII Europe needed the presence of the ABMC and positive 
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American memories more than ever.  The future looked uncertain and turbulent.  The 
ABMC saw itself as bastion of goodwill. 
 
 
Expansion of the ABMC 
The ABMC’s zone of commemoration following World War I was limited to the 
European continent where American soldiers fought and died.  Following WWII, 
Congress allowed the ABMC to cast a world-wide net.72  Now, the ABMC maintained the 
authority to commemorate in the Pacific, Africa, the Philippines, and on “all federally 
owned or controlled territory within the United States and its possessions.”73  This was 
indicative not only of the scope of American military engagements in WWII, but also the 
advantageous position of power the United States now held.  The expansion of the 
ABMC’s commemorative plan meant that new remains would go into non-European 
soil.  Much thought went into the placement of these remains, and final decisions of 
where remains went reflected the hierarchy of diplomatic relations felt by leaders in 
Washington.   
When the Congressional Hearings to continue the ABMC took place in 1946, 
Representative Frances Bolton from Ohio recalled observations she made overseas 
during WWII, when she visited various ABMC sites.  She assured her colleagues on the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs “that the reverence for the whole—the sense one 
has of the reverence with which everything has been done and the respect that is 
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afforded to those men who lie there is something which, to my mind, tells something 
about America that needs telling.”74  This indicated that the proactive beautification 
taken by the ABMC during WWII indeed reverberated domestically.   The story that 
America had to tell became much more important in the bipolar Cold War world.  Part 
of telling the American story required casting American memory as exceptional in 
comparison to perceived enemies.  Mrs. Bolton concluded her thought by contrasting 
U.S. care for soldier dead with Russia’s lack thereof.  Mrs. Bolton’s son served in Eastern 
Europe disinterring Russian and German remains for identification following WWII.  
He reported to his mother that he was shocked at how Russians disregarded care for 
their fallen soldiers.75  Thomas North, the ABMC’s WWII administrative secretary, made 
similar observations about the Russians in his memoir.  North indicated that when 
determining American cemetery sites for WWII, Russia briefly looked like a possible site 
because of their wartime alliance.  The possibility quickly disappeared, however, due to 
the boorish “attitude of Soviet officials.”76  Examples of the churlishness that North 
hinted at are found in the news the year after the war.  The New York Times reported to 
Americans in 1946 that Soviets ordered towns in their German occupation zones to till 
up cemeteries and plant crops to address food shortages.77  This type of perception of 
the Russians’ disregard for war dead was not a new phenomenon post WWII.  The 
tireless efforts to get American soldiers from WWI out of Russian soil in the mid-thirties 
indicated that serious consideration of permanent American burials in Russia likely 
never happened. 
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 The idea that American remains needed to rest in only friendly soil dominated 
commemorative decision-makers motives following WWII.  Friendly soil was easy to 
designate for America following World War I because of the limited scope of its military 
operations and rather clear partnerships.  World War II was trickier.  For the United 
States, World War II was truly a world war.  American military personnel fought not 
only in Europe, but on remote islands throughout the Pacific.  Additionally, airmen and 
seaman fell throughout the globe, often in total isolation.  While the Soviet Union was 
one of the greatest partners of the United States in wartime, a mutual distrust stemming 
from aggressiveness in both Moscow and Washington, made Russia seem unfriendly.  It 
was clear that the soil of Axis nations Germany and Japan held no hints of amicability, 
both fought on until the end.  Yet Italy, the birthplace of Fascism, eventually became a 
partner of the United States.  The ABMC settled on the following factors when deciding 
where permanent American WWII resting places should be:  sites of cemeteries needed 
to reflect offensive progress, they had to be accessible, each required a sense of natural 
beauty, promise of economic development was important, they would not be in enemy 
territory (Italy was appraised as co-belligerent), and not more than 10,000 American 
bodies should be concentrated in one area.78   
 If historians take the ABMC determinants for permanent cemetery locations at 
face value, there is little reason to questions why American military personnel were not 
buried in Germany or Japan—they were enemy belligerents.  Yet, the pliability of these 
determinants to allow Italy to entomb American remains shows that ABMC policy was 
not entirely rigid.    The situational bending of rules indicates a need for critical analysis 
                                                             




of ABMC burial sites.  More than just depositories for dead, “overseas cemeteries served 
to symbolize U.S. global military commitments.”79 Following World War II, American 
cemeteries came to represent not only a diplomatic commitment, but more of a military 
one.  Again, more American military cemeteries went in Europe than the rest of the 
world, as did other signs of long term commitment—the Marshall Plan and NATO 
defense agreements.   
The language used by the ABMC in dedications of WWII cemeteries also revealed 
that conceptions of friendship between nations were far stronger in Europe than other 
cemetery locations.  President Eisenhower’s 1960 dedicatory press releases for 
cemeteries in France, Belgium, and Luxembourg revealed that in European countries 
"friendly soil,” and “friendship” moved the United States to inter remains.80 The address 
given on behalf of President Eisenhower at the American cemetery dedication in 
Carthage never spoke of the friendliness of the soil.  Instead, it purported feelings that 
the living gathered in Carthage to dedicate the sacred ground needed to show more 
diligence “against all that might nullify their [the dead’s] sacrifices.”81  The use of the 
words conveying feelings of friendship was so common in dedications of ABMC 
cemeteries that the absence of such words jumped from the page.  Instead of talking 
about the friendship of the United States and people of Carthage, the address spoke to 
the “unity” between allies who liberated the area from Axis control.82  Serving as 
Eisenhower’s Assistant Staff Secretary, his son, John S.D. Eisenhower, reported his 
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father’s approval of the ABMC’s “wording and purpose” in dedications, and noted that it 
was important to President Eisenhower for “consonance” in his dedication messages.83   
The lack of friendly language in Eisenhower’s Carthage address had deeper 
meanings.  Eisenhower’s call to remember the unity of allies in WWII was likely a 
response to strong feelings of anti-Americanism among French inhabitants of Tunisia.  
Following WWII, Tunisia was one of the North African countries that fought to free 
itself from the orbit of French colonialism.  Official sovereignty did not come to Tunisia 
until 1956.  That year, French Tunisians leveled violent attacks against the United States 
for its support of the Tunisian government.  The initial reason for the 1956 protest came 
when American manufactured guns were found at the murder scene of two French 
nationalists in Tunisia.84  Over 10,000 French Tunisians gathered at the funeral.  Anger 
over the murders combined with the widespread belief that the United States had 
“commercial designs” on French overseas possessions to create a volatile situation.  
Frustration turned to violence when hundreds of French protestors descended on the 
U.S. Consulate building and library where they destroyed $20,000 worth of property 
while chanting “down with America.”85    It is noteworthy that such a location was not 
deemed friendly by the ABMC in Eisenhower’s dedicatory address, and brings questions 
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to the surface about the relationship of American military memory with religion, 
colonialism, and race. 
The Pacific Theater is another area of the ABMC commemorative zone to 
consider race based decisions.  Historians have effectively shown that culturally, 
American soldiers felt not so different from their European enemies during World War 
II, particularly Germans.  American G.I.s certainly did not view German enemies or 
Nazism fondly, but shared skin color and heritage made them seem like a less alien 
opponent.  American soldiers frequently felt that the Germans fought “decently,” and 
abided by conventional rules of war.86  They both feared and respected their skill and 
discipline as soldiers.  As the war dragged on, they also were startled to find that the 
“German foe shared the universal characteristics of ordinary human beings.”87  The 
Japanese enemy that Americans faced in the Pacific was perceived entirely different.  
The Pacific Theater was fought more as a “race war” than a conventional military 
contest.88  Both Japan and the United States shared views of their own national 
exceptionalism, and soldiers from both sides fought with racial hatred for the other.  To 
American soldiers, the Japanese were inhuman, inferior, barbaric, and ruthless.89  It 
was Japan, after all, that brought the United States into the war by a surprise attack on 
the U.S. Naval base at Pearl Harbor.   
Evidence of American soldiers’ perception of Japanese combatants as inhuman is 
found in wartime correspondence between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and U.S. custom 
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officials at ports where American marines returned home from the Pacific.  Customs 
officers in San Francisco reported that it was a growing practice of “marines to bring 
Japanese skulls into the United States as war trophies.”90 This concerned the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff because the Japanese might use such accounts as anti-American 
propaganda and retaliate on the battlefield.  There was also concern that marines were 
breaking the laws of war because “under the rules of land warfare a belligerent is 
obligated to give decent burial to enemy dead.”91  Military leaders in Washington 
ordered commanders in the Pacific Theater to stop this practice, and urged port officials 
to obtain the skulls, if possible, and “destroy them by burning.”92 Boiling down enemy 
heads and bringing them home for display did not meet the American definition of a 
decent burial.  
 American racial stereotypes fostered during World War II in the Pacific had 
applicability in the Cold War.  The hatred that Americans felt towards the Japanese 
enemy “proved to be free-floating, and easily transferred to the new enemies:  to Soviet 
and Chinese Communists, the Korean foe of the early 1950s, the Vietnamese enemy of 
the 1960s and 1970s, and hostile, ‘third-world’ movements in general.”93  The existence 
of this racial hatred is well documented, and race has also proven a reliable means for 
diplomatic historians to approach American relations with non-white nations—largely 
through the lens of paternalism and adherence to the supremacy of white Anglo-Saxon 
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male leadership.94  The fluidity of American racism towards the Japanese coincided with 
military commemorative practices.  No U.S. military cemeteries went on Japanese 
islands, nor did any go in Korea or Vietnam in subsequent wars. 
Despite scholarly recognition of U.S. racism towards peripheral nations, almost 
no racist undertones exist in the records of the ABMC regarding decisions to not bury 
Americans on Japanese soil.  Racist motives to keep American military corpses out of 
Asia and other peripheral regions remained absent from ABMC meetings. Still, the 
ABMC’s emphasis on burials in Europe correlated with a large “ambivalence” that 
Americans felt towards the regions that burials would not take place.  America fought its 
next two wars in Asia, but in the final years of the 1940s, Western Europe remained 
America’s political focus. 95  While blatant racism did not factor into the ABMC’s 
reluctance to leave the thousands of remains temporarily interred in Pacific Island 
cemeteries, perceptions of friendly soil certainly did.   
Meeting minutes from the ABMC’s World War II planning phase reveal that 
much thought went into final selection of cemeteries.  The Commission divided the 
world into commemorative zones and assigned commissioners to study the viability of 
each for burials.  The “Pacific Area” question was tasked to some of the Commission’s 
most important figures, acting Chairman Marine Corps General Alexander Vandergrift 
(1st Marine Division) and future Chairman General George C. Marshall (U.S. Army 
Chief-of-Staff).96  During the meeting where commissioners received their 
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commemorative-zone assignments, General Vandergrift learned from a Navy survey 
that ninety-one percent of American families who had next-of-kin buried in the U.S. 
territory of Guam wanted their bodies returned to the continental United States.97  In 
the following ABMC meeting, that took place three months later, General Marshall 
served as the symbolic Chairman; not officially taking the title until Pershing’s death.  
Marshall found that both General Eisenhower and General MacArthur desired only “one 
cemetery” in the Pacific Region.98  Hawaii was the most desirable location because it 
was symbolic of the whole Pacific War, was on American soil, and accessible to 
visitors.99  Guam was the second choice because it was American soil, but it was 
inaccessible.  The least desirable choice in the Pacific was at Manila in the Philippines, 
because it was now foreign soil and considered a politically unstable country.100  General 
Marshall respected the opinion of the decorated generals, yet he stressed to the ABMC 
commissioners the important psychological effect that American cemeteries, or as he 
called them, “permanent evidence of American sacrifice,” had on foreign countries.101  
Marshall seemed particularly concerned with reminding the Filipinos of the now 
positive relationship between the United States and its former colony.  He did not want 
the apparent “inaccessibility” of the Philippines to deter placing a cemetery there 
because the dead could bind the nations together in the future. 
 Marshall found inaccessibility to be a disingenuous excuse for bringing remains 
home, and he also planned to sponsor legislation for a new class of Gold Star Mother 
Pilgrimages.  Too many times in his military career had he seen unattended burials of 
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American soldiers returned home from overseas combat because of their family’s fear 
that no one would visit the grave abroad.102  At the end of the Pacific discussion, it was 
determined that all three proposed cemeteries remain in contention until it was settled 
how many bodies needed permanent interment following next-of-kin decisions.103  
Much of the reason for keeping three cemeteries on the table instead of only one likely 
came from General Vandergrift’s desire that a cemetery be placed on each Pacific Island 
where our men fought and fell.”104  This was an infeasible desire, but paralleled with 
rivalry between attention to the Pacific and Atlantic theaters during the war. Bitterness 
among different branches of the military and theaters of operation was also prevalent in 
this era of defense reorganization and unification of military commands. 
Ultimately, the only official ABMC cemetery to hold WWII remains was the 
Commission’s third choice, the Philippines.  The U.S. Army erected a large cemetery at 
the Punch Bowl in Hawaii, but the Veterans Administration, not the ABMC, oversaw it.  
Within the Punch Bowl cemetery, the ABMC did commemorate all of the missing from 
the Pacific Theater on Walls of the Missing on a Pacific Memorial.105  Historical evidence 
suggests that the primary reason for not burying Americans permanently on Japanese 
soil was based on WWI precedents to avoid enemy soil, and because of the 
inaccessibility of Japanese islands. ABMC Secretary Thomas North reported that the 
ABMC felt that the upkeep of even memorials on isolated islands like Iwo Jima was 
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unfeasible.106  Cemeteries would prove nearly impossible to maintain at the rigorous 
standards that the ABMC strove for.  The ABMC attempted to acquire funding for a 
memorial on Okinawa in 1960 only to be rejected by the State Department because 
“Japan retained residual sovereignty over the island,” making an American memorial 
there inappropriate.107  North personally resented this decision because when the 
United States occupied the island briefly after the war it allowed the Japanese to erect 
some two-hundred unit memorials.108  This personal dissatisfaction from North seems 
to be the only remnant of cultural animosity towards the Japanese present in the 
ABMC’s historical records. North’s comment was minor considering the conduct of the 
war. 
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The Dishonorable Dead of Plot E 
Thus far, this chapter has shown how the ABMC functioned during World War II 
and started expanding its commemorative scope at the earliest points of the Cold War.  
The fundamental argument of this entire work is that a specific, prideful memory of 
American military remains was implanted in Europe for political purposes.  American 
memory implanted in European soil, up until this point, been the presentation of a 




American remains in Cold War Europe, it is useful to mention a negative memory of 
American remains hidden in France as an anti-memorial.  Over one-hundred thousand 
American military remains rest in France as human relics for the living to hopefully 
learn from.  In addition to the 100,000 positive memories are the remains of some 100 
soldiers whose memory the American government has effectively erased from the public 
consciousness. 
 World War II is the “good war” in American memory.  Americans who lived 
through the war have come to represent the nation’s greatest generation.  The World 
War II remains cared for by the ABMC physically represent this sacred memory.  
American soldier dead of this war in Europe, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, the 
Philippines, and North Africa offer foreigners a chance to engage with the best stock 
America produced.  Historians have begun to dismantle some of the mystique of the 
“good war” in American memory.  America’s WWII generation, just like every other had 
its flaws.  They argue that as a society, America should not only focus on only the 
positive elements of the WWII generation. The negatives must also receive attention.109  
Americans can only find usable lessons from WWII if the uglier aspects of America’s 
World War II experience are included in historical studies. Blindly glorifying World War 
II and romanticizing the era creates a commitment to militarism and misunderstanding 
of history.  It also prevents Americans from critically looking at the way the world views 
their country—and America’s role in the Cold War.  The American soldiers who fought 
in World War II were human beings with flaws.  They fought for a noble cause.  Yet, 
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fighting for such a cause does not necessarily bestow sainthood on the warrior.  Many 
American GI’s cursed, gambled, smoked, drank, and were sexually promiscuous.  The 
war they fought in was the true start of modern warfare.  American military personnel 
died impersonal deaths brought by unseen enemies, their bodies mangled beyond 
recognition.  Fear, combat fatigue, and shell-shock (then misdiagnosed as cowardice) 
were common.   World War II soldiers fought in a fast-paced mobile war.  In some 
theaters, particularly the Pacific, the brutality of the fighting was fueled by racism on 
both sides.  It is unfathomable to think that the diversity of the World War II 
experiences of American soldiers, is captured in a single narrative or commemorative 
site.  Yet, that is what the ABMC’s sites of memory offer for both its World War I and 
World War II cemeteries.  Only one ABMC cemetery contains a counter-narrative, but it 
is hidden from the public eye. 
 The ABMC’s Oise-Aisne Cemetery, seventy miles to the east of Paris, 
commemorates 6,012 American World War I soldiers, however, it also holds an anti-
memorial to World War II.  In Plot E, a burial plot hidden by shrubbery near the 
cemetery’s entrance, rest ninety-six unnamed American World War II soldiers who were 
dishonorably discharged and executed during the war.  These soldiers are concealed 
from view and inaccessible to the general public.  No markers exist to draw attention to 
their resting places.  Their headstones are not upright marble crosses, but inconspicuous 
flat stones bearing only a number.   Little has been written about this site because hardly 
any archival evidence exists about the decision making process to establish dishonorable 
burial plot.  The little knowledge that exists about the site came from family inquiries 
about burial records and Freedom of Information requests.  Some of the most public 




rest in Plot E, as did Eddie Slovik’s (the only American soldier executed for desertion 
since the Civil War).110   
 This site shows the selectivity from the American government about what kind of 
remains it desired to present to the public.  Plot E also demystifies the World War II 
generation.  The ninety-six remains in Plot E are almost all soldiers court-martialed for 
heinous crimes such as rape and murder.  Once found guilty, the Army executed them 
either by hanging or firing squad.  Before each of them died, they were stripped of their 
insignia and dishonorably discharged from the military.  They died not as American 
soldiers, but violent criminals.  This plot shows that not only the fallibility of American 
soldiers, but perhaps more importantly, flaws in U.S. society.  Of the ninety-six remains, 
eighty are those of African Americans—meaning that 83% of all American soldiers 
executed in World War II were black.111  The American remains in ABMC cemeteries 
from both World Wars are not distinguished by race, however, they fought in Jim Crow 
armies.  It is almost certain that racial bias influenced the military tribunals, and 
punishment, of African American soldiers.  The reason that these remains do not rest in 
the public portion of ABMC cemeteries likely has nothing to do with race, but Plot E 
itself is entirely about race. 
 One can only speculate about the reasoning behind Plot E’s existence.  Its 
location at a World War I cemetery, and not a World War II cemetery suggests that the 
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Army did not want the undesirable remains associated with the soldiers of their own 
war.  This perhaps signifies that the memory of World War I soldiers was already 
becoming less potent.  One also wonders if Plot E was viewed as the Army’s attempt to 
protect the families from dishonor, or a way to put the executions out of public memory?  
If this is the case, one wonders why the dishonorable remains were placed in such close 
proximity to a sacred American site?  Perhaps the close proximity of the dishonorable 
corpses to a cemetery full of respected corpses was seen as the ultimate insult to their 
memory.   Historians cannot write history based on hypotheticals.  The lack of evidence 
means that Plot E will remain a mystery unless documents are released, or discovered in 
the future.  The mere existence of Plot E is useful to the argument of this work, however.  
It shows that the government did not want certain remains to contribute to the 
American memory of its sacrifices for the world.  Just as Soviet soil was a cancer in 
which American soldier dead could not rest, the dishonorable dead were a tumor that 
could not taint friendly soil.  The presence of dishonorable remains threatened the 
sanctity of the discourse of the dead so meticulously constructed since 1918. 
 The purpose of this discussion of Oise-Aisne’s Plot E is not to glorify American 
soldiers convicted of rape, murder, and desertion.  Executing soldiers convicted of 
violent crimes was not new for the United States at the time of World War II.  Execution 
was a common practice during the American Civil War, but much less frequent in 
subsequent wars—particularly for cases of desertion.  “Military executions made a 
forceful statement about the need to be prepared to die” in battle and also scared troops 
from disobedient behavior.112  Military execution equated to the ultimate “bad death” for 
                                                             





many soldiers in previous U.S. conflicts.113  Soldiers sentenced to death not only lost 
their lives, but were killed in public display as a lesson to their comrades and brought 
shame to their families at home.  The overwhelming percentage of African American 
soldiers in Plot E merits deeper questioning into the fairness of their trials and 
legitimacy of acquisitions against them.  In a Jim Crow army, it is hardly conceivable 
that all of these executed men received the type of trial they would have if white.  The 
current study is not the place to delve into such questions of legal racism, however. The 
lesson to be drawn from Plot E for this work is the selectivity that the government 
showed regarding what remains the public could interact with.  The racist circumstances 
visible in the executions does not necessarily collate to racist motives for keeping the 
bodies from ABMC cemeteries.  The ABMC did, after all, adopt desegregated burial 
practices.  The bodies of Plot E more likely faced exclusion because they explicitly 
represented the worst elements of America’s war effort.  They died with the label of 
murderers and rapists.  Such obvious bad memories had no place in the sacred fields 
created by Washington to implant specific imagery of the United States to others. Just 
as friendly soil was important to cemetery location, so were friendly remains.  Surely, of 
the approximately 100,000 remains officially commemorated, there are stories that do 
not fit the official memory assigned to the mass of dead.  The Cromwell twins in 
Suresnes who killed themselves due to combat fatigue is one obvious example.  The 
likely difference between the remains in Plot E and other burials is that Plot E remains 
have memories that are verifiably negative.  To this day, the public has no access to Plot 
E.  It essentially stands as the ABMC’s non-memorial to the World Wars.  The 
                                                             




dishonorable dead represent remains with no discernable value among the thousands of 




The United States had an established system of commemoration on the European 
continent prior to the start of the Second World War.  When this war began, American 
remains from the Great War stood out on the landscape as a means for U.S. diplomats to 
remind conquered France of its historic support for the nation.  These American World 
War I remains demanded care even during the conflict.  The French showed their 
commitment to the U.S. by maintaining American graves in the absence of the ABMC.  
Once the United States entered the war, a far larger number of U.S. dead joined their 
brethren from the First World War.  The United States government found that its dead 
of World War I could entice the living to leave the new generation of American dead 
abroad.  The scope of American dead in World War was significant in quantity and 
geographic location.  Dead U.S. military personnel from World War II came to 
overshadow those of WWII and led to an expansion of the ABMC’s commemorative 
mission.  This commemorative expansion was reflective of the United States new role 
international politics.  Final resting places for U.S. remains indicated locations on the 
globe that the United States viewed as vital interests.  In the Cold War, the United States 
came to demand more from nations that housed its military dead than ever before.  The 
discourse of the dead helped define America’s vision of its future alliances and enemies.  




sacrifice.  For the remainder of the twentieth century their memory was called upon to 
address ever shifting international situations.  The early Cold War marked a return the 
aggressive American memory abroad found in the 1920s.  Instead of representing peace, 
American bodies from the World Wars reflected a militant stand against the spread of 



























“The dead cannot go home.  They paid too great a price.  And, we will not go 
home until our friends here feel that our presence is no longer essential to their 
security, when we can leave a land free of terrors, a land where the dignity of the 






Photo 5.1: French woman cleaning American headstones at Suresnes American Cemetery.  Source: 
“Marshall Assures Allies U.S. Will Remain Until Europe is Secure,” Stars and Stripes, September 14, 
1952.  Photos by Red Grandy. Used with permission. © 1952, 2014 Stars and Stripes. 
 
 
The Second World War left the United States and France in very different geo-
political circumstances.  The United States emerged from the conflict one of the two 
world superpowers.  France found itself a humiliated country struggling to find a usable 
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memory of the war that might allow it to rediscover national pride.  Despite these 
different outcomes, both France and the United States found similar ways to engage 
with the memory of American war dead.  Now backed by real international power, the 
United States chose to combat communism and the ideologies of the Soviet Union by 
casting the memories of its World War dead in France as cold warriors.  France 
reverently turned to American dead, participated in memorial ceremonies, and created 
its own resistance memory alongside the victorious American memory.  Thus, in early 
Cold War France, leaders in both France and the United States saw memories of 
American sacrifice as a means to proudly stand up to left-wing ideologies. 
These high level uses of memory trickled down to the individual level.  Edith 
Eustis visited her son Morton’s grave at the ABMC’s Normandy American Cemetery in 
Colleville-sur-Mer in late July 1952.  She was wholly disappointed in her government’s 
attempt at fulfilling its promise to provide a beautiful resting place for her boy.  She took 
her complaint directly to the ABMC’s prestigious new chairman, George C. Marshall.  
Mrs. Eustis wanted General Marshall to explain to her how in the eight years since peace 
there was no memorial building, no chapel, not a single map, only a lone flagpole, and 
no decent road.2 Other than a few marble crosses and the beginnings of a 
superintendent’s house, she found the sacred site in worse condition than it was when 
she visited three years prior. 3  As an American, not just a mourning mother, she found it 
“strongly disgraceful” and repulsive that the “richest country in the world has so 
neglected & overlooked the soldiers who died for her.” 4  Mrs. Eustis traveled to an 
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English war cemetery for comparison and it made her son’s resting place seem even 
worse.  She found that although the British cemetery was not as ambitious and “rich 
looking” it was “quiet and lovely.” 5   She knew that General Marshall could make no 
immediate improvement, but wished that he might get his Commission more motivated 
come autumn. 
This type of letter was concerning to a man like General Marshall.  Since his 
protégé General Pershing had died in 1948, the American Battle Monuments 
Commission was his responsibility.  Marshall did not lead American WWII troops in 
battle, but as U.S. Army Chief-of-Staff, he organized their victory and was cognizant of 
the lives lost fulfilling his plans.  Marshall personally responded to Mrs. Eustis 
informing her that he was travelling on behalf of the ABMC to inspect all cemeteries 
within the month. Normandy was his first stop.  He assured her that “I shall have your 
reactions very much in mind when I visit it” and she should expect a letter of reply.6  
Upon returning home, Marshall felt that the progress his Commission made was very 
satisfactory considering delays of Congressional funding in the early Cold War.  He was 
so impressed with the sites that he compelled the ABMC to take more steps to 
“encourage travel to the various cemeteries.”7  He wanted Americans to feel that their 
dead’s “lasting resting place was not dreary, but beautiful and constantly visited by large 
numbers of people.”  He also felt that “it is to the advantage of our country to have as 
many foreigners as possible see this impressive testimony of sacrifice our men made on 
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their behalf.” 8  Both seemed equally important to Marshall.  It was not enough for the 
cemeteries abroad to appeal to Americans, but they needed to instill in foreigners a 
sense of awe regarding America’s selflessness.  If many others shared in Mrs. Eustis’s 
feelings about Normandy, the ABMC’s mission would be a failure.  Marshall fulfilled his 
promise and responded to the complaint after his return.  He understood the mother’s 
concern, but explained to Mrs. Eustis all of the improvements that the ABMC had made 
in the cemetery not visible to the lay visitor.  He assured her that Normandy was 
scheduled to be completed by the next summer, it was “further advanced than almost 
any other cemetery,” and promised her that that ABMC was “alive to the natural desire 
of relatives for completed cemeteries.”9  He also informed her that British cemeteries 
looked so much more advanced because that nation did not give any of its citizens their 
dead back.10  Marshall’s experience as Chief-of-Staff, Secretary of State, and Secretary of 
Defense made him a chairman with a strong grasp on foreign relations and projecting 
U.S. values abroad.  In America’s fight against communism every weapon in the arsenal 
needed utilization.  The memory of his WWI comrades and WWII legions were such a 
weapon.  Marshall’s 1952 trip was more than an inspection tour.  His participation in 
dedication ceremonies demonstrated the usefulness that memories of American War 
dead had in Cold War politics. 
This chapter explains the continuation of the ABMC into the Cold War and the 
symbolic importance of its post WWII commemorative agenda.  It does so by placing the 
ABMC’s work in the context of Cold War diplomacy.  Much of the memory assigned to 
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U.S. war dead in France repeated the tropes of the interwar:  sacrifice, commitment to 
freedom, and friendship.  A more militant memory also emerged in the early phases of 
the Cold War, however.  As the United States acclimated to its new superpower status, 
its dead in France from previous conflicts became combatants as much as ambassadors 
of memory.  France also acclimated to a new American war memory on its soil.  
American memory on French soil simultaneously served as an avenue to forge a proud 
French memory and incentive to create a distinct, yet equal, French World War II 
memory.  The commemorative rhetoric of French and American leaders in the post-war 
period cast the sacrifices of their current Cold War fighters in the same light as dead 
from the World Wars. While the remains reflected U.S. power, they simultaneously 
needed to impart feelings of amicability in an era of decaying Franco-American 
relations.  French resentment towards the United States increased dramatically in the 
mid-twentieth century as France became increasingly reliant on American loans and 
defense. 11  Though small, and scattered, the vocal American memory projecting from 




Militant Undertones in God’s Acres 
 The ABMC did not have a strong American military presence in France 
following the Great War to associate with.  Some 50,000 U.S. troops remained stationed 
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in France throughout the 1950s, however.12 The French engaged with the American 
military during the interwar primarily through interactions with memories of past 
conflict.  In the first decades of the Cold War, however, the ABMC’s memory of military 
dead partnered with real military power.  More so than after the Great War, the ABMC 
embraced its military connections and adopted an aggressive styles of commemoration. 
The ABMC chose not to follow the same traditional styles of architecture and cemetery 
layouts that it did after World War I.  No longer did American decision makers feel that 
it was necessary to erect public monuments that meshed with European sensibilities.  
The United States was not a minor international player, but a leader oriented towards 
the future.13  Commemorative aesthetics reflected this.  The ABMC abandoned classic 
architecture and opted for a unique American style of “scrapped classicism.”14  This style 
wedded the decorative and elitist neoclassical style with curved, unadorned, flowing 
lines of modern art.15  The United States no longer “struggled with a new role in 
international affairs” as it had following WWII.16    American cemeteries reflected a new 
sense of place in the world. Instead of square burial plots, American WWII cemeteries 
presented trapezoidal and circular plots.  This made it difficult for visitors to locate an 
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individual WWII grave without the help of an “official” ABMC worker.17 The flow of 
WWII cemeteries also varied considerably.  Visitors entered American WWI cemeteries 
and immediately confronted the burial area.  To reach the commemorative chapel they 
had to walk through the individual losses to reach the imposing architecture.  World 
War II commemorative plans did not follow this model.  The ABMC chose not to erect 
any grand monuments for American WWII battles outside of American cemeteries.  
Instead, each cemetery would have its own monument within it, accompanied by battle 
maps.  These forms of monumentation were the first things visitors encountered in 
WWII cemeteries.  Instead of immediately confronting individual loss, visitors saw 
imagery of a powerful federal government.18  At their core, the ABMC’s WWII cemeteries 
represented a “brave new world” led by the United States to foreign audiences.19  It was 
hoped that the new cemeteries showed that America was a unique, modern nation, with 
a government powerful enough to be involved in the everyday life of Americans.20 
 ABMC historical documents also reveal understanding that General Pershing’s 
chairmanship established a strong military heritage that needed continuance.  T. 
Bentley Mott, the ABMC’s European officer through WWII; and the man who appealed 
to Pershing for the ABMC to be proactive so it might retain more bodies following 
WWII; provided an early vision of the ABMC’s post-war position in Europe.  Mott wrote 
to the ABMC’s Washington headquarters in the final months of World War II to discuss 
whispers in the Paris embassy of the ABMC’s eviction following the war.  Mott saw this 
as an attack on General Pershing’s favorite agency which for twenty-five years had 
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received nothing but the most “delicate consideration” from the American government.21  
In Mott’s opinion, Washington had yet to understand the significance the ABMC would 
have in military relations with Europe following WWII.  Mott felt that after Pershing’s 
death the “latest very famous general” would became the Chairman of the ABMC.22  This 
famous general would undoubtedly desire to continue the “Pershing tradition” working 
from the same office and desk that Pershing occupied.  If the Paris embassy relocated 
the ABMC, the Commission would likely never get back the same office space.  Parisians 
would inevitably “seek after” the new famous military leader of the ABMC, and only then 
would the Department of State understand its error in evicting him.23  Mott 
recommended that Chief-of Staff George Marshall lead the charge to keep Pershing’s 
office intact.  Mott’s apprehension about moving the ABMC’s offices showed the self-
importance that the ABMC assigned to itself moving forward in the post-war world.  
World War II commemoration was going to be a great undertaking, and the ABMC was 
going to retain a very public presence.  A great American military leader from WWII 
combat would want to take the helm of the ABMC and assert himself on the European 
landscape.   
Mott’s prediction was only partially correct.  Famous generals continued to lead 
the ABMC, but none maintained the presence in Europe that Pershing did.  Mott’s 
outlook reflected his experiences in the interwar years when a strong American military 
presence did not exist in Europe.  The ABMC’s chairman in the post-World War II era 
would not be as important as the ABMC’s cemeteries themselves.  The most powerful 
American military leaders in Europe were active duty and leading American collective 
                                                             






defense efforts.  These serving generals, already on European soil, would be the new 
era’s military face at ABMC sites.  They would dedicate the monuments and make 
annual pilgrimages to military remains.  The closer proximity of U.S. service members 
to ABMC cemeteries through the Cold War brought more of an official military presence 
to cemeteries than there was during the interwar.  American troops stood readily 
available to serve ceremonial duties and close enough to tour the old battlefields and 
cemeteries.  The practice of having a uniformed veteran at each cemetery to watch over 
the remains as a superintendent also continued.  Each of administrators was to be an 
“American veterans, with special quarters on site at the cemetery.”24  Symbolically, it 
was important for the agency to have a veteran overseeing the graves of military 
remains—a practice that continues today. 
 
                                                             





Photo 5.2: U.S. Soldiers in Suresnes American Cemetery.  Source: “Marshall Assures Allies U.S. Will 
Remain Until Europe is Secure,” Stars and Stripes, September 14, 1952.  Photos by Red Grandy. Used 
with permission. © 1952, 2014 Stars and Stripes. 
 
 
 Despite the strong military component of the American Battle Monuments 
Commission, its leaders took efforts to distance cemeteries from active defense 




cemeteries separated from military establishments.  North wanted all American 
cemeteries from World War I and World War II to “maintain an unquestionable non-
military status. 25  He provided specific examples of what this meant, and why the non-
military status was desired.  Fear of a hot war with the Soviet Union in Europe was a real 
concern, as was the threat of nuclear attack.  In case of emergency, Washington wanted 
to use a few of the ABMC sites for strategic purposes.  It was hoped that “food, bedding, 
etc. which might be needed by other U.S. Government agencies be stored at 
cemeteries.”26  Washington also wanted to install “radio and radar” equipment in some 
cemeteries for defense purposes.27  North never mentioned specific cemeteries or who 
pushed for the transformation of ABMC sites into military bases.  The continual focus 
on Suresnes as an important ABMC site in France throughout various agency records 
makes it reasonable to believe that Suresnes was a desirous location for emergency 
materials.  It also offered a large storage area under its chapel and close proximity to 
Paris and the French Defense Department.  Through this “unsettled era,” North fought 
to keep to keep the military out of ABMC sites.  His main reason for this was the 
relationship France had with the cemeteries.  Throughout the ABMC’s history, even 
during German occupation of WWII, American military cemeteries remained virtually 
“immune from desecration and damage.”28  North and other commissioners reasoned 
that part of the reason that these sites remained untargeted by protestors was because 
they did not possess advert military connotations.  The sites needed to have a strong 
                                                             







military presence, but not a feeling of permanent military bases.  They straddled the line 
between cultural products and military installations. 
 
 
Will the French Fight?  French Participation in American WWII Memory 
 The rhetoric of friendship between France and the United States continued 
through the early part of the twentieth century, despite the inability of both nations to 
see the future in the same light.  The Franco-American partnership during the Cold War 
was at best a “cold alliance.”29  The United States tended to belittle French concerns and 
feminize the nation as over emotional, while France resented the historic dependence it 
had developed for U.S. assistance throughout the twentieth century.30  The fissure 
between the United States and France developed primarily because of France’s 
humiliating defeat in World War II. France’s rapid capitulation in the war proved to 
America that its ally was an ineffective nation morally, politically, and militarily. 31 The 
French needed a means to rebuild their reputation when the war ended.  This 
rehabilitation took many forms, but one was distancing the dishonorable past by 
participating in the victorious one.  American dead served as an accessible point of entry 
into a victorious memory.  By honoring the American dead, French who showed 
passivity during the war, might form memories of strong resistance.  
General Charles de Gaulle, led the Free French movement, and emerged as the 
redeemer of France. He was a fervent French nationalists who saw a future where 
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France stood as an equal partner of Washington, Moscow, and London.  Throughout the 
war, de Gaulle struggled to gain recognition from the Allies. It was not until the 
approach of D-Day that Washington chose to recognize that de Gaulle would control 
liberated France.32   Much of this support came from de Gaulle’s ability to rally 
communists and Gaullists under one banner.  Communists showed a willingness to join 
de Gaulle knowing that Allies needed to win the war for them to have a voice in future 
French politics.33 
 De Gaulle’s Free French forces offered a mixture of asset and liability in the 
European theater.  Following D-Day, American forces struggled over a month in the 
Normandy hedgerows to push the Germans east.  Once the Germans fell back, General 
Eisenhower desired to pursue as rapidly as possible.  Fast pursuit meant postponing the 
liberation of Paris because it held no strategic purpose and would cost time and 
resources.  De Gaulle insisted on liberating his capital and ordered his armies forward 
despite Eisenhower’s wishes.  Understanding the symbolic importance attached to the 
army liberating Paris, Eisenhower ordered American divisions to take the city and 
troops from both nations rushed ahead.  On August 25, 1944, the main body of the 
French and American armies entered Paris. The first waves of Americans to liberate 
Paris on August 25, 1944 described the experience as one of the “greatest nights” of their 
lives.34  Everywhere, crowds gathered to shower them with affection and gifts.  Wine, 
food, music, and sex came in abundance.35   The following day, de Gaulle “relit the flame 
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at the Tomb of the Unknown and led a victory march.”36  In the days that followed, 
Eisenhower sent more of his divisions through Paris on their way to the battlefronts in 
the east at the request of de Gaulle. 37   This showed American support for de Gaulle’s 
leadership and might thwart communist attempts at a power seizure.38 Members of the 
American military represented a partnership through the initial stages of French 
liberation, but in the final year of WWII, and in the years after, hundreds of thousand 
GI’s enveloped Paris and other French cities.  American liberators eventually turned into 
the same asset and liability to the French that they were for America during the war.39  
American arrogance and disregard for law annoyed the French, but their presence also 
provided a means for the French to forget the negative parts of their recent past. 
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Photo 5.3:  Crowds of French patriots line the Champs Elysees to view Allied tanks and half tracks pass 
through the Arc du Triomphe, after Paris was liberated on August 25, 1944. Source: Library of Congress.  




Many historical studies of the legacy of the Great War in France exist, while the 
historiography of France’s immediate post-WWII period remain sparse.40  Much of the 
sparseness comes from the complexity of post-WWII France and the need for studies 
adopting multiple perspectives.  Following the Great War, France had much mourning 
to do, but also a major victory to celebrate.  This was not the case following WWII.  In 
this conflict, France did once again side with the victors.  However, the populous also 
needed to grapple with the overwhelming defeat of 1940 and a fractured population.  
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Under de Gaulle’s leadership immediately after WWII, France made efforts to move 
forward from its troubled past.  Celebrating in liberation required Vichyites, Gaullists, 
Communists, expelled Jews, and other political factions to reach some form of memorial 
consensus.  Efforts to purge France of former enemies took place in the immediate 
aftermath of the war, but never reached full potential.  Around 350,000 French faced 
collaboration charges, three top French officials were executed, and out of 7,000 death 
sentences in French municipalities, 767 were carried out.  Tens-of-thousands of lesser 
sentences from imprisonment, loss of employment, or public humiliations also took 
place.41  General de Gaulle hoped to form a collective French memory of a nation of 
resistors, not traitors.  If truly all French that collaborated in some way with the Nazis 
were punished, the nation would have likely underwent a civil war and seen a crippling 
numbers of sentences.  De Gaulle instead pushed for a more “moderate purge,” despite 
cries from the communists to rid France of all Vichy remnants.42 
 A large part of France’s rehabilitation centered on constructing a memory of the 
some 600,000 French dead that “rebuilt a national identity” from World War II.43  
Between 1944 and 1950 French mourners inundated Paris with requests to erect 
memorials, construct cemeteries, and name streets to remember French citizens who 
died as resistors.  While similar, French WWII memorial practices functioned quite 
differently than those of the Great War.  French commemorations served as civic 
holidays that paid homage to the dead and celebrated peace more so than victory after 
World War I.44  The memory of resistance that formed after WWII was dissimilar.  
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Memories of the dead focused on their role in resisting and placed “greater emphasis on 
victory” to rebuild a prideful national identity through “patriotic euphoria.”45  This is a 
fascinating transition considering that France’s role in victory during WWI was far 
greater than during WWII.  The French went to great lengths to remember themselves 
as active resistors despite the existence of stronger remnants of collaboration.  America 
and Great Britain helped promulgate this message to a certain extent.  They hoped that 
a victorious French image might help de Gaulle control French communists.  General 
Eisenhower did not go out of his way to downplay the French role in their own 
liberation.  Instead, he gave the French resistance room to assert its legitimacy.  He 
allowed French General Leclerc’s French troops to first enter Paris, and publicly 
estimated that French resistors contributed the equivalent of fifteen army divisions to 
the liberation battles.46  At a ceremony at the Arc de Triomphe in September 1944, 
General Eisenhower told his audience that “the French had the largest share of the glory 
having liberated the capital of their country.”47 Additionally, U.S. propaganda posters in 
1944 France did not depict Americans as saviors of a passive France, but often included 
images of American, French, and British fighters side-by-side.48   
French reverence to American dead into the national effort aided in efforts to 
create a prideful memory.  Many French chose not to risk their lives engaging in 
resistance during German occupation, but after the allied invasion many opportunities 
arose for French to associate themselves with the resistance movement, no matter how 
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insignificant the contribution.  One of the most accessible ways for the French to feel 
like a part of the resistance was through participation in ceremonies.  “Taking part in 
celebrations and subsequent commemorations helped root citizens firmly in the 
Allied/Resistance camps and gave them a sense of having participated in a small way to 
Liberation.”49  By participating in victory celebrations, it was possible for a French 
citizen to erase years of passivity and form a memory of themselves as a resistor. 
The thousands of American corpses present in France provided easy access to a 
prideful memory.  Participation in the commemoration of American military dead 
became just as viable a means for the French to create a positive memory associated 
with victory as commemorating their own dead. Throughout WWII, the French had 
thousands of American military dead from WWI to pay respects to in addition to the 
newly deceased American soldiers from WWII.  American newspapers immediately 
following French liberation revealed a population eager to engage with American soldier 
dead.  The byline of the Chicago Tribune’s report on 1945 Memorial Day ceremonies 
abroad was “Europe to Bow to Yank Dead.”50  It reported that “French children would 
bring wildflowers to Americans graves” and that some Parisian children even did this 
throughout German occupation.51  General de Gaulle furnished a French honor guard to 
join this youthful image of French resistance52  The previous chapter of this work 
demonstrated how some French stood up to Vichy rule by maintaining ABMC 
cemeteries. Many of those French who resisted German occupation by caring for 
American soldier dead received commendation for their loyalty to the United States.   
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Chairman George Marshall went out of his way in a 1952 inspection tour of U.S. 
cemeteries to acknowledge French caretakers.  On this visit it was important to for 
Marshall to single out loyal ABMC employees who “with laudable devotion did their 
utmost to care for the World War I cemeteries and monuments during German 
occupation.” 53 As a sign of appreciation, Marshall pinned eleven French and Belgian 
ABMC employees with a special “Army Medal of Freedom Award” with the French 
Government’s Veterans Minister in attendance. 54   The recipients were blue collar 
workers, and the acknowledgement was surely important to them. When General 
Marshall learned that one of the ABMC’s first employees, Andree Champagant, “was 
desperately ill in her apartment” and unable to attend the event, he insisted on making a 
personal visit to her Paris apartment and was willing to walk up six flights of stairs 
because it was “a matter of morale.”55  This positive diplomatic gesture was made 
possible through memory and commemoration. 
 France and the United States also found in the dead a rhetorical channel to 
articulate French resistance.  In a Memorial Day ceremony at Suresnes in 1947, French 
Prime Minister Paul Ramadier linked American WWI sacrifice to WWII praising them 
for realizing that “if France disappeared under a conqueror’s yoke, the cause of liberty 
itself would be compromised.”56  This demonstrated the formulation of a memory 
placing France at the heart of the allied cause—American military dead stood as proof of 
this understanding.  France was the centerpiece of modern freedom.  Later the same day 
American Ambassador Jefferson Caffery addressed a crowd of Frenchmen gathered at 
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temporary American WWII cemetery and strengthened the French resistance memory.  
Caffery told the audience that the American remains from the fight to liberate Paris 
“were not alone,” but died with members of the French armies and French resistance, 
“who worked in darkness and too often died in darkness.”57  Caffery gave the French a 
prideful memory of their part in liberation.  American dead covered the French 
landscape, but Caffery acknowledged that many French died for liberation in less 
celebrated terms.  Letting the French associate American sacrifice with their own helped 
ensure that the United States had a stronger ally in the future.  
 France heralded the memory of American dead, but also took steps to assert a 
distinct memory of their own dead alongside Americans.   Allowing France to share in 
their liberation had the strategic value of helping de Gaulle establish power and get his 
country functioning again.  It also opened-the door to French delusion as well.  Some 
segments of French society actually came to remember their liberation as “almost 
exclusively French” quickly after the war ended.58  The memory of French and American 
war dead converged in a unique, if not combative way, at Fort Mont-Valérien. 
 Fort Mont-Valérien has thus far been a location frequently discussed in this work.  
On the outskirts of its defensive walls sits the American Military Cemetery at Suresnes.  
The fort’s location on the highest ground around Paris made it a strategic asset to the 
Nazis during occupation.  It also became a favored location for the Reich to imprison 
and execute French resistors.  Between 1940 and 1944, over 1,000 French resistors died 
by German firing squad within earshot of the American World War I cemetery.  The 
violence associated with Mont-Valérien made it an excellent location for General de 
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Gaulle to perpetuate the resistance memory that he so wanted for France.  On 
November 11, 1944, de Gaulle visited the site and ordered it be set aside as a 
commemorative location.  He returned the following year on June 18, the anniversary of 
his famous radio address delivered to France from London, to light an eternal flame in 
memory of resistors.59  That same November, the bodies of fifteen French “combatants 
who had served in various branches of the armed forces and theaters of war were 
solemnly buried in a crypt” constructed at Fort Mont-Valérien by order of de Gaulle.60 
The bodies stopped at the Arc de Triomphe en route to their final resting place at 
Suresnes.  There, de Gaulle spoke to the dead and appealed for them “to heal the hurt 
France.”61 The selection of the fifteen remains revealed the specialized kind of memory 
de Gaulle sought.  None of the bodies included were held or executed in Fort Mont-
Valérien.  Instead, the ‘resistors’ were regular soldiers and Gaullists.62  This selective 
remembering ostracized a large portion of France, including communist resistors and 
those who lost family to the executions.  After de Gaulle left office in 1946, government 
support for the memorial ceremony dwindled.  French leaders still laid wreaths 
annually, but the memorial underwent no expansions and the ceremonies never 
approached the level of de Gaulle’s.63  It was not until de Gaulle returned to power in 
1958 that a commemorative focus returned to Mont-Valérien.  The parking area was 
expanded and a sixteenth body from the Indochina war joined the original fifteen in 
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1960.  The lull in commemoration following De Gaulle’s first presidency showed that its 
transformation into a Gaullist site of French resistance memory caused divisiveness in 
French society.  It did provide France a World War II counterpart for the Tomb of the 
Unknown at the Arc de Triomphe, however.  It also asserted a French site of memory 
almost directly beside the American one at Suresnes.  Perhaps this was a way for France 
to further advance a memory of equal partnership in the Second World War.  
Seemingly not wishing let French WWII memory overshadow the American 
memory on Mont-Valérien, the ABMC took steps to transform the Suresnes cemetery 
into its own WWII shrine.   Suresnes served as the ABMC’s bridge of World War I and 
World War II memory.  The architectural style of the ABMC’s WWII cemeteries was 
more aggressive than in its WWI program, but that did not mean that there was a strong 
desire to completely separate the two conflicts in public memory.  Initially, the 
Commission considered merely including American WWII dead in the WWI cemeteries 
already present in Europe.64  This would save money by not requiring the creation of 
new cemeteries from nothing.   The plan to combine cemeteries failed because virtually 
no free space remained in American cemeteries from the Great War. 65  The ABMC’s 
WWI jewel, Suresnes, proved to be the only cemetery that was adapted to commemorate 
dead from both wars.  Commissioners realized that Suresnes was the cemetery where 
“senior   representatives of the French and American governments assembled on 
Memorial Day and other appropriate occasions to render homage to the American 
Dead.” 66  It was not feasible to ask France for another large American cemetery in Paris; 
finding a site as pristine as Suresnes would be difficult anyway.  It was also unacceptable 
                                                             






for America to not have a cemetery to WWII in Paris where high officials could easily 
meet to commemorate both wars.  
Suresnes thus became sort of a problem and exception for ABMC commissioners.  
The Commission decided that the World War I chapel within the Suresnes cemetery 
could easily evolve into a shrine to both wars by simply adding another wing and etching 
the names of WWII unknowns on a memorial wall.  Apparently, a new chapel and 
etched names failed to make Suresnes truly representative of both wars and relevant in 
the new era.  To ensure that the public viewed the cemetery as one of both wars, it 
needed bodies of both wars.  The ABMC fulfilled this need by reconfiguring the WWI 
burial plots to inter twenty-four American unknowns from WWII.  The plot of WWII 
unknowns was set-off from the others in the configuration of a crucifix.67  Disinterment 
of American unknowns in other parts of France for reburial in Suresnes demonstrated 
both the importance of Suresnes as a commemorative grandstand and the need of 
remains to legitimize the space.  The pliability of memory assigned to unknown corpses 
also made them the most desirable remains from World War II to go into the ground at 
Suresnes.  American Ambassador James Dunn told the audience the significance of 
unknowns at Suresnes during the re-dedication of the cemetery.  Suresnes was symbolic 
of “all American overseas memorials to all America’s sons who sacrificed.”68  Unknowns 
went into Suresnes because “their fight was not a personal one,” because death as an 
unknown meant loss of individual memory.  The twenty-four American unknowns going 
into Suresnes represented an infinite number of stories.  But, under the ABMC’s care, 
they represented not fighters for America, or France, or Europe, but “for that 
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impersonal—and reverend—right of mankind to be free.”  “They gave their lives for our 
common cause of freedom,” Ambassador Dunn told the audience.69  This logic mirrored 
the selection of unknown soldiers to rest in the Tomb of the Unknown at Arlington 
National Cemetery.70  The appeal of the unknown was that the corpse might belong to 
any American who never received final closure.  In reality, the remains might have 
represented any ethnicity, religious creed, or background.  Their symbolic transfer to 
national shrines made them the property of collective American memory, however. 
Little evidence about the decision making process to turn Suresnes into a dual-
purpose WWI/WWII cemetery is available outside the Secretary Thomas North’s 
manuscript and the dedication program.  The ABMC’s expansion of Suresnes and 
placement of WWII unknowns within the cemetery made it one of the most calculated 
cemeteries of the ABMC.  In some ways, the commemorative steps taken by the United 
States and France on Mont-Valérien foreshadowed tensions to come.  There was not a 
dialogue between the ABMC and French Ministry of Defense about their use of WWII 
remains on the high ground overlooking Paris.  The actions of the two governments 
unfolded like a sort of memory-arms-race, however.  General de Gaulle used carefully 
selected corpses to craft a French memory of WWII that made the conquered nation 
seem equal with other allies.  This memory entered a landscape where American bodies 
had long reminded France of its sacrifice for a friend.  With a powerful French WWII 
memory present on its borders, the ABMC needed to bring new bodies to Suresnes to 
redefine its own memory on Mont-Valérien.  This duel of memories hinted at Franco-
American clashes to come as the Cold War intensified.  The memory that de Gaulle 
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inserted on Mont-Valérien, very much reflected the political outlook he brought back to 
the presidency in 1958.  France was a proud nation of resistors equal to the United 
States.  
French attempts to assert a resistance memory in the early stages of the Cold War 
did not seem to drastically affect U.S. memory practices.    French inclusion in the 
commemoration of American military dead was mutually beneficial to France and the 
United States.  While it strengthened the resistance memory in France, it also forwarded 
the goal of the American government to keep U.S. military remains abroad.  A battle for 
remains after WWII never reached the level of hostility in the United States that it did 
following the Great War.  Much of this was likely attributed to the clear precedent set by 
the first generation of the American Battle Monuments Commission.  It was also 
attributable to the overwhelming continuation for French reverence for American 
military dead.  In the summer of 1947, the wife of Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt 
returned home from a visit to her husband’s grave in Normandy and reported upon 
leaving her airplane at La Guardia Airport in New York of being “deeply impressed” that 
the “French people want very strongly to have our dead left there.”71  She was sure that if 
Americans saw these cemeteries and the French care “the program to remove bodies 
would be completely dropped.”72  President Truman made a similar plea to mourning 
American families to travel abroad in 1947 and view permanent WWI cemeteries and 
temporary WWII cemeteries.  He “felt sure” that “if they could see for themselves the 
care devoted to the graves” they “would prefer that their loved ones rest forever in the 
                                                             






countries where they fell.”73  The ABMC realized quite quickly into its WWII 
commemorative work the necessity of tactful thinking.  The French could find pride in 
American military memories on the European continent, but also resentment.  Early 
attempts to repair the destroyed American WWI naval monument in Brest met with 
protest from the mayor. Brest suffered considerable damage during the war and the 
mayor advised the ABMC that it should “defer reconstruction of the monument until the 
people’s homes had been rebuilt and the city’s own war memorial erected,” or else it 
risked “psychologically” damaging the American reputation in Brest.74  The ABMC 
understood the mayor’s logic through its own experiences.  It faced protest from the 
local population when trying to repair the monument prior to Brest’s own recovery.  In 
the earliest stages of repair “communists became agitated and the American flag was 
twice torn down from the flagstaff.” 75  It was not until the city was rebuilt and “the 
authority of its government became stable” that an official invitation to rebuild the 
monument came.76 
 The bonds between the United States and France through American dead were 
not enough to ensure a happy relationship between the two nations as the Cold War 
intensified.  The Korean War and more aggressive U.S. foreign policy put France into a 
defensive mode, and through the 1950s animosities grew between the longtime allies.  
One of the biggest questions leaders in Washington had about France in the early Cold 
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War was, in the event of Soviet aggression in Western Europe, “will the French fight?”77  
William Avery Crawford, a State Department official involved with the Office of 
Research and Analysis reported to Ambassador David Bruce in the summer of 1950 that 
a “deep and basic longing to stay out of war” existed in “Frenchmen of all degrees.”78   If 
war came to Europe in the summer of 1950, Crawford envisioned France “throwing in 
the sponge rather than fighting.” 79  But, if the United States provided a “truly serious 
plan for European defenses,” the confidence and fighting spirit of the French might be 
restored.80  A similar letter from the American Embassy in Paris to the Assistant 
Secretary of European Affairs at the State Department concluded that the “French are 
tired, discouraged, skeptical, badly governed, and with a big Communist problem.”81  
Officials at the American Embassy felt the only remedy to the French malaise was 
initiating a complete “psychological transformation,” a task that had no clear formula.82  
Part of the transformation needed to come from a decisive military plan from 
Washington, but much of the effort to transform the French psychology in the 
subsequent years stemmed from more subversive “cultural projects.”83   
A memorandum between officers of the State Department’s cultural relations 
division the following year revealed the emerging importance that the State Department 
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placed on cultural exchanges.  The report argued that “contrary to what many think, 
cultural projects can have tactical value in the cold war.”84 For American culture to 
effectively transform the French, careful planning was necessary.  American cultural 
transfers could not “be massive” because the volume of cultural effort did not impress 
the French, “quality and integrity” did.85  According to the officers, one of the most 
important components of American culture to spread into France was art.  “Good music 
will be applauded.  Good painting and sculpture will be admired.  But not because they 
are American, but because they are good.”86  France hated propaganda and “abhorred it 
when it was disguised in art form.”87  For American culture to positively influence the 
French, it needed to organically depict “social truth,” and not reflect a state sponsored 
attempt to force “democratic art” upon them.88  The State Department’s role in cultural 
transfer was ideally providing support to artists and boosting cultural products while 
“remaining behind the scenes as much as possible.”89  The primary conclusion of the 
memorandum was that “the appeal of art wilts when the Government interposes itself 
between the audience and the artist.”90 
This early Cold War memorandum rises many questions about the ABMC’s role 
in State Department cultural transfer programs.  No clear linkages exist in State 
Department records between the ABMC’s commemorative plans and the Department’s 
cultural transfer agenda. William Delano, the architect responsible for the WWII 
monument at Suresnes reflected in a letter to ABMC Chairman George Marshall that his 











work went beyond commemoration.  Delano complained to Marshall for not mentioning 
his name at any point in the official dedication of his monument.  He believed that his 
work not only showed America’s sacrifices, but also its “cultural and industrial 
achievements.”91 It was clear to Delano that the ABMC’s work was meant to achieve this 
goal, but its failure to publicly praise American artists hindered this meaning.   It is 
highly unlikely that the State Department asked the ABMC to not mention artists so that 
the monument might seem less like cultural propaganda.  But, the fact that dedication 
speeches focused more on the dead than cultural objectives did show how ABMC sites 
might implant American culture onto French soil more subversively.   
If the State Department’s assessment that the French hated democratic art was 
true, the ABMC’s work should have been a totally failed to connect with the French.  The 
ABMC was an American government agency and it clearly stood between the artist and 
the European public.  If a French citizen wanted to find a blatant example of American 
democratic art, they needed only to visit an ABMC cemetery.  By all accounts, the 
French should have abhorred ABMC sites, but they regularly attended ceremonies and 
cared for graves.  The clearest explanation for French acceptance of ABMC sites is the 
presence of American military remains at these sites.  Military remains elevated the sites 
from mere representations of democratic art.  ABMC sites did not primarily transfer art, 
but the memory of human sacrifice—evident by the actual bodies of war.  American 
military cemeteries in France did not just serve as observable art, but places for the 
public to interact with.  The French visiting ABMC cemeteries were not passive 
spectators, but active participants in perpetuating memories.  Cemeteries of the 
                                                             





American Battle Monuments Commission put democratic art on full display, but 
remains provided a buffer between the public and the art.  Because ABMC sites are 
primarily cemeteries, it is not enough for scholars to evaluate the effectiveness of ABMC 
sites as public diplomacy through pure aesthetic analysis. 
The previous chapters on the interwar years demonstrated that even during 
heightened anti-Americanism in the 1920s, ABMC cemeteries escaped hostility.  The 
same was true in the Cold War.  An American historian addressing French anti-
Americanism in 1952 after a prolonged stay in Paris pondered about what America 
needed to do in France to lessen negativity.  He ultimately felt that forbearance was the 
best option.92  The American reformist zeal and never ending drive to control the future 
did not offer a good solution to French anti-Americanism.  The French hated Americans 
because of their incessant need to meddle.  The author’s conclusion in 1952, was that the 
U.S. needed to stop orienting itself so much toward the future and pushing France to 
change.  France was a country oriented towards the past, and the best platform for the 
U.S. to improve French relations was engagement with the past.93  A young nation like 
the United States had few dual French-American memories of the past to share.  ABMC 
cemeteries in France offered some of the few American sites on the French landscape 
that offered the French a clear vision of America’s role in their national survival.  This 
work has shown that ABMC sites also represented American hopes for future diplomatic 
bonds, but the orientation to the future moved through memory.  The mask of memory 
at ABMC cemeteries helps explain why they remained usable locations in Cold War 
France. 
                                                             







Yankee Go Home!:  Memory as a Cold War Weapon 
On November 5, 1952, the day of General Eisenhower’s landslide presidential 
election, he addressed the French people on their national radio network, even stepping 
out of his comfort zone to speak his opening paragraph in French.  Eisenhower’s address 
on Election Day left little doubt about the importance Washington placed on French 
support in the Cold War.  Eisenhower’s selection as president made the future of 
Franco-American relations look optimistic.  He was the face of American victory in 
World War II, he dealt with de Gaulle’s resistance force respectfully, and served as the 
first Supreme Allied Commander of NATO’s command in Europe.  Friendship was 
stressed throughout the president elect’s address to France.  He noted that the Franco-
American friendship was not new, but proven, and one that Americans learned about 
from an early age.  He acknowledged that “friendship between nations was often 
ephemeral,” but through many “vicissitudes, the affection between France and the 
United States has endured, unimpaired. 94  Eisenhower did not hide the purpose of his 
message.  The men and women of France needed to work with the United States and the 
rest of Western Europe to “build a strong shield against the manifest imperialistic 
ambition of [the] Soviet Union.”95   As former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO’s 
European Command, Eisenhower maintained intimate knowledge of the Soviet shield 
America envisioned.   Eisenhower warned the French that “difficult days lie ahead,” but 
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he was comforted by the historic trend of France and America “living together 
effectively.”96  It also pleased him that French allies possessed a “rare combination of 
heroism, intelligence, and culture.”97  At the time of this address, Franco-American 
relations were not as harmonious as Ike reported.  The year leading up to Ike’s election 
had been turbulent.  Discontent over American actions in the Korean conflict increased 
in France.  French dissatisfaction physically manifested when General Matthew Ridgway 
took over as Eisenhower’s replacement as Supreme Allied Commander of Europe.  The 
United States partially controlled the damage by aggressively turning to American 
military dead from the World Wars to make favorable links with the war in Korea. 
The start of the Korean War in June 1950 increased French frustrations with its 
American alliance.98  French dependence on the United States meant that their future 
rested in the outcome of the Korean conflict.  France’s most prominent newspaper, Le 
Monde saw Korea as justification for France to withdraw from NATO and maintain 
neutrality in the increasingly hot Cold War.99  France supported the United States in the 
early stages of the war for going to the aid of South Koreans and sent 1,000 of its own 
soldiers to aid in the United Nations security force.  When North Korean and Chinese 
forces pushed Americans back into the South and forced a frantic evacuation at 
Hamhung, French support waned.   MacArthur’s vision of countering with nuclear 
weapons and a full invasion of China, made France fear entrapment in another world 
war.100 General Matthew Ridgway eventually replaced Douglas MacArthur as 
commander of all United Nation forces in Korea.  Ridgway received credit for improving 
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the morale of U.S. troops in Korea after Chinese forces embarrassingly forced an 
American retreat back into South Korea.  Under Ridgway’s leadership, UN forces also 
regained footing in Korea, pushing communist forces into a stalemate and eventual 
armistice.   
France intently followed events in Korea.  The French Communist Party voiced 
the loudest discontent for America’s battle to contain communism on the Korean 
peninsula.  A U.S. State Department Intelligence Branch survey gauged the French 
opinion of America in 1953 to determine how much Franco-American relations had 
deteriorated since World War II.   The survey sampled a diverse segment of the French 
population.  In general, it found that the French approved many of the bigger Cold War 
programs initiated by the United States.  Fifty-six percent of the French polled approved 
of “efforts to unify Western Europe,” the same amount approved of “the Marshall 
Plan.”101  On the other hand, half disapproved of the Korean War and forty-nine percent 
took issue with the conflicts in Indo-China.102  Despite the disapproval, most of those 
sampled felt that the United States was not entirely responsible for the war in Korea.  
Only fourteen percent felt that the United States was to blame for starting the conflict, 
while thirty-four percent blamed the Soviet Union and communists.  Nearly half of those 
sampled did not know who was at fault for the fighting in Korea. 103  The key issue that 
the French had with the Korea War was America’s conduct.  Seventy-one percent of the 
sample heard that the United States used germ-warfare against North Koreans and 
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Chinese communists.104 Even though most of the sample heard of germ warfare in 
Korea, only thirteen percent believed that reports were true. 105  French communists led 
the effort to cast the United States role in Korea negatively.  The communist newspaper 
L’Humanité frequently reported stories that the war was not going well for Americans.  
At the time of the State Department’s survey there was little doubt that the rumors of 
germ warfare stemmed from communists.  On the morning of the polling, the 
communist paper’s headline reported that “46,000 U.S. soldiers have deserted since 
start of Korean War,” and that Stalin was right when he stated that “the Korean War was 
unpopular with American soldiers.”106  French communists benefitted from an easy 
American target when General Matthew Ridgway arrived from the battlefields of Korea 
in May 1952 to take command of NATO forces. 
When Matthew Ridgway assumed the position of Supreme Commander of Allied 
Forces Europe (SACEUR), the Korean War, the French Indo-China War, and the 
ideological battle of the Cold War all converged.  Ridgway’s position was not just a 
military one.  Correspondence between J. Bonbright, the Assistant Secretary of State for 
European Affairs, with the endorsement of Secretary of State Dean Acheson, orientated 
Ridgway prior to taking over such an important post.  This correspondence included a 
memorandum outlining the key considerations that Ridgway needed to understand 
before assuming his duties.    The primary theme of the document was that everything 
Ridgway said and did in Western Europe carried great weight.107  As SACEUR, Ridgway 
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was “the personal embodiment of NATO itself.”108  He had the “politico-military 
responsibilities” of building public support for NATO, improving European morale, 
stimulating national leaders to take actions desired by the US, and soothing European 
differences.109  Ridgway was essentially a “roving U.S. Ambassador” who needed to show 
constant diligence because “unfriendly elements” of Europe patiently waited for him to 
falter so they could unleash a “propaganda barrage” against the United States.110  
Communists represented the most unfriendly segment of Europe that Ridgway needed 
to face.  Ridgway was warned that “Commies” planned a huge protest demonstration to 
greet him.”111  The warning from State Department leaders was not empty. 
General Ridgway arrived in Paris to assume his command on May 27, 1952.  The 
Paris that Ridgway entered was politically charged and looked more like a police state 
than an open democracy.  Ridgway landed at Paris’s Orly airport as a distinguished 
guest.  Outgoing SACEUR General Eisenhower, top French government officials, and 
hundreds of newspaper reporters welcomed him.  Ridgway’s initial statement revealed 
the cooperative tone that he wished to set during his time as SACEUR.  He was bringing 
to his post, the experience of leading “sixteen nations of differing languages, creeds, 
races, and colors” mixed in one United Nations’ fighting force on the battlefields of 
Korea.112  Despite Ridgway’s experience fighting in World War II and Korea, as 
SACEUR, he “entertained no aggressive designs against any country whatsoever in the 
world,” but “would see to it that no aggression comes to destroy or merely endanger the 
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liberties dear” to NATO countries.113  Leadership of an international coalition to 
maintain peace was of paramount importance at this juncture in history.  The backbone 
of NATO was a new European Defense Community.  Coinciding with Ridgway’s arrival 
was a meeting in Paris of European Defense Community leaders to sign the documents 
officially creating a “European army” that included German troops from the newly 
rearmed West Germany.114  The rearmament of Germans, along with Korea, stood as the 
biggest points of contention for the French. 
French Communists planned a most unpleasant greeting for General Ridgway.  
An indicator of what Ridgway might face came in protest on the streets of Paris the days 
before his arrival.  On May 23, communists mobilized at the urging of their newspapers 
to display their dejection of impending arrival of the “microbian general” who 
supposedly approved germ attacks on communist fighters in Korea.115  The left-wing 
protestors gathered at rush hour train stations chanting ‘Assassin Ridgway,’ ‘Ridgway go 
home,’ and ‘we want peace.’”116  Ridgway was not yet present to comply with the 
demands.  Much of the early protest stemmed from European-wide communist 
demonstrations against talks to bind Western Europe closer together with a European 
army and the subsequent rearming of Germany.117  Communist leaders hoped to draw 
Parisian blue collar workers into the anti-America protest by painting anti-Ridgway 
graffiti on factory walls and timing events around the end of workdays and during 
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weekends.118  They also appealed to Parisian theater goers by putting on play called 
“Colonel Foster Pleads Guilty” that portrayed the Korean conflict from the communist 
point of view.119  The French police disrupted this event, ripping down the stage sets and 
tear bombing the audience.120  French communist newspaper, Ce Soir, printed an open 
letter to Ridgway’s three-year old son asking why his father “destroyed people and 
houses and dropped microbe bombs?”121  In these waves of protest in Paris before 
Ridgway arrived, anything American became a target.  An American reporter was beaten 
at St. Lazare train station and cars driven by Americans were stoned.122  The Parisian 
police arrested 186 communist demonstrators in these events and both sides suffered 
numerous injuries.123  No fatalities were reported in these manifestations, but both the 
communists and police learned the other’s tactics and prepared for the main event, 
Ridgway’s arrival. 
The Ridgways arrived to a greeting by General Eisenhower.  After about an hour 
of ceremony at the airport, Ridgway traveled ten miles through Paris en route to his 
hotel at Versailles.  A Parisian spectator of the event likely recalled memories of military 
occupation in previous years. Prior to Ridgway’s plane landing at Orly, thirty-three 
French bombers tore through the skies as a sign of force.124  Newspaper accounts 
estimated that anywhere between 4,000-20,000 French uniformed and undercover 
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police guarded the route of the motorcade.125  “At every twenty-five yards of the ten-mile 
route armed French police stood on alert, motorcycle police swept the road clear into 
the city, and parked all along the route were vans filled with helmeted Guards.” 126  This 
security came in response to the “weeks of anti-Ridgway fulminations in the communist 
press and threats of rioting and demonstrations.” 127  The American press satisfactorily 
reported that “there were virtually no signs of Communist activity” during Ridgway’s 
first day in Paris. 128  The most offensive thing the Ridgways saw on the way to their hotel 
were signs reading “Ridgway Go home” that “Communist hoodlums” plastered to 
buildings on the route.129  Lack of protest this first day gave American reporters the 
incentive to paint communists as cowards and feminine.  The only French leftists brave 
enough to display anti-Americanism on the route of the processional were a few 
chanting women in suburbs.130  The male leaders of the party apparently “evaporated in 
the face of tough, rigidly controlled and ubiquitous police.”131 
Instead of taking on thousands of armed and ready police, the French 
Communist Party withheld its protest against Ridgway until the day after his arrival.  On 
May 28, some 15,000-20,000 French communists moved to get the “war criminal” out 
of their capital.132 The bulk of the protestors were not the women of the day before, but 
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young male factory workers.133 Both the police and the protestors approached the 
situation with the intention to fight.  Skirmishes broke out all over Paris with some 370 
injuries, many severe.134  Parisian police arrested 718 protestors and shot and killed two 
demonstrators.135  That night, Communist Party Secretary Jacques Duclos was arrested 
by police after they found on his procession a loaded firearm, concealed club, and two 
freshly killed pigeons.136  Duclos’s dead pigeons captured the imagination Parisians and 
Americans alike.  French police claimed that Duclos frantically smothered the pigeons 
before his arrest to “prevent them from being released and to lead trackers to their 
subversive lair.”  Duclos on the other hand suggested that they were “eating pigeons” 
given as a gift from a rural Frenchman.137 Police placed the fowl’s corpses on ice so a 
veterinarian could preform an autopsy to determine if they were “pot or postal 
pigeons.”138 
The anti-American and anti-Ridgway protests marked a turning point in Franco-
American Cold War relations.  De Gaulle’s government suppressed French communists, 
and ousted them from parliament in 1946; despite their critical role in the resistance 
movement.  French communists resented French reliance on the United States most.  
Ridgway’s appointment as SACEUR signified a necessary moment of action.  American 
militarism and fear of being drawn into another world war weighed heavily on French 
communist leaders.139  The governments of both France and the United States were 
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fighting against fellow Party members in Asia, and if another world war started, it would 
be between NATO countries and the Soviet Union.  General Eisenhower was the military 
face of the United States in France as the first SACEUR, but not a good target for the 
communists.  Eisenhower represented a liberator and friend to France who had not 
been actively involved on a combat front since World War II.  General Ridgway, 
however, was a communist fighter coming from the battlefields of Korea.  The popular 
image of Ridgway was a warrior with a grenade strapped to his chest, ready for battle.140  
 The assumption of a more militaristic commander of NATO in Paris coincided 
with Antoine Pinay’s election as Prime Minister of France in March 1952.  Pinay was the 
first true conservative leader of France since World War II.  He had a reputation of 
collaborating with the Vichy during the war, and was in no way friendly to the left.  
Under Pinay’s leadership, French communists faced even more isolation from politics.  
Pinay reinstated laws passed in the wake of the 1848 revolution that ousted King Louis 
Philippe.  In 1952, it again became unlawful for crowds to gather without official 
government authorization.141  Ridgway’s arrival was a chance for communists to test this 
restrictive law.  They learned that Pinay was serious.  His police force was prepared and 
treated the demonstration as a communist attempt to train a new generation of shock 
troops for fighting a civil war.142  In the wake of the Ridgway demonstrations, the French 
government closed down sixteen communist newspapers throughout France.143  They 
also raided communist headquarters in Paris and other French cities in hopes of finding 
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evidence to arrest more of the red leaders.144  American Ambassador James Dunn was 
pleased with the “efficiency and firmness that the French government displayed in 
suppressing the disorders” and sent congratulations to Prime Minister Pinay. 145  Pinay’s 
response indicated that the swift action had little to do with the safety of Ridgway, but 
more broadly represented his desire to deal with insurrection and organized attempts to 
disrupt law and order. 146  Upon taking office, Pinay and his confidants resolved to deal 
with “Commie insolence on [the] first appropriate occasion.”147  The Ridgway protest 
revealed positive and negative foreign policy outcomes to the United States.  A large 
segment of France was not happy with U.S. foreign policy in Asia, but a pro-American 
French government was in place.  The repressiveness of that pro-American government 
ultimately broadened anti-American feelings in France, however.148 
The shared Franco-American memory of World War I and World War II helped 
alleviate some of the tension surrounding Ridgway’s arrival to Paris.  When Ridgway 
assumed command of NATO forces in Paris, the United States hoped for a future in 
which its Western European allies maintained the strongest presence on the globe.  
Through the protest and attempts to restore Franco-American relations, the past 
remained stable ground to articulate international relations.  French communists 
planned to mar Ridgway’s arrival in controversy while Pinay’s cabinet wished to 
welcome him with grand ceremony. 149  Pinay’s government wished to not only “honour 
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the new supreme commander,” and suppress protest. 150  More important was the wish 
to “express the gratitude of France to the first American general officer to set foot on 
French soil in the landings of 1944.”151  Ridgway’s leadership in the distant battlefields of 
Korea stirred controversy, but he was a hero returning to France.  Pinay felt that it was 
necessary to focus on this aspect of the man.  Ridgway reciprocated respect to France 
through its own war memory.  After the ceremony welcoming Ridgway to Paris, his 
heavily protected “convoy of cars” entered Paris travelling “along the Champs Elysees to 
the Arc de Triomphe, where General Ridgway “laid a wreath on the tomb of the 
unknown Soldier.”152  Like so many other Americans before him, Ridgway began his new 
relationship with Paris by showing acknowledgement and understanding of their past 
sufferings.   
Memory allowed the leaders in both countries to show the fundamentals of the 
amicable relationship they wanted.  Ridgway’s acclimation period, coupled with more 
communist activity in Paris, stifled chances of him leading American Memorial Day 
ceremonies in Paris, even though he arrived on the eve of the holiday.  ABMC Secretary 
Thomas North arrived in Paris a few weeks before Ridgway to oversee the Commission’s 
operations.  North was present for the anti-Ridgway demonstrations, but none of them 
interfered with the ABMC’s work.  On the day of Ridgway’s arrival North wrote to 
Chairman George Marshall and let him know that the ABMC’s business had gone on as 
normal during the protest.  He reported to his boss that he “had the usual accumulation 
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of problems to solve, but nothing of unusual importance.”153 At the time of the letter, 
North was planning a Memorial Day ceremony at Suresnes, and General Eisenhower 
had personally inspected the cemetery beforehand and given his approval.  The 
respected general would not attend, however. North reported that the highest American 
dignitary that would attend the ceremonies at Suresnes was Ambassador Dunn.154  North 
wrote General Marshall the following month to inform him that the Memorial Day 
during the heightened anti-Americanism proved “inept.”155  The failure of the day 
resulted from the ABMC allowing American veterans organizations to handle most of 
the planning.  North did not provide specifics of what went wrong during the ceremony, 
but concluded that private organizations lacked the “training to handle such affairs,” 
and indicated that they did things that “gave notable offence to more than one key 
French official.”156   
Shortly after General Ridgway’s arrival to France he sought to capitalize on the 
positive French memory of his D-Day connection and traveled to the Normandy beaches 
to speak at the eighth anniversary of the Allied landings.  The New York Times reported 
that it was highly “suggestive that almost the first act of General Ridgway was to return 
to the beachhead where he led the assault on Hitler’s Europe.”157 For Ridgway, rural 
Normandy was a safer zone than urban Paris because of demographics and strong 
memories that Normans had of liberation.  Ridgway was an honorary citizen of 
                                                             
153 North to George Marshall, May 27, 1952, Box 161, Folder 6, ABMC File, Papers of George C. Marshall, 
GCML.  
154 Ibid. 
155 North to George Marshall, June 23, 1952, Box 161, Folder 6, ABMC File, Papers of George C. Marshall, 
GCML. 
156 North to George Marshall, May 27, 1952, Box 161, Folder 6, ABMC File, Papers of George C. Marshall, 
GCML. The offensive conduct took place at St. James cemetery according to North, but the tone of his 
letter indicates that the ceremony at Suresnes followed the same pattern. 
157 Anne O’Hare McCormick, “The Lesson of D-Day May Not be Lost on Stalin,” The New York Times, 




Normandy and on his anniversary visit greeted as “an acclaimed liberator.”158  The 
Times wondered how the same man could be “denounced as a monster by the 
Communists in Paris” and days later be embraced as a hero? 159  The conclusion of 
American reporters was, of course, that the “Normans speak with the true voice of 
France.” 160  With the physical reminder of American sacrifice around him, Ridgway let 
“the lords of communism” know that freedom, sacrifice, and the common good is what 
NATO countries believed in, and would die for again if need be. 161  The Normandy 
beaches represented Hitler’s ultimate failure of turning to militarism to achieve his 
objectives.  Allied victory at D-Day was the start of the Nazis’ demise.  The American 
press saw Ridgway’s selection of the D-Day beaches to give his first major speech 
appropriate because it might remind Stalin that he would face the same outcome as 
Hitler if he chose to rely on militarism to combat NATO. 162 
  By the end of the summer, when some of the public scrutiny of Ridgway faded 
from the atmosphere in Paris, Ridgway had his chance to engage with the memory of the 
dead at Suresnes along with George C. Marshall and Prime Minister Pinay to formally 
tie his vision of the future with the sacrifices of the past.  The ABMC’s WWII extension 
on the Suresnes chapel neared completion as communist protest engulfed Paris.  The 
Commission eagerly awaited Congressional appropriations for a dedication ceremony 
that would improve on that year’s failed Memorial Day ceremony.  Marshall wrote the 
Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, Clarence Cannon in the early 
summer of 1952 to let him know that ABMC work moved along rapidly, outpacing 









Congressional funding.  Marshall desired Suresnes to be dedicated “as soon after 
completion as possible,” because it was important to have graves of American war dead 
open to the visiting public.163  
 
Photo 5.4: U.S. Marshall and Ridgway arrive for Suresnes dedication ceremony, September 14, 1952.  
Source:  ABMC Archives, Arlington, VA. 
 
 
Marshall maintained a keen interest in using American memory of the World 
Wars to bolster Franco-American relations.  In 1950, President Truman fired Secretary 
of Defense Louis Johnson after the unpreparedness of the U.S. military to engage in 
large scale military endeavors became evident.   Truman replaced him with George C. 
Marshall.  Marshall primarily worked to restore morale of the United States armed 
forces and rebuild them from the demobilization that followed World War II.  While 
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Marshall attempted to restore the U.S. military to its former prominence, he remained 
chair of the ABMC.   This unique position placed Marshall in the situation to elevate the 
mission of the ABMC.  During this time, Marshall used his position as Secretary of 
Defense to defend the ABMC from potentially crippling alterations.  As part of the 
rebuilding process, the Defense Department saw fit to cut the ABMC’s officer allotment 
in half from ten to five, feeling that the five officer billets might have better use 
elsewhere.164  This proposed cut came at the height of the ABMC’s World War II 
commemorative work.  Secretary Thomas North stated that, during the Korean War, 
budget cuts forced them to “several construction” projects while “veterans and relatives 
of the dead” recurrently worried that the job would never be completed because interest 
in WWII was passing away.”165 
Marshall took action upon hearing of the possible cuts, fearing that they might 
retard the ABMC’s progress and result in poorly maintained cemeteries.  He personally 
wrote General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to laconically remind 
his former pupil that in addition to his many other duties, he “still seemed to be 
Chairman of the American Battle Monuments Commission.”166  Marshall warned 
Bradley that the cuts to ABMC personnel might create conditions of poor maintenance 
in cemeteries and upset the ever-increasing number of visitors travelling to the hallowed 
locations.167  Marshall sent out a second letter days later to the Defense Department’s 
Management Committee Chairmen, General Joseph McNarney reporting that if the 
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personnel reductions impeded on ABMC’s mission the “over-all morale factor” of 
American civilians and soldiers could plummet.168  This was entirely undesirable to 
Marshall while he labored to prepare a fighting force for Korea.  If it looked like the 
government had abandoned the venerated WWII remains, soldiers might hesitate to 
offer their services in future wars.  In this instance, the power of Marshall’s name and 
position saved the ABMC.  Instead of falling from ten to five officer billets, the ABMC 
actually increased its officer assignments to twenty-two.169   
The following year Marshall stepped down from his position as Secretary of 
Defense and began his civilian life.  Marshall wrote President Truman during this first 
year of retirement and filled him in on the ABMC’s entire WWII commemorative plan.  
President Truman personally responded to Marshall, letting him know that he hoped 
“we can do what you suggest” because “I think it is a good idea.”170  At the end of 
Truman’s letter, he handwrote a promise to Marshall that “I’ll do everything I can.”171  
The full support of President Truman, along with Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff 
Omar Bradley, demonstrated the cultural weight of ABMC sites.  Some of the Defense 
Department’s support for ABMC requests waned after Marshall’s leadership there 
ended, but a strong respect for the ABMC’s mission lingered in the Pentagon.  In 1953, 
new Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson wrote General Marshall to personally deny the 
ABMC’s request that their officer assignments be extended for a longer periods than 
others because the nature of ABMC work required continuity.  Secretary Wilson 
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regretfully told Marshall that tours in Korea took priority, and the ABMC could not 
receive special treatment.  Nevertheless, Wilson assured Marshall that “the Department 
of Defense stands ready to cooperate with the ABMC in every possible way to facilitate” 
its important work.172  Marshall traveled abroad in the period to personally assess if 
appropriate commemoration of the World Wars was taking place abroad. He 
participated in ceremonies and witnessed how ABMC cemeteries cemented bonds 
between nations on this trip. 
The impetus for Marshall’s trip in September 1952 seems to have come from four 
reasons:  a letter from a discontent mother regarding her son’s grave in Normandy 
(introduced at the beginning of this chapter), Marshall’s desire to officially assess the 
work of the commission he led, the need for an American speaker as prominent as 
Pershing to kick-off a new wave of dedications, and a popular figure on the ground to 
join Ridgway in a public plea for NATO and united European army.173  The ABMC 
wanted Marshall to take this trip and participate in the Suresnes dedication.  Secretary 
North envisioned the dedication of Suresnes to rival the grand Montfaucon dedication of 
1937.174  Aside from President Truman, North saw Marshall as the American speaker 
most capable of winning over the French.175 Marshall agreed to participate in the 
Suresnes rededication, which would hopefully remedy the poor Memorial Day service 
there in the wake of communist protests.  He departed the United States in the late 
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summer of 1952 with his wife Katherine.  On Marshall’s tour, he visited all of the 
ABMC’s new WWII sites and reported all of his observations back to the ABMC’s other 
commissioners.  The entire trip reveals that just as ABMC sites acted as anti-war 
statements and commitments to democracy in the interwar years, they now refracted 











The pinnacle of Marshall’s inspection tour came at the rededication of the 
Suresnes American Military Cemetery outside of Paris. The dedicatory ceremony of the 
new American WWII cemetery at Suresnes effectively showed the clear uses of memory 
as an assertive weapon for the United States in ideological battles of the Cold War.   In 
the summer of 1952, French disdain for the Korean War, French colonial struggles in 
Indochina, and French resentment of its dependence on the United States converged at 
the rededication ceremony of Suresnes American cemetery.  At the dedication, Marshall 
served as the keynote speaker from the United States, along with General Matthew 
Ridgway, and America’s ambassador to France James Dunn reading remarks from 
President Truman.  French speakers included President Auriol, Marshall Juin, and 
Prime Minister Antoine Pinay.  Much like the WWI dedications, the connection of the 
U.S. and France through commitment to democracy prevailed.  More prevalent in the 
speeches, however, was Cold War policy, Asian Wars, and articulation of new foreign 
policy goals through the channel of memory.  The text of the ceremony in many ways 
read as a response to the communist campaign against General Ridgway that rocked 
Paris only months earlier. 
  Marshall’s speech sounded like a firm lecture to Europe based on his experience 
with the past.  He began his lesson recalling the connection that WWI had to WWII and 
his participation in the first Memorial Day service in France at the Meuse-Argonne 
American Cemetery in 1919.176 Sadly, the “same conflict” of WWI was resumed on the 
same battlefields only two decades later, lamented Marshall.  He recalled the repetition, 
explaining that one American division “occupied the exact sectors” in both wars.177  He 
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then expanded the connection to the Korean conflict, relating that a soldier of that 
division served as a lieutenant during WWI, then a Corps Commander in WWII, and 
sacrificed his life leading the same division in “far off Korea.”178  Using this soldier as an 
example of “terrible repetition,” and sacrifice, bridged all of America’s modern wars to 
the international audience.179  Marshall hoped that all American soldiers’ sacrifices 
might lead to “genuine bonds of good will and good faith on this earth.”180  Yet, he 
sensed that a “spiritual unification of Europe” was a prerequisite for peace.  Recent 
political events showed that this unification still obliged nourishment.181 He hoped that 
the “men who lie buried here in some other world beyond our conception may be aware 
of the efforts we are making to promote peace and understanding.”182 He then turned to 
the recent Ridgway riots.  Marshall never implicitly stated that communism acted as the 
barrier to European unification, but the audience likely made the connection when 
Marshall put forth his hope that American remains were “deaf to the propaganda” 
calling for America to go home and “leave Europe to the mercy of a ruthless 
aggression.”183  It pleased Secretary North that Marshall tactfully addressed the scrawls 
of “Yankee go home,” plastered all over Paris.184  Dead American service members 
spread all over France in ABMC cemeteries would never go home, nor would the living, 
until Europe no longer needed them.  Marshall’s example of the American soldier who 
fought in World War I, World War II, and died in Korea showed America’s commitment 











to containing “ruthless aggression” wherever it arose.  It tied the present wars to the 
French memory of liberation as well. 
General Ridgway was the next American speaker at the rededication.  Ridgway 
did not comment on the recent attacks that French communists made in his name.  
Instead of a soldier, he wore the hat of ambassador that the State Department informed 
him that he often would need to don.  Much of Ridgway’s speech imparted the ideology 
behind NATO and general combativeness towards communism.  He acknowledged that 
the event celebrated was American, but that America should not be the centerpiece.  The 
ideals presented by speakers at the Suresnes ceremony belonged to “all people of all 
lands to who life without freedom is worse than death.”185  American remains at 
Suresnes rested not in France, but in the “soil of freedom.”186  Ridgway saw France, and 
the rest of Western Europe, as “brothers” who possessed values that “separate men from 
beasts.”187  These values were individualism, charity, truth, and faith in God.188  Ridgway, 
like Marshall, did not explicitly label communists as the beasts, but it is clear that they 
were the target.  American remains in France served as reminders to all NATO countries 
of their shared cultural values.  Ridgway hoped that the pilgrimage to American remains 
might reinvigorate the crowd to back policies that “resolved to deter aggression, or crush 
it to the earth if unable to prevent its occurrence.”189  The memory of American dead 
hopefully compelled the living to work together.  The American service members that 
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remained in France were there to provide physical force whenever a challenge to the 
values arose.  Living troops in Europe would “defend freedom continuously.”190 
Ridgway also unknowingly provided the audience an explanation of how memory 
functioned as a diplomatic tool.  He noted that “devout and earnest men and women” 
traveled to Suresnes every year since its creation and would continue to do so in the 
future.191  Perhaps reflecting on his difficultly finding the appropriate words to speak on 
such a solemn occasion, Ridgway concluded that there “is repetition in what has been 
said and what will yet be spoken at such ceremonies.”  Every year someone will stand 
before the American dead and speak of “pride, humility, renewed resolve, and 
rededication of the living” to accomplish what previous generations failed to, Ridgway 
told his audience.192  Repetition did mean that these sites had a shelf-life for usefulness.  
Interacting with the memory of American military dead was repetitious, but not 
commonplace.193  Some of the most important aspects of human life required repetition.  
Visiting military remains was akin to attending church service or reciting a well-known 
devotional.  Communion with American military dead, like spiritual reflection, “renewed 
the moral strength and courage” of those willing to participate.194  Ridgway’s conception 
of American military cemeteries made them sites that leaders and citizens should use 
frequently.  These sites transcended the present and remained relevant.  The dead 
linked the living to the past, perpetuated a memory, and provided direction for the 
future. 









French speakers similarly used American WWI and WWII sacrifice to evoke an 
image that current Cold War conflicts fit the same mold. They also confirmed that 
American memory indeed provided France an avenue to highlight their own national 
power. French President Auriol opened the ceremony with the assurance to the dead 
that regardless of recent anti-Americanism, France guards your graves with reverence, 
honors your memory, and pledges to watch over the Franco-American friendship.195  
This type of declaration mirrored similar French promises in the past.  It was different, 
however, because now American dead would feel the truthfulness of such promises by 
knowing that French and American soldiers currently “sacrificed in the Far East for the 
same ideals of justice and freedom” that they died for.196  Maintaining peace was the 
predominant Franco-American goal for memory throughout the interwar.  Now, fighting 
together in the Cold War best commemorated the memory of the dead. Prime Minister 
Pinay, who had recently suppressed French communists, also employed the sacred 
space of Suresnes to tie American soldier dead to French soldiers fighting in Indochina.  
In an eerily prescient speech, Pinay thanked American dead fighting in the World Wars 
and thanked the living for “still fighting in Asia.”197  He noted that Frenchmen associated 
the dead American soldiers within the walls of Suresnes with “our valiant soldiers in 
Indochina” who currently sacrificed to “safeguard our civilization.”198  These remarks 
demonstrated that Pinay viewed the French Indochina War in the same light as the 
World Wars.  They also showed Pinay capitalizing on the ingrained connection that 
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Americans felt to the French in order to tie the Indochina war to the safety of both 
democratic nations.  A French memory tying their current fighting in Vietnam with 
American memory in WWII also contributed to the French resistance narrative.  
The United States was not yet involved in Indochina at the point.  Marshall and 
Ridgway only had Korea as a comparable example of America sacrifice to use as 
commentary in the present.  But, within two years of the Suresnes dedication France 
lost in Indochina and the United States moved towards one of its most controversial and 
costly wars in Vietnam.  The rhetoric used by American leaders like Marshall and 
Ridgway tempered greatly as Asian conflicts became more controversial.  Yet, Marshall 
comfortably reported to the ABMC commissioners that he found the work of the ABMC 
entirely “satisfactory” and that the dedication of Suresnes Cemetery was “exceptionally 
well organized and impressive” in 1952.199  In this early Cold War period, an assertive 
and militant memory of U.S. sacrifice was palatable in France. 
Marshall continued to articulate his views regarding the utility of war dead 
abroad to the public through the 1950s.  In a 1957, he followed a precedent established 
by General Pershing in 1934 and contributed an article to The National Geographic 
explaining the ABMC’s work to the American public.  Marshall’s article was short, but 
effectively displayed his personal thoughts on what American military cemeteries 
represented.  It was his opinion that “the establishment of American war cemeteries 
abroad was of great international importance” because “each stands as a perpetual 
reminder of the sacrifices the United States made in the common cause.”200  This was 
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reflective of his push to have an American military cemetery present in the Philippines 
in the post-war period so Filipinos would have a positive memory of America on their 
soil.  Marshall appealed to Americans to travel abroad and see ABMC sites.  He had 
done so himself twice.  Once, he visited graves as a young soldier in the American 
Expeditionary Forces.  The second time was in 1952 when he “went as an old soldier 
seeking fallen comrades.”201  The time that Marshall spent communing with American 
soldier dead abroad represented the “most poignant” experience of his life.202  He was 
proud to serve as the chairman of the government agency that kept faith with the dead, 
and proud of the fine work that the ABMC did.  The ABMC, no matter how thorough it 
was, would never do enough for the soldier dead it commemorated.  Marshall felt that 
the presence of Americans abroad was the “something more” that all ABMC cemeteries 
needed.  The remains overseas belonged not just to bereaved families, but represented 
the “sons of every free man.”203   
General Marshall wanted Americans to travel to Europe during the Cold War and 
show Europeans their positive characteristics.  His ABMC had created convenient sites 
where the best of America could go on display.  Anyone, world-wide who loved freedom, 
shared a kinship with American dead in Marshall’s opinion.  He urged all National 
Geographic readers to visit American remains and pay tribute to the dead as he had.204  
Marshall’s personal faith told him that there was “life as a spirit,” and American military 
remains abroad held a constant vigil on the behalf of the United States.  These dead 
“wanted visitation.”205  Marshall, like Pershing, anticipated cemeteries full of the living.  
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Marshall attempted to instill in Americans a sense of civic duty to visit American graves.  
Thousands of Americans traveled to Europe each year and once there, it required little 
effort or sacrifice to visit an American cemetery.  The ABMC had taken steps to make all 
WWII sites easily accessible by railroad or highway.  Marshall did not understand how 
any American enjoying a holiday abroad could not take the time to “ponder the deeper 
significance behind their blithe fun, and remember to who they owed the freedom of 
movement, and gaiety of Western European cities.”206  America’s military dead abroad 






  The utilitarian function of the ABMC cemeteries remained clear throughout the 
very early stages of the Cold War, but became complicated once the United States 
became involved in large-scale military engagements in Asia.  The complication relates 
to the shift of total war to limited war, an issue that will become relevant in the following 
chapter.207  American leadership desired the sacrifices of American soldiers in Asia to be 
equivalent to their World War counterparts, but this became difficult.  U.S. military 
objectives in Asia did not achieve the totality of the World Wars.  The military did not 
“mobilize all available national resources to defeat enemy regimes,” nor intend to 
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“conquer, occupy, and reengineer opposing states.”208  Instead, U.S. policy in Asia hinged 
on merely “containing” the enemy.  In limited warfare, the handling of war dead 
changed, as did commemoration.  Unlike casualties of the World Wars, American 
soldiers who died in Asia did not congregate in permanent overseas cemeteries.  The 
deaths in these wars did not approach the numbers of the World Wars, bypassing the 
logistical need to stem repatriation, and the Asian countries did not seem like 
destinations American families willingly would travel to for visits to graves.  In George 
Marshall’s speech at Suresnes he proclaimed that the “dead cannot go home.”209  This 
made their sacrifice and commitment to allies more important and lasting. In the 
remainder of U.S. battles in the twentieth century, every effort was made for the dead to 
go home.  Thus, the American World War remains abroad became a precious 
commodity that would not increase.  Their memory abroad continued to fluctuate with 
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VI. Emissaries of Goodwill:  Memory Diplomacy in the Post War Era 
 
“Perhaps we should make our removal from French soil complete by reinterring 
the bodies of these American men on American soil.”1 
 
 
The memory of American military remains in France moved away from that of 
aggressive cold warriors as the 1960s progressed.  The explicit ties that American 
leaders made between sacrifice in the World Wars and sacrifice in Asian wars essentially 
ended with large scale military intervention in Vietnam.  As this war became unpopular, 
democratic American leaders primarily used memory of its past sacrifice in France as 
evidence for sustained friendship, not justification for making the Cold War hot.  When 
French President Charles de Gaulle pulled France from NATO in 1966, American 
memory briefly became a weapon to attack the honor of France.  This militant tone 
faded as social unrest built towards the transformative year of 1968.  The widespread 
protest of the late 1960s, and discontent over Vietnam, made many Americans and 
Europeans question the usefulness of glorifying the military with the threat of nuclear 
annihilation looming large.  The ABMC fought for its life in this period and attempted to 
prove its worth to Congress and the American people.  With the conservative resurgence 
of Richard Nixon, the ABMC found a powerful ally and became more politicized than it 
ever had before.  The ABMC’s mission during the Nixon presidency became one of 
boosting public moral, bolstering American’s pride in their past, and casting Vietnam in 
positive light.  
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President Kennedy visited Paris in the fall of 1961 on one of his first official 
overseas trips.  His goal was to make a favorable impression on President de Gaulle and 
set a positive trajectory for Franco-American relations.  Kennedy’s presidency was one 
associated with youth, the future, and action.  Still, Kennedy’s visit to Paris proved that 
he understood the implications that historic memory played in the present. During a 
visit to the American Embassy the second day of his trip, Kennedy outlined to the staff 
the important uses of memory in diplomacy.  He began his address to the embassy staff 
recounting a toast he delivered for de Gaulle the previous night that praised General’s 
role in World War II and Franco-American friendship.  “The United States’ interest in 
France is not based on mere sentiment,” he told the staff.2  It was “customary” and 
routine for officials on such visits to emptily “recall Lafayette and all the rest.”3  Still, it 
was important for Kennedy that the embassy staff realize how memory served real 
national interests despite its obvious transparency.  To prove his point, Kennedy 
provided a short history lesson to the staff.  After George Washington’s presidency “the 
sentimental memories of the Revolutionary War disappeared” between France and the 
United States.4  The result of this amnesia was a quasi Franco-American naval war 
during the John Adams’ administration.  Kennedy noted that, out of all Adams’ 
accomplishments, he wanted his epitaph to read “He kept peace with France.”5   What 
was the easiest way to keep peace in the Cold War era?  Keeping the memories of past 
Franco-American amicability alive was one of the most efficient and useful ways, 
                                                             









Kennedy explained.  “When you speak for the United States here, and when the French 
people comprehend the long movements of history, I believe you have a unique 
opportunity to be of service,” Kennedy lectured.6  In other words, although engaging 
with memory sometimes seemed routine, it should not.  It was the duty of Americans in 
France to frequently recall the past and remind the French of American sacrifices for 
them.  Kennedy reminded the embassy that “France is larger than the total of its parts.”7 
Its cultural influences spread throughout the globe.  Friendship with France came with 
widespread benefits for the United States. 
 French culture and antecedents of its revolution existed all over the modern 
world.  If the United States lost France as an ally, the reverberations would spread far 
past Europe.  An assignment at the American embassy was “of the greatest possible 
importance to our common cause,” and American staffers needed “to devote every 
energy to strengthening the common ties which bind us.”8  Among the most common 
ties was memory.  Kennedy’s vision of memory as a diplomatic tool moved some of the 
responsibility for bolstering relations from the passive military remains buried in 
France.  He placed more responsibility on the living to actively recall shared memories 
of mutual sacrifice in warfare.  As a tangible part of that past, American dead still had a 
role to play.  The memory of dead shifted back towards the Wilson’s liberal uses.  Their 
presence offered a means to secure Franco-American relations and provide assurance of 
mutual interest in the stability of the other.  The instability of the 1960s for the United 
States domestically and internationally made keeping a stable memory of dead abroad 
                                                             







difficult.  The American escalation of Vietnam and shift from Democratic leadership to 
Republican leadership by the decade’s end marked a return to a more politicized and 
responsive American memory abroad.  
From the end of the Eisenhower administration through those of JFK, LBJ, and 
Nixon, misunderstandings between France and the United States often turned into 
nearly complete fissures.  This chapter looks at the ways the American memory of the 
World Wars, represented through military remains in France, served as tools for leaders 
from both nations to continue positive engagement with one another despite high level 
disputes.  It also analyzes the limitations of memory diplomacy in extremely tense 
periods of foreign relations.  France’s 1966 withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization threatened to close the gates of shared transatlantic memory, and 
challenged the usefulness of memory as a diplomatic tool.  The chapter flows 
chronologically, focusing on the ambassadorships of James Gavin, Charles Bohlen, and 
Sargent Shriver.  These three American diplomats represented the JFK, LBJ, and Nixon 
administrations.  Their time in France coincided with the deepest Franco-American 
division of the 20th Century, and the escalation of U.S. involvement with Vietnam.  From 
the French perspective, President Charles de Gaulle retains a central role, because as 
president of the new Fifth Republic he held immense power.  Considerable attention in 
this chapter is devoted to how all of these men engaged with the memory of the World 
Wars and American dead to articulate concerns in the present.  President Nixon 
politicized the ABMC more than ever before.  He used the favorable memories that the 
ABMC nurtured to address American discontent for Vietnam and to speak for the silent 






New Relations with the Fifth Republic 
 When John Kennedy assumed the American Presidency in early 1961, General 
Charles de Gaulle was two years into his second presidency of France. He entered this 
office promising to bring political stability and international creditability back to France.  
Ending the brutal war in Algeria and drawing up a constitution that created a powerful 
presidential office represented de Gaulle’s initial goals.9  The Algerian situation 
produced a “grave hour for France” in which disheartened French commanders in 
Algeria threatened to invade Paris with paratroopers, overthrow de Gaulle, and continue 
the war to hold Algeria as a colony.10  Kennedy assured de Gaulle of his personal 
support, “as well as that of the American people,” in this time of unrest because de 
Gaulle’s attempts to “settle the tragic problem of Algeria” made him a “champion” for 
“liberty and the principles of democracy.”11  De Gaulle informed Kennedy that he “was 
deeply touched” by the sincerity “expressed to me in your name and in the name of the 
American people.”12  This exchange indicated a shift in the way American policymakers 
viewed France.  Following de Gaulle’s return to power, no longer was France so 
“feminized” in official reports, but instead commonly received labels as a stronger, 
masculine, stable nation led by the ‘towering, lionhearted, magnificently strong” General 
de Gaulle.13  This was not necessarily a welcome change.  A stronger French ally 
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seemingly benefitted the United States in its efforts to stifle Soviet expansion in Europe, 
but also challenged the dominant position that the U.S. desired to hold internationally. 
Prior to his first meeting with President de Gaulle in May 1961, President 
Kennedy received recommendations from respected diplomatic historian Arthur 
Schlesinger regarding how to interact with the French leader.  Schlesinger warned 
Kennedy that de Gaulle was a “most impressive and commanding personality.”14  
Schlesinger suggested that JFK not “be unduly intimidated” by de Gaulle’s strong 
personality or commanding six-foot-six frame.15  De Gaulle inevitably would display 
“huffiness” during the meeting, but the young American president needed to respond 
with “candor” and “not hesitate to express disagreement.”16  Winston Churchill 
frequently fought with de Gaulle and subsequently gained the General’s deepest respect, 
while FDR attempted to passively charm him and utterly failed to personally connect.17  
American efforts to stand up to de Gaulle diminished as his hostility towards U.S. 
foreign policy increased through the 1960s.  The more consistent strategy that 
Washington officials adopted toward de Gaulle revolved around avoiding open 
confrontations and patiently waiting for nature, or an assassin’s bullet, to remove the 
septuagenarian from office.18  In the meantime, Washington leaders dealt with de Gaulle 
through non aggressive channels, like positive memories of mutual sacrifice. 
 General de Gaulle was the last of the influential WWII allied leaders to govern 
over his nation.  De Gaulle’s person represented service in the Great War and leadership 
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of the Free French movement.  His connection with the Second World War brought him 
much respect from the Western powers.  In Kennedy’s opening letter to de Gaulle he 
acknowledged that “you [de Gaulle] have been a captain in this climactic struggle for 
two decades, and I am newly arrive upon the field.”19  President Kennedy tasked 
esteemed American WWII veteran General James Gavin to head the American Embassy 
in Paris. Kennedy felt that Gavin’s wartime association with de Gaulle gave him the 
experience needed in France during a “critical moment in history” when “powerful 
destructive forces” challenged universal Franco-American values.20  Kennedy hoped that 
Gavin, a famed general of the 82nd Airborne division and liberator of Sainte-Mère-Église 
during the Normandy invasion, would “travel extensively outside” Paris while 
ambassador, to learn French culture and put forth a popular representation of American 
culture.21  It was obvious that Gavin’s association with popular American WWII memory 
factored into his selection as ambassador.  Gavin answered Kennedy’s call to service 
with the stipulation that he serve no longer than two years.22  Months into his second 
year “worrisome business problems” and “schooling of his four daughters” compelled 
him to relinquish his ambassadorship and return to civilian life as a CEO in a profitable 
Boston consulting firm.23  Still, Gavin worked hard to establish positive relations with de 
Gaulle and France in his short tenure.   
 Gavin’s correspondence with the White House and State Department showed an 
understanding that his association with World War II played a pivotal role as a Cold 
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War diplomat.  Gavin explained to Kennedy’s national security advisor, George 
McBundy, in May 1962 of his surprise over the reception he received because of his 
participation in the liberation of Normandy.24  It struck Gavin that “war is so meaningful 
to these people, and anyone who participated in the liberation of France is automatically 
well received at the outset.”25  He urged the Kennedy administration, and those 
thereafter, to “consider this [European WWII service] important criteria in selecting an 
Ambassador for the next ten to fifteen years.”26  Gavin remained cognizant of his 
military experience throughout his tenure as ambassador.  In the final months of 1961 
he corresponded to a friend that he was “rather sensitive upon coming here [Paris] of 
having so much military background.”27 This helped him deal with de Gaulle one-on 
one, but he worried that French intellectuals would ostracize him as a “philistine and 
militarist.”28  To avoid these labels, Gavin made extra effort to make the French view 
him as “more than just another General but a diplomat who has interest in the cultural 
life of France.”  Gavin achieved this by creating his own artwork, attending museum 
exhibitions, frequenting research institutions, and teaching French children non-
military applications missile technology.29   
In addition to creating an aura of Renaissance man, Gavin fully understood the 
utility of his military background in French culture.  Instead of facing ostracism because 
of his connections to the American military machine, many French doors opened to 
Gavin because of his WWII service.  He reported to a friend that he was warned prior to 
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going to Paris that “we [his family] should not expect to be invited often into French 
homes.”30  Gavin had the opposite experience.  He and his family frequently received 
dinner invitations.  He attributed much of this to France’s reverence for American 
sacrifice in World War II.  Gavin was taken by the “depth and feeling” the French felt 
towards his role in the Normandy invasion.  Wherever he went publicly, strangers 
approached him and spoke about it.31 Gavin’s experience in France made him feel that 
his own culture took military sacrifices for granted.  In France, respect for sacrifice and 
service were “not only widespread, but highly emotional.”32  Gavin’s words showed 
slight envy that an American veteran in Paris received more respect than he did at 
home. 
 The previous chapters of this work showed American ambassadors frequently 
engaging with the memory of American military dead to comment on international 
situations.  Less evidence exists to demonstrate that Gavin relied heavily on memory to 
bolster Franco-American relations.  This is somewhat surprising considering his 
personal experience with French admiration of his WWII service.  Gavin’s short time as 
ambassador partially helps to explain why he adapted memories of the World Wars to 
contemporary issues less than his predecessors. Gavin is unique to twentieth century 
American ambassadors to France in that he was a veteran of the WWII European 
Theater.  This surely gave him different perspective regarding memorial ceremonies.  
From his own accounts, it appears that Gavin often received honor and recognition from 
the French when he went out in public to honor the past.33  Similarly, as a 
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commemorative speaker, Gavin was not an outsider looking in, but a participant of past 
events.  The battlefields he visited and soldiers he paid respect to were often his own.  
Gavin did lead ceremonies for the 18th anniversary of the D-Day landings by paying 
respect to the American dead at the ABMC’s Normandy cemetery, but he also laid the 
cornerstone for an American museum at Sainte-Mère-Église, the Norman town he 
helped liberate.34   
Gavin was a vestige of World War II and used the memories of American sacrifice 
to achieve political ends.  There is evidence that Gavin turned to the memory of 
American sacrifices in World War II for contemporary reasons.  He related in a 1962 
telegram to Secretary of State Rusk that at a luncheon with President de Gaulle he 
reminded that French leader that the United States was no longer an isolationist nation 
in the postwar world—the “thousands of our sons buried in Europe” attested to that.35  
This retort came in response to a “coldly harsh” recommendation from de Gaulle that 
the United States stay out of Western European affairs unless absolutely necessary.36  
Gavin’s relation of the event to the State Department showed clear annoyance.  His use 
of military remains to get a point across to de Gaulle showed the power he felt this tactic 
would have with a president who also participated in the war.  
 The sparseness of Gavin’s utilization of American sacrifice to achieve political 
ends does not indicate that memory served a limited purpose during the Kennedy 
administration.  Gavin was in himself a living incarnation of American WWII sacrifice 
for the French to engage with daily.  Kennedy made his first visit to de Gaulle during the 
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Memorial Day holiday of 1961 and returned home on the anniversary of D-Day.  It is 
notable that he did not retrace the steps of Woodrow Wilson and visit Suresnes 
cemetery outside of Paris to deliver a prominent foreign policy address.  In fact, 
Kennedy’s trip itinerary included no visits to any of the American World War 
cemeteries.  This is surprising considering the timing of Kennedy’s trip and his record as 
a decorated World War II veteran of the Pacific Theater.  Kennedy was, in a way, 
breaking protocol by not visiting these sacred locations.  Yet, his words and actions 
throughout the trip still demonstrated a keen understanding that the memories of 
American sacrifice in the World Wars served contemporary ends.   
After arriving in Paris on Memorial Day 1961, Kennedy told the audience 
gathered at Orly airfield why he traveled to France. He was humble, calling France “our 
oldest friend” and French “the language of free men.”37  Part of Kennedy’s speech 
reflected why he might not engage so closely with sites of American memory.  “I come 
not merely because of the past but because of future associations in defense of the west. . 
. France is the central figure of the common effort.”38  Kennedy’s youthful new 
administration aimed to reinvigorate a centuries old partnership.  He desired to find 
solutions for ongoing problems and not dwell on won wars, unless necessary.  Indicators 
of the past’s usefulness came within the same speech.  The future that the United States 
and France strove for was one where “France never again be a beach-head for war, but a 
fountain-head of peace,” according to Kennedy.39  Even though JFK strove to set a tone 
                                                             







of forward thinking for his trip, it was important to recall the somewhat recent 
memories of occupied France’s liberation through American beachheads.   
Despite the forward looking rhetoric of Kennedy’s opening remarks in Paris, he 
did engage with the past.  Hours after his arrival, his motorcade arrived at the Arc de 
Triomphe where both Kennedy and de Gaulle heard their national anthems and 
reviewed French troops.  Kennedy then walked alone to the Tomb of the Unknown and 
lit the ceremonial flame as so many other Americans had for the past half-century.  He 
then joined de Gaulle for minutes of prayer and silence before leaving.40 Kennedy 
dabbled in the past for the remainder of the evening.  Four hours later, he delivered a 
toast that night during a formal dinner at the Elysee Palace that heavily relied on 
common Franco-American memories to improve relations between the nations.    The 
lengthy toast dealt entirely with past associations between France and the U.S., recalling 
George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and the ideals of both nations 
shared commitment to the core ideals of their revolutions.  Kennedy promised his 
audience that “the security of my country would be directly threatened if France were 
not independent, strong, and sovereign.”41  The United States wanted this for France 
above all else.  He cited the memory of American dead as proof of this.  “In this century, 
on two occasions, young men from my country have come to contribute to the 
maintenance of that independence and sovereignty.”42  The American dead in France 
sacrificed not so America could hold power of France, but the two nations might be “one 
body.”43  It pleased Kennedy that the French leader he had the fortune to deal with was 
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de Gaulle, “the only great leader of World War II who occupies a position of high 
responsibility.”44 Kennedy tactfully ended his recounting of shared Franco-American 
experiences by asking the audience to drink to de Gaulle, a man who played an integral 
part in the Franco-American past.  
Gavin, JFK’s living embodiment of American World War II memory to France, 
stepped down in 1962.  Kennedy quickly contacted President de Gaulle after accepting 
Gavin’s resignation.  He expressed to de Gaulle his reluctance to accept Gavin’s 
departure because he achieved such satisfactory relations with France.45  Gavin’s 
“unusually heavy family obligations” coupled with his lack of “private means,” forced 
Kennedy to approve the resignation, however.  He hoped that his personal letter, prior 
to any formal announcement, would provide clear answers to the inevitable rumors to 
follow.  De Gaulle also learned from the letter that Kennedy wanted Charles Bohlen, one 
of America’s most well-known and “distinguished professional diplomats” to take over 
the American embassy in Paris.  Bohlen knew France well and possessed a keen 
admiration for the country.46  Outgoing Ambassador Gavin did not feel that Bohlen 
could fulfill Kennedy’s expectations in Paris.47  Gavin reasoned that Bohlen was “too 
identified with the thinking in the State Department and has led us into several 
impasses with both the Germans and the French.”48  Instead of possessing the military 
background that the French respected, Bohlen was a career diplomat that would likely 
be met with skepticism from the French. Kennedy did not follow Gavin’s advice and 
placed Bohlen in America’s important Paris embassy.  Bohlen’s ambassadorship 
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coincided with the biggest Franco-American fracture in the twentieth-century.  This 
required Bohlen to turn to popular memories of U.S. military dead in France to mend 





France Leaves NATO  
In his memoir, Ambassador Bohlen reflected on de Gaulle’s foreign policy views.  
“A great country has no friends, it only has interests,” Bohlen reported de Gaulle 
saying.49  This was problematic for Bohlen.  De Gaulle allowed no “place for sentiment 
in his government’s analysis of international problems because he thought those who 
did were likely to be deluded or tricked.”50  Refusal to let sentiment influence foreign 
relations was seen by Bohlen as a barrier to Franco-American relations.  “Sentiment” 
pervaded American foreign policy of “past, present and future,” according to Bohlen.  
From a “cold blooded” realist perspective de Gaulle was correct, “sentiment should not 
play a role in policy.”51  Nevertheless, the United States felt that its cultural ties with 
France and shared past merited friendship through sentimental ties.  The true sign of 
friendship in foreign policy was a nation’s willingness to “sacrifice for countries.”52  
Which Bohlen noted that the United States had done for France on multiple occasions—
and France had once done for the United States.  Bohlen’s feeling that emotionalism 
                                                             







belonged in foreign relations shined through during his ambassadorship in France. 
Bohlen, unlike his predecessor James Gavin, was not a participant in the European 
Theater of World War II.  He was a career diplomat serving years as U.S. Ambassador to 
the Soviet Union and the Philippines.  The inability of Bohlen’s person to bring forth 
memories of French liberation seemingly made him a diplomat who more assiduously 
used the rhetoric of memory in his arsenal of diplomatic tools.   His much lengthier 
ambassadorship to France, six years to Gavin’s two, and the increasingly volatile 
Franco-American partnership likely contributed to his increased use of memory as well. 
De Gaulle’s belief that sentiment had no place in foreign policy did not stop 
Bohlen from pulling on the heart-strings of the French population when articulating the 
foreign policy objectives of the Kennedy administration.  Bohlen’s first Memorial Day 
address in Paris brought American remains in Paris from World War I and World War 
II into the nuclear age.  He never explicitly named Korea or Vietnam, but noted that the 
dead of Suresnes “stretched round the world forming an unseen chain binding all 
ordeals we [the U.S.] have undergone and the victories we have won.”53  The conflicts 
represented in most U.S. conflicts saw “Americans fighting on the side of Frenchmen in 
a common cause in which we are still prepared to fight and if need be to die.”54  Bohlen 
was primarily concerned about what nuclear weapons might do to the legacy of 
American sacrifice for France, however.  He told his audience that American soldiers 
from both World Wars entered into battle thinking that their wars “would be the last.”55  
The world “now lived under a menace unimaginable even to them,” Bohlen explained.56  
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The “nuclear bomb is indeed the ultimate weapon because it represents the 
apocalypse.”57  It was up to France and the United States to “promise the dead that the 
future shall not fail them” and to “arm ourselves against the dangers of war” instead of 
following past mistakes and arming “to build a war itself.”58  Bohlen lamented that 
“governments being what they are” caused disagreements and sporadically “ruffled 
historic harmony” between France and the United States.59  It was his hope that in an 
era of possible apocalypse, both nations stay together by embracing the “enduring bond 
of blood” each shared with one another.60  Instead of focusing on the divisive nuclear 
questions that plagued Franco-American relations in the early years of the Kennedy 
administration, Bohlen hoped that France and the United States might lead efforts to 
prevent nuclear war by reflecting on the memories of American dead.61  Bohlen felt that 
the living could only move past the “superficial” and overused rhetoric of Franco-
American friendship if they actively communed with the dead that forged the 
friendship.62  The presence of dead validated that the discourse was real and might 
continue. 
 Bohlen’s next Memorial Day in Paris marked the twentieth anniversary of the D-
Day landings.  Suresnes, not Omaha Beach was the platform in which Bohlen delivered 
his commemorative address.  The desire to bridge World War I and World War II 
together as one representation of the Franco-American commitment to freedom and 
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human justice factored into this decision.63  He wished not “to confine myself to this 
anniversary alone” because in both wars American lives were “rightly and truly 
sacrificed.”64  Bohlen directed his 1964 remarks not on fear of nuclear weapons, but on 
the necessity of soldiers sacrificing their lives “before God and nature.”65  Americans 
from both wars lying in “French soil added increased emotion” to Bohlen.66  The 
presence of American dead assured Bohlen that “our two countries are so deeply 
imbedded” in similar points of view that “no divergences of the moment can possibly 
mar or spoil the feelings of respect.”67  The death of American soldiers was a sad 
occurrence.  The presence of their remains abroad was a comforting thing in times of 
international strife, however.  Military graves reminded arguing nations that each 
shared investment made for the other in blood.  This reminder was particularly useful 
now that President Kennedy was dead and his predecessor was escalating the American 
conflict in Vietnam. 
 President de Gaulle increasingly took measures to parry American uses of its 
popular war memories against France.  On this twentieth-anniversary of D-Day, Bohlen 
voiced a memory of American soldiers with no high-ranking French officials present to 
hear.  In previous years, it was common for top French government officials to stand 
beside American officials to signal mutual respect.  This was not the case in 1964 
according to Bohlen’s autobiography.  It annoyed Bohlen that President de Gaulle 
allowed his personal pride to get in the way of such important commemorative events.  
De Gaulle and his Free French forces did not play a leading role in the Allies’ D-Day 









invasion.  Therefore, on the twentieth anniversary of the event, de Gaulle “would not let 
any French government official of any importance take part in the anniversary.”68  De 
Gaulle, thus made D-Day “un-history” in Bohlen’s opinion.69  This mandate that no 
high-ranking French officials attend U.S. commemorative events stifled the usually open 
channels of commemorative exchange.  The United States chose not to retaliate against 
de Gaulle by boycotting his important memorial ceremonies.  Bohlen noted that France 
adopted an “opposite treatment” of ceremonies commemorating the anniversary of 
landings in Southern France at Toulon.  De Gaulle and other government officials 
attended and made official statements at Toulon because “the Free French forces had 
participated.”70  Both Bohlen and his British counterpart stood with de Gaulle on this 
occasion to show their mutual interests in this historic episode.  Bohlen added that 
thankfully a bomb planted in a flower pot on the stage failed to detonate and kill de 
Gaulle and the other dignitaries at this Toulon event.71 
 De Gaulle’s reluctance in 1964 to participate in American ceremonies 
commemorating events which the French had no stake coincided with a general erosion 
of relations.   American unwillingness to make France a nuclear power, and escalation in 
Vietnam factored prominently in this faltering partnership.  From 1964 until 1968, the 
United States continually escalated its war with North Vietnamese communists.  De 
Gaulle saw in Vietnam the pillars of America’s flawed foreign policy—“naïve self-
righteousness, a readiness to quash smaller nations’ independence, a tendency toward 
military actions that could engulf France in a world war, and wrongheaded persistence 
                                                             







in containing ‘Communist’ expansion. . .” 72 As Vietnam intensified, so too did French 
resentment for U.S. foreign policy.  Tensions came to a head in 1966 when de Gaulle 
withdrew from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and called for the U.S. military to 
leave his country.  French foreign policy experts articulated that the decision came about 
not because of anti-Americanism, but to combat a “mono-polar world dominated by the 
United States.”73  De Gaulle hoped that France’s action might empower other European 
nations to stand up to a United States that “all over the world used its power as it saw fit 
without consultation” of its allies.74 Memorial ceremonies served as a battleground 
during this deterioration instead of the celebratory stage that they once were.  
 De Gaulle’s March 1966 announcement that France was leaving NATO and the 
U.S. military needed to leave France shocked the world.  He gave the United States one 
year to remove all of its military personnel and bases from French soil.75  When de 
Gaulle delivered his demand to Secretary of State Rusk, it brought forth a visceral 
reaction from the head American diplomat.  Rusk reportedly asked de Gaulle if his 
mandate included the “dead American soldiers in the cemeteries as well?”  This angrily 
delivered question left de Gaulle in silence and gave Rusk at least some satisfaction in 
one of the darkest hours of Franco-American relations.76  Rusk’s retort demonstrated 
the place that American remains held in diplomatic relations.  The rhetoric of American 
military bodies in France throughout the twentieth century was one of friendliness and 
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supposedly meant perpetual respect.  A French challenge to the established system 
required a powerful response.  Rusk’s instinctual turn to bodies showed the cultural 
significance Americans placed on their war dead.  In the minds of most Americans, 
France owed its existence to American sacrifice.  American death in both World Wars 
was the ultimate gift to France, but so was leaving American bones in French soil.  This 
was one of the most powerful signals of trust that one nation could give to another.  If de 
Gaulle led France to default on its NATO commitments, was his nation worthy enough 
to hold America’s esteemed military dead?  Both Americans and French addressed this 
question. 
 After Rusk’s angry retort to de Gaulle about removing U.S. military remains from 
France, U.S. leaders worked to smooth out Franco-American relations. In a circular sent 
out to all European NATO missions and U.S. Ambassadors, Rusk urged anyone dealing 
with France to make it “very clear that there is an empty chair always ready and waiting 
should she [France] decided to return.”77  The American memory of sacrifice in the 
World Wars still offered a means to guilt France back into the orbit of the United States. 
Ambassador Bohlen believed that France expected the United States to “drag its feet, 
raise objections at every move, and in general behave in a bitchy fashion” throughout its 
military withdrawal. 78  The United States instead worked to accommodate French 
desires.  President Johnson tried to do all that he could to meet de Gaulle’s demands 
and Bohlen warned of the futility in “punishing or getting tough with France.”79  Despite 
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this acknowledgement of de Gaulle’s steadfast commitment to U.S. withdrawal, Bohlen 
continued to attack the policy through the memory of American dead. 
Bohlen understood that nothing could change de Gaulle’s mind about NATO.  
Still, his Memorial Day address at Suresnes only two months after de Gaulle’s 
announcement showed a visibly different tone.  He did not fail to mention U.S. struggles 
in Vietnam as he had the previous two years.  In this speech, Bohlen equated American 
sacrifices in both World Wars to the escalating war in Vietnam.  It was not enough to 
pay respect to American bodies on the hillside overlooking Paris.  He directed the 
audience to “not flinch from thinking of the new graves now being dug in Vietnam.”80  
Fighting in Vietnam was not shameful.  “People say that Americans are victims of their 
own idealism . . . see things in black or white . . . and miss the real nature of the 
problems that confront us,” Bohlen explained.81  He acknowledged if this was a fault, it 
was “a fault that harbors its own special virtue.”82  He reminded his French and 
American audience that America’s commitment to idealism was the “mainspring” of its 
intervention all over the world the past twenty years.  “Reflect on what the world would 
be like today” if the idealism that inspired the remains of Suresnes was absent in 
Americans, Bohlen demanded of his audience.83  The United States responded to “the 
appeals of the helpless, weak, and oppressed.”  Sometimes it did so awkwardly, too late, 
or too faintly,” but when the response came it was from “the most powerful nation on 
earth.”84 France was twice saved in recent memory by the idealism that the remains in 
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Suresnes represented.  Bohlen did not want these bodies removed because France 
needed the reminder of American sacrifice in this hostile period.  The dead at Suresnes 
showed that the United States “continued today as we have acted in the past” and they 
deserved to be saluted “without guilt or trepidation,” the same as the living American 
soldiers ordered to vacate the ungrateful country.85  Bohlen’s message was succinct and 
seemingly intended to instill guilt into the French leaders for their recent actions.   
 The memory of American remains held a prominent place in public discussions in 
the immediate aftermath of de Gaulle’s NATO decision.  Following shortly after de 
Gaulle’s March 1966 NATO decree, the French Defense Ministry announced the 
discontinuation of an annual ceremony honoring American Sargent Laurence Kelly at 
the Invalides Hospital in Paris.  Sargent Kelly was an American soldier from Altoona, 
Pennsylvania shot accidentally by the French Homeguard on August 25, 1944 while 
rushing into Paris to be the first American liberator of the city.  Kelly’s shooters took the 
mortally wounded GI to a French pharmacist who organized an annual ceremony in his 
memory thereafter. Parisians and the American Legion’s Paris Post No. 1 celebrated 
June 10 each year as Sergeant Kelly day.86  The French government allowed this 
celebration of Kelly’s sacrifice to take place at the Invalides—perhaps the most powerful 
military shrine in France.  The event was not a grand spectacle—it attracted 
approximately 150 participants each year.87  Cancellation of the event so quickly after 
the order for the American military to vacate France aroused calls of anti-Americanism 
and attacks against de Gaulle. 
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 The Defense Ministry held to its mandate that the ceremony not take place at the 
Invalides despite public discontent.  Speakers for the Defense Ministry did publicly 
clarify that “the order was not directed at our American friends and allies and it would 
be unjust to interpret it that way.”88 The cancellation merely reflected a new policy of 
not allowing any private ceremonies at the Invalides.89   The French pharmacist who 
once cared for Kelly and organized the event moved forward with commemorative 
plans, despite her government’s actions.  She simply moved the event to Suresnes 
American Cemetery.  Reporter David Halberstam attended the event at Suresnes and 
noted that a “feeling of protest” hovered over the entire ceremony.90  Attendance of the 
memorial increased ten-fold from the previous year.  Instead of a paltry 150 mourners, 
1,500 attended.91  Among these, most were French of the older generation wishing to 
prove that de Gaulle did not speak for the entire country and that his recent attitude 
towards American sacrifice in WWII “approached bad manners.”92  Ambassador Bohlen 
attended along with French dignitaries such as ex-president Reynaud, anti-Gaullist 
politicians, and French generals.93  The high point of the ceremony for the audience 
came when de Gaulle’s representative, Jean Jurgensen, declared that “without the 
United States, France would no longer exist.”94  This brought forth spontaneous 
applause from the French attendees.   
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This type of French reaction to de Gaulle dominated Bohlen’s memory of the 
period.  In his autobiography it stood out to him that many French desired to “show they 
were still pro-American, despite de Gaulle’s break with the United States” because “they 
felt that his actions were a slur on French good manners.” 95  Bohlen saw many French 
going out of their way “to demonstrate their good will to the representative of a country 
which had twice fought beside them on the battlefield of Europe.”96 
 Engaging with the sentimental memories of American dead reversed no French 
policy.  The U.S. military planned an incredibly efficient evacuation and some “800,000 
tons of war material and all airbases” were out of France a month before de Gaulle’s 
deadline.97  It was Bohlen’s solemn duty to say goodbye to American military families 
who worshipped at the American Cathedral in Paris before their departure in March 
1967.  He lamented that “it is going to seem very strange not to have an American 
military presence in France . . . this is the end of a long story which started on June 6, 
1944.”98  Only the remains from that day and other battles stayed in France as military 
reminders. The saddest aspect of the exodus to Bohlen was that a “natural affinity exists 
between French and Americans” that is made even greater where military families live.99  
He wanted the American families leaving to know that, as Ambassador, he knew that 
“Franco-American friendship is not merely a customary phrase, it is a real and enduring 
sentiment.”100  Many Americans left France feeling that it was not the average 
Frenchman that wanted them gone, but the desire of an overly prideful de Gaulle. 
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 Bohlen’s rosy view of Franco-American relations was not all true.  Real French 
resentment towards American policies existed in the capital.  Beginning in 1966 French 
protestors assembled at the U.S. embassy and countless petitions flooded the embassy’s 
mailboxes. 101 In early March 1966 over twenty-four young French protestors rushed 
past French guards at the U.S. Embassy screaming “U.S.A. Assassins” while hurtling ink 
bottles against the building.102  When Vice President Hubert Humphrey visited Paris in 
1967 he was met at nearly every stop by protestors throwing eggs, paint, and rocks.103 A 
reader of the Los Angeles Times felt compelled to submit an open letter to the 
newspaper after seeing photos of French protestors burning American flags in public.  
He felt that the French “should be ashamed of themselves” and suggested they “visit 
some of the American cemeteries in France, where thousands of our boys are buried” to 
get a reminder that “they are free” because of our boys.104  The writer planned his own 
protest by cancelling his visit to France and compelling other Americans to do the 
same.105   
Bohlen might have seen genuine French admiration for Americans through 
commemorative events, but negative stories persisted in the headlines.  Enough so that 
Rusk’s off-handed comment to de Gaulle about the removal of American dead in French 
soil actually received consideration in the halls of the U.S. capital.  Chairman of House 
Armed Services Committee, Mendel Rivers (D-SC), drafted legislation in 1966 for the 
United States to “complete its military withdrawal from France by bringing home the 
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bodies of the 60,501 American soldiers now buried” there.106  American corpses in 
France “gave their lives to save France from disgraceful defeat” and Rivers felt that if the 
current French attitude continued, the American bodies needed reinterred in American 
soil.107  Rivers proposed legislation never took flight.  The bodies remained in the now 
hostile French soil.  Bohlen left his Paris post in the winter of 1968.  He departed feeling 
that so long as de Gaulle was in power “there would be very little chance of improvement 
in Franco-American relations,” yet he remained an idealist.108  In his heart he knew that 
a “profound friendship between the United States and France remains in being,” he had 
seen this in countless commemorative ceremonies.109  If an event emerged that tested 
the life of either nation, he knew that France and the United States would stand together 





Thawing Tensions:  A Return to Positive Memories 
 Sargent Shriver began his ambassadorship to France in May 1968 during a time 
when relations between the two countries were “in a state of definite decomposition.”111 
Worker strikes, student demonstrations, and anti-Vietnam protest engulfed Paris and 
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other French cities.   The diplomatic situation started to improve slightly in 1968, 
nonetheless.  President Johnson’s decision in March 1968 to halt bombing over North 
Vietnam, coupled with his announcement to not seek reelection and allow Vietnam 
peace talks to begin in Paris, improved French perceptions of the United States.112  
Sargent Shriver arrived in Paris at the start of a slight anti-American thaw.  Still, the 
atmosphere in Paris was revolutionary.  In May 1968, student riots and nationwide 
workers strikes joined forces and raged through the capital city.113  The revolutionary 
winds in Paris hinted to the start of a new era.  French youth coming to age in the 
universities rose up against the old order, much like their counterparts throughout the 
world did in 1968.  De Gaulle served as a particularly good example of the antiquated 
system.  Instead of putting money into improving French domestic life and growing the 
economy, he spent most of his presidency in the pursuit of nuclear weaponry and a 
revitalized national image.114  These goals came at the expense of state funding for the 
universities.  In May of 1968, French students nationwide mobilized to protest against 
de Gaulle and the outmoded university system.115  Student protests in Paris turned the 
streets into a battleground and eventually French workers joined demonstrations by 
staging the largest strike in Paris since the Paris Commune.   
In this atmosphere, Shriver reported that he had two approaches to his 
ambassadorship.  He could “let events take their natural course,” or “try to make his 
Embassy and himself a part of those events.”116  Shriver chose to assert himself into the 
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current events because he felt that they naturally aided in his objective to reestablish 
communication and restore confidence between France and the United States.117  A clear 
example of the Shriver’s resolve to stop the deterioration of relations came from one of 
his wife, Eunice’s, first actions upon arrival to their residence in Paris. Upon seeing her 
new home, Eunice inquired as to why the flagpole bore no American flag.  Security told 
Mrs. Shriver that all of the demonstrations in Paris made it necessary to remove the 
Stars and Stripes because it attracted protestors.  She flatly rejected this notion and 
ordered that the flag fly proudly over the family home.118  
Shriver served in the South Pacific as a naval officer during WWII and received a 
Purple Heart.  While he brought WWII service back to the Paris Embassy, he did not 
have the European theater service that Gavin did.  Shriver’s connection to the popular 
and well-liked Kennedy family elevated his position in French society.  Newspapers 
reported French elation over Shriver’s selection.119  A “new look” was coming to Paris, 
and the “Kennedy tie” of Shriver allowed him to immediately improve the U.S. image 
abroad.120 Shriver viewed his mission in Paris in the same light as his deceased brother-
in-law, JFK.  Kennedy’s address to the Paris Embassy staff in 1961 impelled them to “to 
devote every energy to strengthening the common ties which bind us.”121  This primarily 
meant spreading Americanism by setting a good example, but also by regularly engaging 
with popular anecdotes of Franco-American memories.  Shriver brought Kennedy’s call 
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for devotion and energy to his ambassadorship.  He wanted to “use himself to show 
something about the U.S. to as many French as possible” by staying out of “contentious 
areas” and looking “for areas where France and the United States could cooperate.”122  
Shriver’s engagement with popular memories of American sacrifice in the World Wars 
was a lucrative channel to build a foundation for better relations.  A publication about 
Shriver’s administration stated that “if more Americans were aware of the investments 
each country had in the other’s past, diplomacy might achieve more.”123  It was Shriver’s 
job to “not jar history loose on its hinges, but to keep the hinges oiled.”124 
Keeping the hinges of history oiled required Shriver to show strategy in his public 
comments.  Prior to his arrival in Paris, State Department officials advised Shriver on 
what he should and should not say in any public statement.  One thing he absolutely 
needed to avoid referencing “directly or indirectly was Vietnam.”125 He was instead 
supposed to craft a “story line” that flowed from the “proposition that from the time of 
our revolution until now, U.S. European relations have been generally characterized by 
an increase in U.S. power” relative to Europe’s “amazing recoveries” from World War I 
and World War II.126 Shriver’s speeches commemorating American military dead 
adhered to this advice. 
Bohlen chose to explicitly link Vietnam to American sacrifice in the World Wars 
in the final part of his ambassadorship when the United States felt most defensive of its 
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place in Europe.  Vietnam had no place in Shriver’s text when framing the American 
memory of past wars, however.  In his first Memorial Day as Ambassador at Suresnes he 
relegated his focus mainly to American sacrifice in the Great War—likely because 1968 
marked the fiftieth anniversary of that war’s end.  This speech reflected on the resolve of 
Franco-American relations and their ability to rise above cynicism to make a better 
world.127  Shriver continued to capitalize on this anniversary publicly and articulated the 
lessons that American World War I remains taught contemporary society.  At St. Mihiel, 
Shriver delivered his homage to American remains in the French language.  It delighted 
the French that Shriver tried such a feat despite his “terrible accent.”128  Part of his 
address was broadcasted on French national television, and it elated Shriver that he had 
the chance to speak to so many Frenchmen through the medium of memory.129  
Speaking in French was indicative of how Shriver wished to use Great War memories to 
improve relations.  World War I represented a war in which the French proudly fought 
until the end, not one in which Americans swooped in as liberators.   
On the golden anniversary of the war, Shriver wanted to not just remember 
American remains, but the “hundreds of thousands of young French graves that 
defended their homeland.”130  Both French and American dead taught that death in 
battle did not favor one nationality over the other, that rampant nationalism brings 
death and destruction, and the future belongs to cooperative, not suspicious, minds.131  
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Shriver hoped that the living did not tarnish the memory of World War I dead by 
highlighting their mistaken belief that they died “fighting the war to end all wars.”132  It 
was the living, not the dead’s, fault that war continued.  In this age, France and the 
United States needed to look back to the Great War and find inspiration for “fraternal 
peace.”133  Shriver addressed French diplomats weeks later and explained to him the 
personal revelations he gained from his St. Mihiel visit.  It inspired him as ambassador 
to remember how France and the United States “so often worked together,” as they 
should.134  He assured the French diplomats that the lessons he took from St. Mihiel 
represented not “isolated gestures,” but something he would continue to perpetuate as 
ambassador.135   
It seems overall that the fiftieth anniversary of the Great War’s end came at an 
opportune time for the new ambassador.  The chance to travel France and address the 
nation through positive memories of the Great War allowed Shriver to cast a favorable 
impression of himself and his nation quickly.  Fiftieth anniversary ceremonies also 
provided a bridge for Shriver and de Gaulle to start a positive relationship.  President de 
Gaulle held a large parade in Paris to commemorate Armistice Day.  Colonel William 
Jones, an engineer for the ABMC sat in the reviewing stand near Ambassador Shriver 
during the event.  His observations of the day revealed that the parade was a positive 
episode in Franco-American relations.  “All of the Allies in World War I, except Russia,” 
marched past the reviewing stand in the order they entered the conflict.136  The not so 
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long-ago expelled U.S. troops passed de Gaulle last and “the applause of the French 
crowd was greater than for any other [country] except the French.”137  A similar sign of 
improving relations came at the end of the event when all ambassadors present 
approached de Gaulle to congratulate him on the event’s success.  Many noted that de 
Gaulle “talked longer with and was more cordial to Ambassador Shriver than any 
other.”138  This ceremony of memory positively opened the lines of communication in 
the strained Franco-American partnership and offered hope of better days. 
The twenty-fifth anniversary of the Normandy landings came the following year.  
This occasion gave Shriver another chance to approach the French through popular 
American memory.  Shriver visited Utah Beach to commemorate this event.  His speech 
repeated the story-line of long standing Franco-American cooperation.  He linked the 
real wall of “fire, concrete, and barbed wire” that Americans faced twenty-five years ago 
to a metaphorical wall of “mistrust, ignorance, misery, and oppression” that France and 
Americans faced presently.139  The only way either country could break these walls was 
through cooperation.  Franco-American solidarity would salute the graves of dead 
Americans and show them that their offspring still had the ability to scale obstacles 
together.140   
More striking than Shriver’s words on this important anniversary was the overall 
atmosphere of the event he wished to create.  Instead of a sad occasion, there was a light 
heartedness to much of the official anniversary.  Much of Shriver’s correspondence 
following the event centered on the 8th Infantry Division’s preparation of an “American 
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picnic lunch” served to dignitaries on Omaha beach.141  He thanked a British General for 
joining him and his wife on our “little American picnic.”142  To Cornelius Ryan, writer of 
the book turned Academy Award winning movie The Longest Day, Shriver joked that 
“the world will be pleased to know that following your own private ‘landing’ on Omaha 
Beach, that you were able to get your motorized vehicle off the beach and back into 
battle without any casualties.”143  He also hoped that he enjoyed the “picnic” and 
thanked Ryan for attending and bringing more attention to the event.144  Officials in the 
American Battle Monuments Commission showed displeasure towards Shriver’s 
attitude toward the important twenty-fifth anniversary.  An ABMC engineer in Paris 
reported that Shriver actually wanted to hold the picnic inside of the Normandy 
cemetery, among the graves.145  The ABMC’s Paris office immediately denied this 
request and Shriver appealed to ABMC executives in Washington, who upheld the 
denial.146  One ABMC representative met with Cornelius Ryan during the anniversary 
week and discussed the Shriver picnic with the Longest Day author.  When reflecting on 
Shriver’s request to hold the picnic inside of the cemetery, Ryan commented that “you’re 
[the ABMC] lucky he didn’t want to play touch football there.”147   
The ABMC found Shriver’s people-to-people approach to diplomacy too informal 
for its mission.148  Shriver’s participation in commemorative ceremonies received good 
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press and seemingly improved Franco-American relations, but sometimes made the 
ABMC cringe.  For example, at the well publicized St. Mihiel commemoration in 1968, 
Shriver’s small children reportedly ran around in a frenzy swinging on the protective 
ropes around monuments and “ducking in and out of them with no one trying to control 
them.”149  While this type of display possibly made Shriver seem more relatable to the 
average citizen, it was not the type of engagement with the memory of American dead 
that the ABMC was accustomed to.  There was fear within the ABMC that Shriver’s 
“disregard for diplomatic protocol” at their events might cause “ill feelings” instead of 
contributing to better Franco-American relations.150  This fear seemed somewhat 
misplaced, however.  It was an “open secret” in France that President de Gaulle planned 
to make the twenty-fifth anniversary of D-Day the first one in which he participated.151  
This never happened because he resigned two months before the event.    It is unknown 
if Shriver would have curtailed the American picnic if de Gaulle attended.   
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Photo 6.1: Ambassador Shriver at the twenty-fifth anniversary of D-Day, June 6, 1969.  Source:  
Sargent Shriver Papers, JFK Library, Boston, MA.   
 
Shriver’s less formal approach to the anniversary of D-Day was reflective of a 
shift in D-Day memory where shared sacrifice and tragedy were accompanied by 
commercialization.  A New York Times reporter attending the 25th Anniversary at 
Normandy skeptically captured the new tone of the once solemn event.  He noted that 
while the remnants of the landings and military cemeteries made World War II seem 
closer to the present at Normandy than anywhere else in Europe, a distance detached 
the invasion more from the present each year.152  Normandy was now “manicured and 
touristy” with “cafes, souvenir shops, and hotels.”  Young publicity men lingered in the 
crowd like vultures promising “to do this or that for someone’s book, movie, or 
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television series” depicting the invasion.153  It was hard to believe that “anything great 
was done here,” reported the author.154  It was not just the commodification of 
Normandy that stood out to the reporter, but also the public lack of understanding of 
the event.  On multiple occasions, he witnessed aging veterans attempting to tell their 
account of the day to tourists only to realize by the end of their story that “the tourist 
was no longer listening.”155  After the event, the reporter reached the conclusion that the 
only redeemable thing about Normandy now was the dead, their memories, and 
individual experiences of mourners.  The orators, bands, and generals all showed 
reflections of the bigger commodification.156  Shriver’s post-ceremony correspondence 
showed that the reflections of the Times reporter had merit. 
Sargent Shriver, Eunice, and returned to the United States in 1970, to allow 
President Nixon to appoint his own ambassador, and for Sargent to enter politics.  The 
Shrivers’ presence in Paris renewed some of the French perceptions of the United States.  
Throughout Shriver’s two years at the American Embassy many things contributed to 
improved relations:  LBJ’s halting of bombing over North Korea and his decision to not 
seek reelection, Nixon’s election and 1969 trip to Paris, the Apollo 11 moon landing, and 
de Gaulle’s retirement.157  Shriver’s embassy was a part of these events and he made a 
genuine attempt to improve the image of the United States.  This often included visiting 
American graves to remind France of its shared past. Looking at Shriver’s engagement 
with memory as a diplomatic tool indicates that he saw something lacking in this 










method by the end of his ambassadorship.  His engagement with American dead leading 
up to the 25th anniversary of D-Day called for progressive action from the public, not 
passive talk.  At the 25th anniversary at the American D-Day beaches, he was part of new 
spectacle of American memory.  The American Battle Monuments Commission 
struggled to keep itself relevant in American culture throughout the 1960s.  As Shriver 
called for action to commemorate the dead, the ABMC fought to maintain its prestige 
and attempted to remain relevant in U.S. culture.  The final section will look at the 







The ABMC on the Offensive 
 The American Battle Monuments Commission faced new challenges at the start 
of the 1960s. Visitation to ABMC cemeteries depended greatly on international 
circumstances, the location of the cemetery, and the war it commemorated.   Cemeteries 
at well-known sites, like Normandy, garnered more visitation than others in more 
remote areas of France.  By the early 1960s, the lagging visitation to ABMC sites and 
budget cuts made the relatively young government agency fear for its life.  The New 
York Times reported in November 1961 that Americans no longer traveled to ABMC 
sites in the numbers that they used to.  Relatives, in particular, did not visit the graves as 
they once did.  At Suresnes American Cemetery, the most visited of the ABMC sites 




1961.158 Tourists still visited the cemeteries according to the article, but “most visitors to 
these graves were French.”159  The concluded reason for the dwindling number of family 
visits was that the “graves are far from home and trips to Europe are expensive.” 160  The 
drop in numbers was upsetting, but ABMC Secretary Thomas North was still pleased 
that the cemeteries brought in a large foreign audience.  “What is perhaps not well 
appreciated at home is the great psychological impact upon foreign peoples of these 
solemn shrines,” North reflected prior to his retirement. 161 “Week in, week out, they 
[foreigners] come by the thousands—in buses, on foot, in cars, by bicycle,” and learn 
that the U.S. spent far more of herself than money in helping to free the occupied 
countries from their invaders.”162  It was not entirely disheartening that the relatives did 
not come in such large numbers, since the graves still received company.  Besides, lack 
of relatives was a natural occurrence.  As time passed, fewer and fewer next-of-kin lived 
to visit.  In 1961, forty-three years had gone by since the guns of August fell silent.  It 
was not as if no interest from relatives existed.  The Times stated that families at home 
remembered their dead in ways other than personal visits.  American superintendents at 
cemeteries stayed busy answering correspondence, taking photographs of graves, and 
laying wreaths at the request of families on important dates.163 
 More concerning to the ABMC was the increasing stress placed on its mission 
from Washington due to funding issues.  Beginning in the early 1960s, the State 
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Department began making plans to sell valuable Parisian real estate owned by the 
United States Government to purchase more housing for the growing cadre Washington 
bureaucrats overseas.164   One property eventually placed on the auction block was the 
office of the ABMC.  In 1967-1968, the ABMC’s traditional Paris office was sold. 165  The 
sale brought the government a fine profit, but Thomas North lamented that “this 
marked the end of an era for the Commission.” 166  Since the end of the Great War, the 
ABMC’s office was an American landmark in Paris where relatives frequently arrived to 
receive a welcome and directions to their loved one’s grave.167  With public knowledge of 
declining numbers of relatives visiting, segments of Congress felt that the United States 
need not maintain such a prominent office for the ABMC.  North saw the closure as a 
“serious loss to the veterans and relatives of the dead. 168  De Gaulle’s withdraw from 
NATO was convenient for the ABMC’s eviction.  The Commission took over the vacant 
offices of Belgium’s NATO headquarters in Garches, a western suburb of Paris.  This 
building was much more isolated than their downtown location and lacked public 
transportation. 169    North’s bleak assessment of the ABMC’s eviction by the State 
Department was not entirely fair.  Staff members from the ABMC visited Paris during 
the move and found the U.S. Embassy more than willing to work with them.  The 
Embassy realized that it was important for next-of-kin to have an accessible location to 
gain information about American cemeteries in France.  Downtown Paris was obviously 
the best location for this.  The American Embassy agreed to give the ABMC a room 
                                                             









“furnished and equipped in an attractive dignified manner” with two ABMC staffers 
present to receive pilgrims.170  ABMC inspectors recommended that its Paris office 
consider sending Pershing’s old furniture to the embassy reception room to keep the 
attachment to history present and impress visitors.171  Despite North’s dismay over the 
ABMC’s move, the Commission’s inspectors actually felt that the new arrangement was 
superior to past procedure.172  It was not as if the U.S. Embassy totally abandoned the 
work of the ABMC in Paris.  Allowance for prime space in their building demonstrated 
that the Commission’s work retained value in the period of heightened anti-
Americanism.   
The primary value that the ABMC’s work in France had is visible in letters from 
families who interacted with the ABMC.  During the height of the 1966 NATO 
controversy, the sister of a deceased WWII veteran visited France to see her brother’s 
grave.  Throughout her trip, the ABMC served as her primary point of contact.  She 
wrote to the ABMC after returning home imparting her belief that they “performed a 
tremendous public relations job for the United States Government.”173  Many times in 
her trip, Frenchmen related to her that they frequently heard of the ABMC’s good deeds.  
Additionally, for many American tourists and French, the ABMC was the face of the 
United States.174  This was a good thing, in her opinion.  The positive work of the ABMC 
helped create a favorable view of the entire American government. 
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The ABMC struggled to remain relevant in the American culture through the 
1960s, despite positive feedback from visitors.  Reflecting on the 1960s, Thomas North 
saw the start of a decline.  The ABMC casted a world-wide net and oversaw regular 
activities abroad.  Still, beginning in the 1960s, “the Commission received little 
publicity. . . no provision for public information was set-up.”175  Most of the agency’s 
public affairs work moved from a professional’s desk to side-work for the ABMC staff.176  
Yearly, the Commission found itself pressured to “reduce cost.”177  North described the 
staffers as facing so many hardships through the 1960s that the only ones who remained 
did so because they personally saw their mission as a “labor of love.” 178  With fewer 
resources, the Commission continually worked to show its face to the public.  This did 
not always succeed, however.  The ABMC’s third chairman, General Jacob Devers, 
attempted to breathe new life into the agency by “cleaning house to revitalize the staff” 
in 1968.179  Part of this revitalization included persuading General North to relinquish 
his position as Secretary.180  North had worked with the ABMC since the end of the 
Great War, and Devers felt it was time to move the Commission into a new era.  Devers 
also tried to bring the ABMC more into the American consciousness at home.  He 
personally called on President Kennedy to have the U.S. Postal Service release an ABMC 
stamp to coincide with their dedication of its Honolulu memorial.181 Kennedy’s aid 
responded to the request in the negative.  He explained to Devers that only fifteen 
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special stamps were released per year and that the ABMC technically already had a 
stamp in 1945-46 when a series of stamps commemorating sacrifices of all branches of 
the services was released.182  The ABMC’s request went to the USPS, but it was one of 
many in a “tremendous backlog,” and had little chance of moving up the list.183 The 
Commission fought to keep its overseas staff numbers at 440, but in 1968 the “axe fell” 
and large personnel cuts went into effect.  With a costly war in Vietnam, funds needed to 
go towards living military personnel more so than the dead.184 
A reduction of budget and personnel was not the biggest problem that the ABMC 
faced through the 1960s.  The ABMC’s greatest struggle was for its very life.  Beginning 
with the 89th Congress (1965-66), and in each successive Congress through the 1960s, 
House representatives introduced bills which would establish a National Cemetery 
System within the Veteran’s Administration.”185  These bills varied in content, but many 
iterations of them called for the dissolution of the American Battle Monuments 
Commission, in favor of administration from a centralized Veteran’s Administration 
overseeing all national cemeteries.  The practical reason for consolidating all national 
cemeteries under the umbrella of one government agency stemmed from budget 
concerns. Increasing demand for burial in national cemeteries created by the elderly 
generation of WWII veterans and Vietnam casualties also drove consolidation 
arguments.  Threat of abolishment forced the ABMC to articulate its importance to the 
United States and distinguish what made it unique among other national 
commemorative agencies.  The political debate over the continuation of the ABMC 
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revealed the dual impulses within the United States to continue holding American 
memory of the World Wars abroad in special reverence, and the move forward from its 
strong military connections. 
Republican Senator John Saylor from Pennsylvania stood out as one of the most 
vocal opponents of ending the AMBC.  Saylor was a World War II veteran, yet as a 
member on the House Special Subcommittee on Cemetery Affairs, he displayed a belief 
that the United States needed to stop bowing to the whim of the World War II 
generation simply because of their popular memory.  In his questioning of the Assistant 
to the Director of Veterans Affairs, Saylor resented that leadership in the Veterans 
Administration lacked the “backbone” to take a definitive stance on the ABMC’s 
worth.186  Saylor asked the assistant “why continue the Battle Monuments Commission 
and their expenditures if you can turn it all over to the Veterans Administration, and 
one administration?”187  He received no direct response to this inquiry.  Thus, Saylor 
concluded that the ABMC retained a special status just because it had a couple old 
generals and admirals on it, that former President Eisenhower showed interest in the 
Commission because of his early career work on it, and finally because many of its 
present members were Eisenhower appointees.188 These historic factors did not make 
the ABMC an agency that Congress “cannot touch,” in Saylor’s opinion.189  Ending the 
Commission would benefit the American people by saving the federal government 
money and stopping “a few generals from taking a trip around the world twice a year.”190 
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A representative from the ABMC was not present during the questioning when 
Saylor delivered his critical assessment.  Reading the transcript caused alarm in 
leadership of the Commission, however.  The ABMC’s new Secretary, A.J. Adams felt 
that Saylor had malicious intent to “eliminate the Commission for no other reason than 
personal pique.”191  Saylor’s biggest irritation seemingly stemmed from resentment over 
retired generals travelling to ABMC sites on funding from American taxpayers.  
Regardless of Saylor’s motives, ABMC Secretary Adams and new Chairman Mark Clark 
waged an offensive war to keep their Commission alive.  Reduction of personnel, budget 
cuts, anti-Vietnam protest, and lax commemorative ceremonies all signaled shifting 
public perceptions of the value of the ABMC’s memory within America and France. 
Leaders in the ABMC needed to respond to these changes if they wanted the 
Commission to survive into future. 
The ABMC defended itself primarily using two arguments.  The first one was 
more superficial and dealt with cosmetics and the demanding nature of maintaining 
ABMC sites.  The ABMC’s total budget was a miniscule compared to the Veterans 
Administration.  Its absorption into such a large agency would, inevitably, dilute the 
“detail and personal attention it now receives from the Commissioners and their small 
staff.”  The “level of maintenance would surely decline and cost would go up” under the 
VA.192   Leaders in the ABMC did not want the erosion of their high standards.  One 
engineer noted that “in comparison with ABMC’s cemeteries, Arlington Cemetery is a 
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weed patch.”193 He did not want sacred American sites throughout the world to fall into 
disrepair because of DC politics.   
More important to the ABMC’s quest for survival was articulating its significance 
to American culture at home and abroad.  Chairman Mark Clark wrote Senator Strom 
Thurmond, a member of the Senate Committee on Veteran Affairs to explain the 
broader importance of the ABMC to the United States. “Each year more than three 
million Americans and foreigners visit the Commission’s cemetery memorials abroad,” 
Clark explained.   The ABMC gleaned from public feedback that their sites created “more 
real understanding of the friendship among the people of the countries in which they are 
located than any other of our governmental activities.”194  Clark also personally wrote 
John Oakes, the editor of the New York Times in hope that he would print a personal 
appeal from the ABMC to its world-wide subscribers.  Clark firmly believed that “it 
would be a serious mistake to abolish the ABMC” and end its “high purposes” of 
bringing “credit upon the United States”195  Furthermore, Clark reasoned that the ABMC 
should not even be considered for consolidation with the VA because it maintained not 
“cemeteries,” but “shrines that keep alive the memories of thousands of young men who 
gave their lives in two world wars on foreign soil.”196  These shrines long ago ceased to 
be places for future burial, so it made no sense to lump them into a large federal 
cemetery system.   
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The Veterans Affairs investigative committee tasked to study the issue came to 
agree with the ABMC’s argument.  Investigators found ABMC memorial cemeteries to be 
“a source of pride and inspiration to Americans and foreigners alike.”  “More than a 
million foreigners and thousands of Americans” annually visited these sites.197 
Diplomatically, the committee also found value in ABMC cemeteries.  “Foreigners are 
reminded of our nation’s respect for its honored dead and the supreme sacrifice made 
by so many Americans for their freedom and well-being.”  The committee concluded 
that “there is probably no other program or activity which promotes more sympathy, 
understanding and friendship for the United States among the people of the countries 
where the memorials are located.”198  Representatives from the French equivalent of the 
ABMC also came to the Commission’s aid reporting that France stood alone among 
Allied countries for having a centralized commemorative agency for their war 
cemeteries.  The head of French military cemeteries and memorials warned the ABMC 
that he tirelessly attempted to “completely divorce” his commission from the French 
Ministry of Veterans Affairs because a “monuments and cemeteries commission could 
only succeed as “a separate entity under the highest authority of state.”199 
The ABMC proved its value to the United States and thwarted Congressional 
attacks by explaining that their sites no longer met the definition of cemetery, but stood 
as eternal monuments. Chairman Mark Clark’s argument that the ABMC’s “closed 
cemeteries should be maintained in perpetuity as national shrines” won the day. 200   
                                                             
197 “Report of the U.S. Veterans Advisory Commission on the Veterans Benefits System,” undated, Box 1, 
Entry 47, Legislative History, Records of the ABMC, RG 117, NARA. 
198 Ibid.   
199 G.M ver Hult to General A.J. Adams, March 3, 1969, RG 117, Legislative History, Box 1, NARAII.  The 
French head of cemeteries and memorials cited was Admiral Galleret. 
200 Mark Clark to Strom Thurmond, February/March 1971, Box 1, Entry 47, Legislative History, Records of 




The ABMC sites ultimately held too much national importance to be passed into the 
massive Veteran’s Administration where they could not get the personal care required to 
maintain them.201  By framing their cemeteries in this light, the ABMC froze them in 
time.  No soldiers from other wars would ever lie with American World War dead 
abroad.  Nor would any soldiers in ABMC cemeteries be reinterred and shipped back to 
American soil, except in extremely special situations. The ABMC received requests for 
repatriations throughout the twentieth century but held firm to its commitment of 
‘closed cemeteries.’  All of the bodies that the ABMC cared for came to them only after 
next-of-kin decisions, or because no family existed to speak on the dead’s behalf.   Also, 
the Commission felt that “host countries would not tolerate” repatriation of American 
bodies and it did not want unsightly gaps in its shrines where permanent graves once 
stood.202 
The ABMC’s argument for its continuation seemingly disconnected it from the 
turbulent wars and prioritized the memory of American remains from the World Wars 
abroad in the national consciousness.  Yet, after surviving the onslaught, ABMC leaders 
adopted proactive measures to make sure the government and American public found 
the Commission relevant.  The Commission also found a friend in President Richard 
Nixon.  The federal attack against the ABMC began under the administration of liberal 
president Lyndon Johnson and ended in the Nixon administration.  General Mark Clark, 
a decorated WWII General and NATO commander in the Korean War, was Nixon’s 
appointee to replace Devers and lead the ABMC.  Once Clark successfully led the ABMC 
through its Congressional attack in the late 1960s, he threw his support to President 
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Nixon’s escalation of the Vietnam War.  Clark found an ABMC ally in President Nixon, 
and Nixon saw the usefulness of the ABMC in improving declining moral among 
Americans over Vietnam.  
In May of 1970, General Clark demonstrated to President Nixon that the ABMC 
fully supported the war in Vietnam and saw American sacrifice in Indochina in the same 
light as the World Wars.  Clark wrote to Nixon on behalf of the entire ABMC “to fully 
support you on the selfless and courageous action you have taken in the Cambodian 
situation in protect our heroic men in Vietnam and preventing a communist take-over in 
South East Asia.”203  This support came at a time when many other Americans showed 
dissatisfaction that Nixon was actually expanding the Vietnam conflict in other 
countries instead of bringing the ‘peace with honor’ he promised.  Clark viewed Nixon’s 
expansion of the war as a tribute to the American remains that the ABMC 
commemorated.  He praised Nixon’s “decisive action” for “assuring the U.S. and free 
world that the gallant men whose graves are in Europe will not have died in vain.” 204 
 A meeting between General Clark and President Nixon months before at the 
White House foreshadowed the ABMC’s pro-Vietnam support.  President Nixon 
explained to General Clark that he firmly believed that the ABMC “cemeteries and the 
sacrifices of those buried in them should be an inspiration to the people of America and 
give them a sense of pride in our national heritage and accomplishments.”205  Nixon 
fully supported the work of Commission and experienced many ABMC sites himself.  He 
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saw ABMC cemeteries as a valuable asset that could boost the morale the American 
people.  He wanted to make sure that all ABMC commissioners fully understood the 
sites by visiting them all.  After years of threatened budget cuts and termination, the 
ABMC found Nixon eager to spend on the Commission’s behalf.  He assured Clark that 
even though the ABMC did not have $30,000 budgeted for a trip to send commissioners 
abroad, that “sum should be available from some place.” 206  He immediately tasked an 
assistant to find the money.  Nixon also felt that the military should provide the ABMC a 
plane to make cemetery visits and desired that Clark and other commissioners visit 
American troops in Vietnam.207  Inspired by Nixon’s enthusiasm, Clark suggested that 
the ABMC release a film to the American public “showing our installations and the story 
behind them.”208  Nixon loved the idea and suggested that Clark work with the United 
States Information Agency to obtain the equipment and personnel needed to make such 
a product.209  Clark left the White House an inspired leader.  He urged Secretary Adams 
to immediately work on acquiring a Defense Department aircraft to visit ABMC sites 
and the battlefront.210  He also moved to develop a committee to decide the best means 
“of informing the public about the ABMC and arousing the public’s interest in the deeds 
and sacrifices of those buried overseas.”211  No longer a Commission fearing elimination, 
the ABMC now viewed itself as the government agency most qualified to “create in our 
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citizens a greater sense of patriotism and pride in our national heritage and 
accomplishments.”212    
 General Clark and the rest of the ABMC commissioners used a Defense 
Department plane to make two inspection trips in 1970 after the Nixon meeting.  Their 
first tour was of the European cemeteries.  Clark reported to Nixon in June 1970 that the 
trip was successful and that all ABMC travelers acted “as emissaries of good will and 
friendship to the citizens of the countries in which our cemeteries and monuments are 
located” just as Nixon had “cautioned us to act.”213  Clark’s observances of foreigners at 
ABMC cemeteries assured him that he led the government office that “created more 
respect, understanding, good will, and friendship for the United States than any 
other.”214  Clark’s biggest concern after the first inspection tour was that the ABMC 
currently maintained an unbalanced “commemoration of the deeds of our armed 
forces.”215  The Korean War had no memorials, nor Vietnam.  Clark would think more on 
this unbalance in his next tour of the ABMC’s Pacific region assets and visit to 
Vietnam.216  Nixon appreciated the feedback that Clark gave him.  It warmed his heart 
that “people still cared and remembered” the American dead on foreign soil.217 
 General Clark made his inspection tour of the Pacific region through the first 
month of 1971.  He visited Hawaii, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan.  He met 
with the leaders of each country and was impressed with their knowledge of the ABMC’s 
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mission.218  Through Clark’s interaction with foreign leaders, he saw a need for an 
American memorial in South Korea to sustain their development as a “strong and 
faithful ally of the United States.”219  The tour also included a stop to Vietnam for the 
ABMC leadership to hear from U.S. commanders how the war was going.  This trip was 
seemingly intended to boost morale and plant the seed for future Vietnam 
commemoration.  Nixon was again pleased that his new ABMC members could travel 
abroad and do diplomatic work for him.  He thanked Clark for examining the “means for 
emphasizing and strengthening the bonds which unite us to allied and friendly Asian 
nations,” and for “conveying to them the goodwill of the U.S.”220  The ABMC’s Fiscal 
Report for 1971 clearly imparted a feeling that the Commission played a role in U.S. 
diplomatic relations and desired to start commemorating “the Korean War, and 
ultimately the War in Viet Nam.”221 
 It took three years to make the ABMC film that Clark and Nixon envisioned.  The 
goal of The Price of Freedom was to make the “nation devote more effort and attention 
to regaining and maintaining the splendid spirit in which this nation was born.”222  This 
order came directly from President Nixon himself.  He wished the ABMC to “influence 
the news media, which gives too much attention to the unruly minority who are 
violating our laws at will while not placing proper emphasis on the often forgotten 
virtues of Duty, Honor, and Love of God and Country.”223  Clearly, Nixon saw that the 
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ABMC’s role of caretaker of the dead made it a powerful manipulator of public opinion.  
The film debuted to the American public in 1973.  It represented the ABMC’s attempt to 
provide information on its history and the cultural value of its sites abroad.  The film’s 
release after the Congressional attacks on the ABMC, and the narrative of the film, 
portrayed the ABMC as a national treasure.  Clocking in at just under a half-hour, The 
Price of Freedom explained the long tradition of American military sacrifice to its 
viewers and the ABMC’s mission to preserve this sacrifice for perpetuity.  Script writers 
packed a grand military narrative into the short running time.   
The Price of Freedom endeavored to show an unbroken link between ancient 
Greek culture and contemporary U.S. military conflicts.  It began with the Greek battle 
at Marathon and the Greeks’ immediate efforts afterwards to create a monument that 
reminded how the preservation of freedom required “willingness to pay the price.”224   
The ABMC portrayed itself as a successor of the Greek monument makers.  It was the 
Commission’s mission to “erect memorials to honor the men who died for their country, 
so the living whose hearts were seared by their death could appreciate them.”225  With 
this ancient link established, the film progressed through a hyper-patriotic narrative of 
U.S. wars from the American Revolution onward.  It noted that although the fighting 
spirit of the American soldier won wars, great men dominated commemorations in the 
first century of the republic—George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Ulysses Grant, and 
Robert E. Lee were legendary men whose memory society cast in stone to “keep 
something alive and guard the land.”226  It was not until after World War I, and the 
                                                             






creation of the ABMC, that “everyman would be accounted for, no one forgotten.”227  
The ABMC ennobled all American military dead, and its Chairman, General Clark, who 
during World War II asked Italy only for “enough soil to bury his gallant” during his 
offensive through the country epitomized the sanctity of the Commission. 
 The film utilized personal reflections from individuals to highlight the ABMC’s 
importance to the American people.  General Clark explained that, as Chairman, he 
wanted to “focus the attention of the people back home to the great price they [the dead] 
paid so we can enjoy the blessings of freedom.”228 Clark delivered his message in a 
poised and humble way.  The next interviewee was a Frenchwoman speaking from 
Suresnes Cemetery.  She recollected Americans entering Paris during World War II and 
the “crazy” reception they received from appreciative French.  This interview provided 
viewers the perspective of someone in France who appreciated the United States and 
showed the goodwill that ABMC cemeteries created between nations.  The final 
interview included references to Vietnam and brought the ABMC’s work into the 
present.  That Pacific perspective came from a Japanese-American that fought with the 
famed 442nd Regiment in the Pacific Islands during WWII.  The veteran was interviewed 
at the ABMC’s Pacific memorial at the Punchbowl Cemetery.  The film’s narrator noted 
that this memorial honored not only the Pacific theater of WWII, but also the Korean 
War.  It signified that after WWII, the U.S. assumed leadership of the free-world and 
carried these responsibilities into Korea and Vietnam.  The Japanese–American veteran 
related to the audience that he visited the cemetery not only to honor his WWII 
comrades, but also men from his unit currently dying in Vietnam.229  Following this 







interview, the narrative shifted to President Nixon’s quest to build a lasting peace in the 
world.  The scene faded out to the all too familiar sounds of military airplanes and 
helicopters associated with the Vietnam War.  
The Price of Freedom is not a film easily accessible today.  No copy exists among 
the ABMC’s institutional collection.  To contemporary viewers, the film very much 
comes across as a conservative leaning pro-Vietnam film.  It is not known how the 
American public received the film.  Nixon and his staff found it to be “a truly 
inspirational presentation.”230  At the very least, The Price of Freedom briefly placed the 
ABMC back into the public eye.  American sacrifices in Vietnam also found a firm 
linkage to the World Wars through the video production. 
The Vietnam War seems to be the root of much of the ABMC’s trouble in the 
1960s.  Through the twentieth century, the ABMC had a clear role in American culture 
as the caretaker of military remains abroad.  Through the Cold War, the United States 
reverted back to its pre-World War I policy of total repatriation.  In America’s Asian 
wars the dead did go home, and the government took painstaking steps to ensure that 
the number of unknowns and missing in actions remained as low as possible.  The 
motives for this decision are visible in ABMC debates about commemoration in the 
Pacific.  Japanese islands were remote, represented unfriendly soil, and a small chance 
existed that considerable numbers of Americans would visit graves left behind.  A 
cemetery without visitors was merely a cemetery, and not a site of public memory that 
ABMC cemeteries were.  There was little chance in the political atmosphere of the Cold 
War of placing large ABMC cemeteries in an unstable Korea or Vietnam.   The new 
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attitudes towards American peripheral wars also altered the ABMC’s role as the agency 
responsible for commemorating the sacrifices of all American armed service members in 
foreign wars.  How would unpopular wars in Asia be commemorated?  The length of 
American commitment in Vietnam meant that throughout the sixties there was no 
completed story to work from.   It is also notable that in both World War I and World 
War II, cemeteries acted as the focal point of all ABMC commemoration.  Without 
soldier dead to care for, the ABMC’s commemoration of the Asian wars decreased 
dramatically.  Their official commemoration of Korea and Vietnam was essentially 
tacked on to the Honolulu Memorial at Punchbowl Crater in Hawaii.  The names of the 
missing in Korea and Vietnam and maps of significant battles in both wars gained 
placement alongside similar commemoration to the Pacific theater in WWII.231  These 
additions evolved much slower and in a more laborious process than World War 
commemoration. The ABMC’s Vietnam memorial pavilion did not join monuments from 
other Pacific conflicts in Hawaii until 2012. 
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Photo 6.2: Honolulu, Nov. 11. 2012 - Flanked by Vietnam War veterans, Senator Daniel Akaka, 
Congresswoman Colleen Hanabusa, American Battle Monument Commission Secretary Max 
Cleland untie a “maile lai” officially dedicating the new Vietnam War pavilion at the Honolulu 
Memorial following the annual Veterans Day ceremony at the National Memorial Cemetery of the 
Pacific on Sunday. The new Vietnam War pavilion combined with the already existing Vietnam 
War Courts of the Missing at the Honolulu Memorial constitute the only federal memorial to 
veterans of the Vietnam War built solely with federal.  Source: ABMC.gov (Official American 




The 1960s marked the start of a transitory period for the American Battle 
Monuments Commission.  The epoch of the World Wars was over.  Its replacement was 
a Cold War defined by ideological battles, fear of nuclear holocaust, and proxy wars. 
Contemporary issues proved more pressing to the living than memories of victories past. 
France, the United States’ eldest European ally, and gateway to the continent seemed, 




in a precarious position.  The Commission was the protector of the past and caretaker of 
American remains from a bygone era.  For the first time since its creation in 1923, the 
ABMC found that it needed to prove its national value.  Limited and controversial wars 
signified an end to new ABMC cemeteries.  This meant that the ABMC needed to walk a 
fine line.  The Commission had make sure that Americans and foreigners still found 
value in its cemeteries.  Leaders of the ABMC in the 1960s worked to prove their 
relevancy. It appears that the ABMC’s efforts worked by the start of the 1970s.  Their 
reports in 1971 and 1972 indicated that attendance at major ceremonies across Europe 
went in “excess of previous years.”232  
Military remains in Europe were simultaneously frozen in time and used as a 
bridge to the past and present.  American dead from the World Wars stood out in 
speeches and public relations projects as signifiers of American friendship to foreign 
nations, reminders of a golden period of friendship.  No matter what the international 
situation, these dead represented a specific period.  At the same time, when needed, the 
memory of the dead also served as a means to link the past and present.  American 
leaders saw the remains of their military dead as an effective medium to show foreigners 
and Americans alike consistency in its military demands.  Thus, the 1960s placed a fork 
in the road of the ABMC.  One path kept the memory of its remains safely anchored in 
friendly past.  The other placed the same remains within the contentious new wars in 
the Third World.  Throughout the 1960s, American leaders waffled on which road the 
memory of its Great War and World War II dead would take.  In the end, the fork did 
not lead to two distinct destinations.  It instead sporadically intersected.  President 
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Woodrow Wilson rocketed the United States toward a strong international presence 
when he committed American soldiers to the European battlefields of World War I.   
Since that moment, American military dead of now tranquil battlefields could 
simultaneously portray a revered era, or speak to a specific contemporary circumstance.  





Conclusion:  Contemporary Uses of U.S. Memory Abroad 
 
American and French leaders turned to the memory of American military 
remains buried in French soil to address existing political situations throughout the 
twentieth century.  Political regimes changed, diplomatic situations altered, and the 
public perception towards their own nation and others shifted.  Throughout all of the 
flux, the presence of American bodies remained a constant.  They retained an unbroken 
vigil for interests of the United States abroad.  Although dead, they were far from silent.  
The living provided them a voice.  The public assigned meaning to their sacrifices, 
validated their memories, and showed respect for them even during the most chaotic 
periods in France.  Even though the dead permanently occupied the same soil for 
perpetuity, they were not inert.  Their memory lived and evolved with the times.  The 
way the living interacted with the American dead shaped the memory of their war and 
motives for fighting.  Now, in the present era, do these remains still have cultural 
meanings?  Are the American bones of World War I and World War II in Europe still 
relevant to generations who did not live through their deeds?  Do they still fulfill a 
diplomatic purpose?    
 At the time this work was written in 2014, all American veterans of the Great War 
have died.  The final American doughboy, Frank Buckles, passed on at age 110 in Charles 
Town, WV the same town where this work was penned.1  Each day while writing, the 
author paused countless times to watch traffic move along the Frank Buckles Memorial 
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Highway.   While no American veterans remain to pass on their lived memory of the 
Western Front, thousands of American WWII veterans live on as relics from one of the 
most revered periods of their nation’s past.  They too are rapidly disappearing from the 
ranks of the living, however.  An article from late 2013 estimated that some 640 
American veterans from the Second World War die each day.2  
 This conclusion seeks to understand if the American memory of the World Wars 
still has relevance in American culture today.  The Cold War ended in the early 1990s 
and the weight of fighting communism lifted from American war dead buried in Europe.  
But, with the fall of the USSR could they now rest in peace, or did they have other 
battles to fight?  This conclusion will analyze how U.S. leaders have engaged with the 
memory of World War I and World War II dead abroad following the Cold War.  It will 
end by analyzing the U.S. Federal Government shutdown that occurred in Fall 2013.  
An exhaustive march through political uses of American military remains for the 
latter part of the twentieth century is not necessary for this conclusion.  Each year, 
American and French leaders gather at American military cemeteries on solemn days 
and give a voice to the dead.  This voice refracts the international concerns of the 
moment and anchors solutions to current problems in reinterpretations of the past.  For 
instance, President Ronald Regan’s famous “The Boys of Pointe-du-Hoc” speech 
delivered in Normandy on the 40th anniversary the invasion looked to D-Day to provide 
context to the four decade long Cold War.  Reagan spoke directly to the Soviet Union in 
his speech commemorating American military valor.  He reported that America was 
“prepared to reach out again in the spirit of reconciliation” and that there was no 
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“reconciliation welcome more than one with the Soviet Union.”3  President Reagan 
acknowledged that staggering sacrifices that the Russian people made in World War II 
for the Allied cause.  He hoped that the Soviets could learn from their military dead the 
lessons that the United States and NATO partners had from their own dead.  Reagan 
promised the Soviets that the West “does not want war” and was ready to “seize the 
beachhead of peace.”4  Each day citizens of the West prayed that the Soviets might 
abandon desires for conquest and change for the better.5  The change did not happen 
immediately, but took place before the next major D-Day anniversary. 
 Ten years later, President Bill Clinton traveled to Normandy to commemorate the 
50th anniversary of D-Day and articulate his own foreign policy agenda on an 
international stage.  Americans closely scrutinized Clinton’s engagement with the 
memory of American WWII remains.  Those who lived through WWII viewed him as a 
member of a “selfish generation” unwilling to sacrifice for their nation.6  Clinton was not 
known as a strong supporter of the military, he himself had dodged the draft during the 
Vietnam War.  Veterans feared that a leader such as Clinton would fail to properly 
commemorate American sacrifices in World War II.  Instead of perpetuating a message 
of heroism his words might diminish their glory.7  Clinton and his staff took the 
commemorative trip seriously and saw its political uses.  Despite being uncomfortable 
with “military flag waving,” Clinton spent weeks learning the history of D-Day and 
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drafting speeches.8  His goal was to make veterans and the current American service 
members see him in a “new light.”9  Feedback from veterans following Clinton’s D-Day 
speech showed that Clinton succeeded in his mission.  Washington Post writers 
reported “almost universal praise” from veterans towards Clinton’s words.  He showed 
sincerity, understanding, respect, and genuine emotion when addressing the memory of 
American WWII dead.  Clinton cast his generation as the children of World War II 
sacrifice.  He respected the sacrifices of the aging WWII generation, but assured them 
that “they did their jobs, [now] we must do ours.”10  The problems of the 1990s were far 
different than those that rocked the world in 1944.  Americans learned from the 
sacrifices of World War II and moved forward with their memory in mind.  The Cold 
War was over, and America’s enemies no longer revealed themselves so clearly.  The 
United States no longer could apply unlimited military force, nuanced diplomacy and 
partnerships were the only way to protect America’s national security.11  Veterans 
present for Clinton’s 50th anniversary speech not only engaged with the past, but left 
with better understanding of the future.  One veteran admitted that “we are all 
beginning to understand this is a different era.”  Another left Normandy knowing that “it 
is an entirely new world than the one that came into being after the war we fought.”12  
The stakes of this new world became much clearer during the presidency of Clinton’s 
successor, George W. Bush. 
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 The terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 made 
“everything different now.”13  Much of the difference came from the leadership decisions 
of President George W. Bush.  Following the Al-Qaeda attacks, the United States 
immediately deployed troops to Afghanistan to punish those responsible for the attacks 
and dismantle Islamic terrorist groups.  NATO and UN countries joined the United 
States in Afghanistan providing both assets and military personnel.  International 
support for the United States in Afghanistan demonstrated that most countries believed 
that military force was justified.  The 2001 invasion turned into a prolonged insurgency 
war, and in 2014, troops are still fighting in Afghanistan.  Thousands of Americans have 
lost their lives in the conflict and tens-of-thousands more left the theater maimed.   
 While allied nations supported the United States led war in Afghanistan, 
President Bush’s second theater of the War on Terror, Iraq, faced major international 
criticism.  President Bush’s foreign policy agenda in his first term evolved into hybrid 
plan adopting new and old aspects of American methodology.  His rhetoric for waging 
war on Islamic terrorists was based firmly on his Christian faith and belief in 
democracy.  Perhaps more than any other twentieth century U.S. President, Bush 
espoused the idealism of progressive President Woodrow Wilson.14  Bush also brought 
the United States back into the ideological battle of the recently ended Cold War.  At the 
start of the new millennium, the promise of a peaceful era seemed possible for the 
United States.  After September 11, the “red threat” of communism was replaced by the 
“green menace of radical “Islamo-fascism.”15  President Bush was committed to 
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preventing another 9/11 and instead of following the containment doctrine of the Cold 
War, his Bush Doctrine relied on the preemptive ‘shoot first, ask questions’ later 
policy.16  This policy was put to the test when the U.S. intelligence alleged that Iraqi 
President Saddam Hussein was constructing weapons of mass destruction and 
harboring terrorist.  In order to protect the United States, President Bush won 
Congressional approval to invade Iraq, overthrow Hussein’s government, and install a 
democratic beacon in the Middle East.17  The large international coalition found in 
Afghanistan did not appear for Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Great Britain stood as the 
prominent ally of the United States in this conflict.  Hussein’s regime quickly toppled 
and President Bush declared the American mission accomplished in Iraq.   Building a 
democratic government in Iraq proved difficult, however.  Radical Islamic groups joined 
Iraqi nationalists to force the United States out of Iraq.  American troops found 
themselves caught in a civil war and insurgency.  Approximately 5,000 Americans died 
in Iraq before finally withdrawing after seven years of occupation in 2011.   
 The international unpopularity of the Iraq War caused a spike in anti-
Americanism around the world.  President Bush turned to the memory of American 
soldiers buried abroad from the World Wars to improve perceptions of the United States 
in the early phases of the War on Terror.  France’s possession of large numbers of U.S. 
military dead made it one of the countries most aggressively exposed to American 
efforts to draw international support through popular war memories. 
 Throughout, this work has shown persistent manifestations of French anti-
Americanism throughout the twentieth century.  Though constant, French anti-
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Americanism is nuanced.  While the French may grow angry over American arrogance, 
economic policy, military aggressiveness, or cultural differences; fundamental ideals 
from their similar revolutions remain present.18  When the United States declared war 
on Iraq in 2003, French President Jacques Chirac emerged as one of the loudest 
opponents of the war.19  This contrasted with French support for American actions in 
Afghanistan.  President Chirac was the “first foreign head of state to arrive in New York 
after September 11” to pledge solidarity with the United States and a willingness to “fight 
America’s attackers.”20  At the time of the United States invasion in Iraq, French aircraft 
attacked Taliban outposts in Afghanistan and French soldiers took casualties alongside 
Americans on Afghan battlefields.21  Chirac did not see the invasion of Iraq as just, and 
would not commit French forces.  He warned President Bush that an invasion of Iraq 
likely would turn into a drawn out bloody conflict.  France experienced strong Arab 
nationalism when fighting Algerian rebels in the mid twentieth century—Chirac had 
even fought in that conflict.22  In Chirac’s 2003 assessment, American occupation of 
Iraq would draw in terrorist and increase Islamic animosity towards the Western 
world.23 
 The American public saw Chirac’s refusal to support the United States as 
betrayal.  Anti-French sentiment swept the nation shortly after the beginning of the Iraq 
War.  American businesses dumped French wine in the streets.  French fries, French 
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toast, and French dressing all had their despicable adjective replaced with “freedom.”24  
Florida Congresswoman Ginny Brown-Waite saw French non-support for Iraq so 
offensive that she proposed a resolution to the House of Representatives to “remove the 
remains of any United States service member interred in an ABMC cemetery located in 
France or Belgium”25  This move mirrored the similar 1966 proposal to remove 
American military dead from France after de Gaulle ordered the U.S. military out of 
France.26  The logistical and economic prospects of destroying ABMC cemeteries was 
entirely unfeasible, and insulting to the dead.  Representative Waite’s proposal was 
mainly a rhetorical insult to France. Yet it publicly reminded the French of America’s 
sacrifice for their nation on two different occasions.  
 In the weeks after Waite’s proposal, French attacks on remains from World War I 
soldiers buried in its soil captured American headlines and put the ABMC on high alert.  
Days after the invasion of Iraq started, French vandals broke into the British World War 
I cemetery at Etaples outside of Paris where nearly 11,000 British, Canadian, Australian, 
and New Zealand soldiers rested.   They spray painted the graves area with swastikas 
and insults like:  “Dig up your trash, it’s soiling our land,” “Death to the Yankees,” and 
“President Bush and Prime Minister Blair, Saddam will triumph and spill your blood.”27  
This was not an attack on American military remains, but the vandalism contained clear 
anti-Americanism.  President Bush was explicitly mentioned, and Great Britain was the 
United States’ strongest ally in the Iraq invasion.  The ABMC responded with “increased 
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vigilance over its 24 U.S. military cemeteries.”28  The ABMC’s director of engineering 
and maintenance assured Americans that “We have on-site personnel 24 hours a day, 
we are concerned and we have increased our vigilance.” 29  Further adding, “this is not 
going to be tolerated, and we intend to work closely with local authorities and police to 
be sure [of it].”30 
 President Chirac opposed the Iraq War, but his response to the desecration of 
graves revealed the sanctity the French felt towards the Allied dead that their soil held.  
Chirac described the graffiti as “inadmissible and shameful.” 31 He personally wrote 
Queen Elizabeth at Windsor Palace and stated, “From the French people and from me 
personally, I offer you my deepest regrets.”32  He further noted that while he did not 
support the war his thoughts went out to the British soldiers currently engaged in 
combat.33  Other top French officials also spoke out.  France’s Minister of State 
Hamlaoui Mekachera, condemned the vandalism in the strongest terms and was 
appalled by the “violation of the memory of combatants who came to liberate our 
land.”34  Donnedieu de Vabres, the vice chairman of the French National Assembly’s 
Foreign Affairs Committee, assured America and Great Britain that this “crime was 
committed in France, but in no way reflects the true feelings of France.”35  French 
resentment towards U.S. and British military aggression still showed itself at places of 
memory on the French landscape.   In the days after the desecration at the British 
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cemetery, “anti-American graffiti were sprayed on a memorial in the Luxembourg 
Gardens in Paris that commemorated the victims of the September 11 attacks in New 
York and Washington.”36 
 The public attention in France and the United States towards the memory of dead 
from past wars intensified through the first year of the Iraq War.  2004 was not only a 
presidential election year, but also marked the sixtieth anniversary of D-Day.  President 
Bush capitalized on the opportunity and traveled to Europe during the anniversary to 
speak at the sites of American graves and urge the free world to take up arms.  Bush’s 
European visit included a three day trip through Europe, primarily visiting Italy and 
France where he could speak with “high-profile opponents of the war, including Pope 
John Paul II and President Chirac of France.”  Police in both countries anticipated that 
Mr. Bush would face “large protests” and extra security measures went into place.37  
Protestors interviewed by international press made efforts to make the distinction that 
their hostility was not against “the sacrifices that the United States made sixty years ago, 
but against the Bush administration’s occupation of Iraq.”38    A communist protestor in 
Paris noted that “I am here today demonstrating against George Bush, but I will be on 
the beaches tomorrow celebrating and supporting America’s involvement in 
liberation.”39 The protestors separated their attacks on present American policy from 
sacred memories and wished that President Bush do the same.  Many “emphatically 
rejected Bush’s repeated comparison of the acts of U.S. soldiers 60 years ago with the 
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military campaign in Iraq.”40  The ready-made response from French protestors 
commenting that American leaders used their memory of the World Wars to drum up 
international support for their current policies, indicated that this tactic was somewhat 
worn after nearly a century of use.  
American reporters saw the strategic implications of Bush’s European tour.  New 
York Times reporter Richard Stevenson noted that “the trip provides Mr. Bush, as an 
incumbent seizing the spotlight on the world stage, a kind of visibility that [his 
opponent] Mr. Kerry cannot hope to match.” 41  The biggest stage that Bush could stand 
upon that Kerry could not was  “when Mr. Bush goes to the Normandy American 
Cemetery in Colleville-sur-Mer, France to talk as Commander-in-Chief about how the 
United States uses its military power in service of its ideals.”42 The sixtieth anniversary 
ceremonies gave Presidents Bush and Chirac the opportunity to address the rocky 
relations between their two countries in the comfortable shadow of American military 
dead.  Readers could assess the ceremony in differing ways, but close attention to the 
text leaves one with the feeling that President Chirac, more so than President Bush, used 
American memory to make a powerful contemporary statement.   President Chirac did 
not disrespect the memory of American dead in France, however, his speech did 
effectively adopt a memory of American dead that painted a somewhat critical picture of 
the Iraq War.  Chirac espoused the usual rhetoric of friendship that American military 
dead reminded nations of, and assured his audience that this friendship confidently 
“remains intact to this day.”  Even though lately the friendship was more of a 
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“demanding” partnership.  Nevertheless, the partnership, like the corpses of Normandy, 
represented “eternal” friendship “founded in mutual respect.”43  Chirac never in his 
speech made open reference to Iraq, but he included French memories of the war that 
likely led the nation to not support the United States battle with the Iraqis.  In World 
War II, France “experienced the long ordeal of war and occupation,” something Chirac 
vocally believed Iraq surely would face also.  France owed much to the United States for 
ending Nazi occupation, but the French also remembered “the terrible suffering during 
the course of the battle waged, the suffering of the soldiers, but also of the civilians.44  
This was not something that the French were willing to go through again, or inflict on 
others, unless the cause was deemed absolutely worthy.  France looked to the memory of 
the World Wars as guideposts to future policy.  To Chirac, the memories on their 
landscape spoke of “a duty of remaining faithful to our values . . . to build a society 
which bears the hallmark of respect and dialogue, of tolerance and solidarity.” 45 This 
“was the very quintessence” of D-Day.46 
President Bush’s speech did not impart such strong feelings of Iraq. He did recall 
the successes of past alliances in Europe and reminded the audience that “our great 
alliance of freedom is strong, and still needed today.”47  Most of his speech, however, 
focused primarily on what drove his foreign policy—Christian faith.  He mentioned 
prayer and divine guidance on numerous occasions.  Bush clearly wanted his audience 
to leave the beaches of Normandy knowing that the American military was driven by 
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Christian morals.  He concluded his remarks describing what the beaches of Normandy 
looked like after Americans won the day.  They were covered with the debris of war, 
belts, canteens, socks, K-Rations, helmets, diaries, photos, and carnage.  More 
importantly,   “there were Bibles, many Bibles, mixed with the wreckage of war.  Our 
boys had carried in their pockets the book that brought into the world this message:  
Greater love as no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends.”48  This 
willingness to sacrifice for friends impelled the United States to come to France’s aid 
twice, and might possibly bring France to support America’s future endeavors. 
President Bush apparently found that using the memory of American sacrifice in 
the World Wars a worthy way to engage with the French in this turbulent period.  The 
following year, the Washington Post reported that the  “administration is highlighting 
the thousands of overseas graves of American war dead as part of a public relations 
campaign to convince foreigners of the United States’ good intentions in its battles with 
Islamist terrorists.”49  The face of this public relations campaign was the small and 
unassuming American Battle Monuments Commission.  Brigadier General John 
Nicholson was appointed to head the ABMC by President Bush.  General Nicholson 
worked with the Bush administration to “aggressively recruit more foreign and 
American visitors” to U.S. military cemeteries overseas. 50   As America waged a War on 
Terror, Nicholson saw the ABMC as a tool to improve international perceptions of the 
United States.  He wanted “them [Europeans] to hear stories of how American men and 
women died for democracy.”51  “Thousands of graves are a reminder that the U.S. came 
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when asked, restored democracy and then left without seizing territory, colonies, slaves, 
reparations or money.”52  ABMC sites were not just commemorative locations, but 
cultural weapons that provided visitors an inspirational and educational destination.53  
Chairman Nicholson’s vision of what ABMC sites might achieve was not new, he just 
stated the goal in a more direct way than others before him.  The goal of boosting public 




From October 1-16, 2013, the United States federal government closed down 
when bipartisan differences in Congress postponed the passage of the federal budget.  
Coming in the era of sensationalized, twenty-four hour news coverage, the shutdown 
dominated headlines for its duration.  A special timer ran on many news channels to 
inform the world of each second of the closure.  Republicans and Democrats blamed one 
another, President Barack Obama’s leadership abilities faced serious questioning, some 
800,000 federal employees went on unpaid furlough, and countless Americans realized 
how big of a presence their federal government was in their life when denied access to 
services often taken for granted.  Some of the most public outrage stemmed from 
blocked access to national parks, memorials, and cemeteries.  Many Americans felt they 
had a right to visit these natural treasures no matter what the political circumstance. 
When the Washington Post reported the first day of the government shutdown, 
one of the agencies it chose to highlight was the small, and relatively unknown American 
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Battle Monuments Commission.  A profile of this Commission’s final hours before 
closure was an intelligent choice.  It explained the ABMC’s commemorative work abroad 
and showed that the shutdown had international reach.54  It also informed the American 
public that sites like American military cemeteries had no immunity from the budget 
freeze.  The iconic opening scene from Saving Private Ryan would not be replayed in 
real life by aged veterans making sacred pilgrimages to visit deceased comrades abroad 
for the foreseeable future.  The Normandy American Cemetery was closed for business.55  
It was with a heavy heart that, Michael Conley, the Chief-of-Staff of the ABMC’s 
Arlington office informed his staff that they had only four hours to “tie up all loose ends” 
and go home.56 Only he, and the superintendents of the overseas cemeteries would 
continue working as essential ABMC employees.  In the final four hours, the ABMC’s 
digital communications manager unpublished the ABMC’s Facebook page, de-activated 
its YouTube account, and closed the website (including access to burial databases).57  
 Americans who followed the ABMC’s social media presence knew the possibility 
of such closures.  The ABMC posted a warning the previous day on Facebook that “all 
cemeteries and memorials would be closed for the duration of the shutdown.”58 Timothy 
Nosal, the ABMC’s public affairs director told the Post reporter that his primary worry 
with the shutdown was for “all the visitors to the foreign cemeteries—people who had 
spent years saving up for trips to visit the gravestones of loved ones and who would now 
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arrive to find those cemeteries closed.”59  Nosal’s concern was on point.  In the 
comments to the Facebook message announcing the closure one woman posted her 
shock.  She and her 81 year old father had saved “thousands of dollars to travel to a 
foreign country for one visit” to his uncle’s grave.60  They were scheduled to travel to the 
grave the first day of the shutdown and were in no position to “just zip back” at a later 
date.61  Other commenters sided with the upset visitor, some with more anger than 
others.  One man posted that he would “demo” the gate for her if he was present and 
then place a blank check in the ABMC’s office to pay for the damage.62  Others displayed 
reserved anger ranging from disappointment that the “dead were disrespected by our 
politicians” to feelings of sadness because “brave heroes deserve better than this.”63 
Commenters showed a general consensus that such closures represented a distasteful 
political game.  The American soldiers buried in France did not sacrifice for this kind of 
politics.64  A sense of national embarrassment also came through in the posts.  One 
individual feared what European visitors to American sites would think then they 
arrived to cemeteries only to see a chained gate accompanied by a sign that read “closed 
for lack of funding.”65 
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The French did indeed follow news of the shutdown and status of American 
military cemeteries on their soil.  The newspaper Liberation reported that the Suresnes 
American Cemetery had been hampered by the shutdown.  French reporters interviewed 
the ABMC’s superintendent at Suresnes Angelo Munsel.  Munsel reported that he had to 
send home all of his French workers, but kept them on alert in the event that damages 
happened to the cemetery.  Munsel was the only employee allowed onsite during the 
shutdown, and he could receive no visitors.  He reported that it was “sad, but not the 
end of the world,” and hoped for a timely resolution.66 Munsel wished to impart to the 
French audience an understanding that he was not a politician, but had to follow their 
orders.67  The Liberation reporter noted that all other French ABMC sites also closed 
down, but that Normandy American Cemetery was a special case because visitors could 
access the cemetery grounds by entering from the staircase directly from the beach 
instead of the gates.  Still, the ABMC would ask all visitors to leave the ground without 
any confrontation.68  It seemed strange to the reporter that a cemetery was the target of 
closure while U.S. consular services operated normally.69   
French readers of the article validated American fears that such closures would 
embarrass the United States.  One French commenter saw the closure of cemeteries as 
evidence of “capitalism’s permanent failure,” while another saw it as a signifier of 
“Europe’s return to leadership” and America’s imminent decent into economic 
depression at any moment.70  French business owners near more visited cemetery sites 
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worried that that closures would hurt them financially.  An anonymous restaurateur in 
Normandy noted that on the first day of the shutdown she had “80-90 customers” but 
only because they arrived not knowing the cemetery was closed.71  The cemetery drew in 
more than one-million visitors each year and kept her business alive.  If the U.S. 
government kept the cemetery closed for a lengthy period, local businesses faced 
financial deprivation.  French tour guides also felt the sting of the shutdown.  French 
tour guide, Michel Mickael typically filled his Peugeot van with a dozen tourists and 
escorted them around Normandy.  On the first day of the shutdown, he had only one.  
Another French driver met a group of French tourists at the Normandy train station 
during the shutdown and bluntly warned them that ‘the [American] memorial is closed.  
The Americans are out of money!”72  While French financial concerns do not represent a 
deep sentimental attachment to American cemeteries, they do indicate the touristic 
draw that American military cemeteries had in France.  This type of magnetism was 
what the ABMC hoped all of its cemeteries would possess in the planning stages. 
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Conclusion.1 : Notice to visitors of Suresnes American Cemetery posted October 1, 2013.  Source: 
Photo Pierre Andrieu. AFP. 
 
Public outrage over the closure of national memorials and cemeteries swelled in 
the days following initial reports of ABMC closures.  More stories of American tourists 
denied access to the grounds of military cemeteries abroad appeared in national and 
local newspapers.  The Winston Salem Journal provided a story four-days after the 
shutdown of a North Carolina couple who saved money to fulfill a “long-held dream of 
honoring local heroes by placing a red rose on each grave.”73  Instead, the couple arrived 
to a closed gate and futilely waited for access while busloads of “outraged” Americans 
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pulled up on their “once-in-a-lifetime trip.”74  The turned-away Americans piled up their 
roses at the locked gates in honor of the dead instead of placing them over the intended 
graves.  The North Carolina couple wanted their local paper to know that they traveled 
to Europe to honor Americans who died for freedom, but instead found that the sacred 
remains of “heroic fathers and grandfathers” used by their government as disrespectful 
“political ploy.”75  Other tourists at Normandy did not follow the rules as the North 
Carolina couple did.  A 71 year old veteran from Ventura, California arrived at 
Normandy “embarrassed to see that the American flag was not flying over his comrades’ 
graves.”76  He and his wife ignored the signs to stay off the cemetery grounds and joined 
other American tourists in scaling the cemetery walls to respect the graves without 
government guidance.77  Although thousands of miles away from Washington, American 
remains entered the domestic political game.   
The chapters coming before this have shown how the politicization of places of 
memory is not new to American culture. The American government systematically used 
the memory of military remains abroad for political and diplomatic purposes 
throughout the twentieth century.  Yet, for the most part, protestation from the public 
remained nonexistent.  These American places of memory on European soil largely 
existed in relative stability through the through the twentieth century.  They received 
constant care, repetitious ceremony, and seemingly became commonplace.  A critic of 
these sites, or person skeptical of their cultural importance, might argue that the 
routineness of their existence signified diminishing significance in American culture.  
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With the American World War I generation gone and the WWII generation rapidly 
fading, why would America care about their places of memory?  The 2013 public outcry 
against closing national places of memory to make political statements revealed that 
these sites still retained importance to American cultural values.  There is little public 
backlash when the places of memory are used by politicians in a way that sustains a 
positive image of the United States.  Military remains abroad represent the best aspects 
of the United States, they are American citizens who traveled abroad and sacrificed 
themselves for ideas bigger than the United States.  When leaders make pilgrimages to 
these sites and make statements that coincide with this mission there is little need for an 
attack.  And, when the public has open access to these sites to personally experience 
their places of memory, a call-to-arms to preserve the sites is unnecessary.  When the 
status-quo is challenged, protest arises.   
Closure of cemeteries abroad received national attention, but most of the public 
battle against government closures of sacred sites took place in Washington.  The 
American public blamed President Obama and Democratic leadership for the 2013 
government shutdown, and the Tea Party faction of the Republican Party.  Many 
Americans viewed the closing of ABMC cemeteries abroad as a disgraceful political 
tactic, but these locations did not serve as suitable locations to protest the closures.  
They were not American soil, nor were they easily accessible.  A remedy to the problem 
was for protestors to target places of memory in Washington that commemorated the 
same sacrifice as ABMC sites abroad.  The war memorials on the National Mall are some 
of the most visited sites in Washington, DC.   On any given day tourists crowd the 
Vietnam Memorial, Korean War Memorial, and the newer World War II Memorial.  




and public access denied.  Just as Americans who had already planned visits to ABMC 
cemeteries abroad still made their trips, so too did Americans who made travel plans to 
the National Mall.  Thousands of Americans with no plans to travel to the Mall 
scheduled visits during the shutdown as a means to protest.   
Throughout the shutdown, American World War II veterans arrived daily to visit 
the memorial to their sacrifice that did not come until 2004, fifty-nine years after the 
war concluded.  It should come as no surprise that a public relations fiasco took place 
when eighty and ninety year old WWII veterans arrived to their memorial on the 
National Mall to find barricades and guards denying them access. For many of them, 
this was their one chance to visit the memorial before their death.  Each day various 
news agency reported the political attack waged against the “venerable club” of World 
War II veterans.78  Images of elderly WWII veterans “storming the barricades” to their 
memorial just as they had stormed the battlefields of World War II came to symbolize 
the unpopularity of the shutdown.79  The elderly veterans represented not only 
liberators of Europe and the Pacific, but modern day “monument liberators of 
Washington.”80 
Despite their partial responsibility for the closure of National places of memory, 
representatives of the Tea Party turned to closed war memorials in Washington to make 
political statements.  Two weeks into the government closure, Tea Party leaders Senator 
Ted Cruz and former Governor Sarah Palin spoke at the World War II Memorial as part 
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of the Million Vets March.81  Although National Parks police had sporadically allowed 
World War II veterans to pass through the barricades to memorials, full public access 
still was not allowed.  The Million Vets March was an effort to push the government to 
grant full access to these sites.  Thousands of protestors turned up at the monuments 
and “angry exchanges between police and demonstrators took place.”82  It was not 
necessary for police to make mass arrests of the protestors, but physical altercations 
between police and demonstrators did take place.83  Senator Cruz and Governor Palin 
spoke to crowd in the early stage of the protest at the World War II Memorial.  Their 
remarks primarily centered on President Obama’s disrespect for U.S. armed forces. 
Senator Cruz demanded to know why President Obama was spending federal money to 
barricade the monuments.84  Governor Palin mockingly called the barricades 
“barrycades,” after President Obama’s nickname of Barry.  She also let the audience 
know that she was there to “honor our vets” and to point out that blocking memorials 
was no way for a “commander-in-chief to show respect and gratitude to our military.”85  
After listening to Republican leaders, many of the protestors physically removed the 
barricades and carried them to the wall of the White House.86   
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The final battlefield of the government shutdown that needs included in this 
conclusion is the treatment of military dead killed in ongoing Middle Eastern wars 
during the shutdown.  The protest against government policies regarding federal 
disbursement of funds to care for war dead meshed with perceptions of disrespect for 
the memory of past veterans.  Public reaction to each demonstrated how American 
memory of the World Wars still retained relevance to contemporary Americans.  It also 
bridged the gap between sacrifice in the War on Terror to the World Wars. 
On October 8, a week into the shutdown, senior Senators John McCain (R-
Arizona), and Harry Reid (D- Nevada) called a live quorum in the Senate that forced the 
entire Senate to gather and hear speeches.  The purpose of this gathering was to 
denounce an unexpected result of the shutdown—the suspension of the $100,000 death 
gratuity wired to families of American military personnel killed in service to assist them 
with funeral expenses and travel to receive their bodies.87  The action from Senate 
leaders came in response to the deaths of five American service members killed by an 
improvised explosive device in Afghanistan in the previous days.  Senator McCain 
berated his fellow Congressmen and expressed embarrassment, outrage, and shame that 
political bickering had blocked deserved “benefits for those who served and sacrificed” 
for their country.88  Congress seemed shocked when veterans’ organizations and family 
members notified them of the inexcusable delay in funds for bereaved families. 
Legislation was passed to fund the military during the shutdown, without understanding 
that death gratuity payments were not a part of the plan.89  Throughout the first week of 
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the shutdown, seventeen American service members died in the line of service and none 
of their families received money to care for their remains until Congress acted on 
October 8.90  The New York Daily News ran a full length article profiling the service 
members killed in Afghanistan and included interviews from their families.  In 
conclusion it was pointed out that “astoundingly, while the payments to families are 
delayed and the rest of American is making do without federal services, the gyms on 
Capitol Hill remain open, and, of course, members of Congress, unlike furloughed 
employees, are still collecting pay.”91 
The very open coverage of Congressional failure to care for American military 
dead during wartime coincided with protest over the closure of sacred American sites of 
memory at home and abroad.  Countless other stories ran about other casualties of the 
government shutdown, but anyone who lived through the eighteen days of the shutdown 
and kept up with media coverage will likely remember the prominent place that care for 
American military dead, past and present, held in the public discourse.  As a whole, it 
seemed that Americans did not expect the memory of veterans or care of military 
remains to become targets in a political battle.   
It is still too early to determine how the War on Terror will be commemorated in 
the United States.  The combined wars in Iraq and Afghanistan represent the longest 
sustained war that the United States has ever fought.  Although an exit is in sight as this 
work is written, American military personnel still are dying in Middle Eastern theaters.  
If the discourse of the 2013 government shutdown offers any indication of how the more 
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recent wars will be commemorated, it appears that the memory of American military 
sacrifice in the World Wars will be linked together with the War on Terror.   
The sacrifices of American soldiers in the World Wars continues to show its 
pliability.  American military sacrifices have evolved into one rhetorical mass with 
unclear divisions.  The enemies of the United States throughout the twentieth century 
into the twenty-first have blurred into one.  Clear distinctions between militarism, 
authoritarianism, communism, and radical Islamism are almost nonexistent.  As the 
World War II generation disappears, their memory becomes more open to 
reinterpretation and expansion.  The elderly WWII veterans that took part in protest 
during the shutdown were joined by their offspring and veterans from other twentieth 
and twenty-first century wars.  They all rallied around a belief that American military 
sacrifice should never be compromised to achieve political goals.  Culturally, military 
memory in the United States is something to be employed to advance national 
greatness, not impair it.  As long as American military dead impart favorable memories 
of American sacrifice to allied partners, the United States maintains a strong chance of 
continuing as a hegemonic force culturally and militarily.  When host countries no 
longer see value in the sacrifice of American military dead abroad, or fail to see 
connections of past American sacrifice to contemporary battles, the United States will 
have slipped from its position of power in international relations. 
 Americans care about the preserving the memory abroad that the 120,000 
remains from World War I and World War II represent.  The ABMC is not the most the 
most well known government agency, but its mission is deemed important when 
challenged.  Do the political uses of these remains detailed in this conclusion leave us 




Suresnes was the ABMC crown jewel following the Great War and in the early years of 
the Cold War, it seems to have lost some of its draw.  An online travel blog from an 
American couple that visited Suresnes not long before this was written indicates waning 
American interest in this site.  The couple wrote of their conversation with Suresnes’s 
American superintendent Angelo Munsel.  Munsel reportedly told them before 
departing that “very few people ever come here, thanks for stopping by.”92  The author’s 
own experience at Suresnes can verify this observation.  In a visit to Suresnes in the 
summer 0f 2012, during the peak of the Paris tourist season, no other tourists arrived at 
the Suresnes American cemetery during a several hour visit.  Superintendent Munsel 
provided a similar assessment of lagging visitation.  What explains the lapse in 
Americans going to Suresnes?  As the contemporary presidential speeches show, the 
Normandy American Cemetery, not Suresnes is now the premier location to make 
commemorative speeches and engage in memory diplomacy.   
American sacrifices on D-Day capture the American imagination.  Normandy has 
become a destination spot for many American tourists.  A visit to Normandy allows 
Americans to walk the D-Day beaches and other Normandy battlefields made popular by 
films like Saving Private Ryan, Band of Brothers, and The Longest Day.  The American 
cemetery at Normandy overlooks the landing beaches, provides a beautiful vista, and 
contains a state-of-the-art museum that provides historic context of the D-Day invasion.  
Suresnes offers a breathtaking vista of Paris, but fails to compete with other tourist 
offerings of the city.  It is also somewhat difficult to travel to Suresnes.  Public transit to 
the suburb is available, but not easy for a foreigner with no grasp of the French 
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language.  Suresnes is still the location of commemorations and speeches, but 
Normandy is now the crown jewel of ABMC cemeteries.  While Suresnes is a cemetery of 
both World War I and World War II, the twenty-four WWII unknowns do not make it as 
much a relic of WWII as the 9,000 remains of Normandy.   
 It is likely that visitation to Suresnes and other ABMC WWI cemeteries will 
increase in the near future.  The year 2014 marks the centennial of the Great War in 
Europe, and 2017-2018 mark the centennial of America’s entrance.  It is unknown what 
type of resurgence the Great War will have in the American collective memory.  The 
ABMC is anticipating increased focus on its WWI sites.  They have recently undertaken 
programs to locate important sites on American World War I battlefields and create an 
interpretative center at the Meuse-Argonne American cemetery.  It is unlikely that 
visitation levels will match the levels of the interwar years.  Official pilgrimages are long 
over and, for the most part, mourners of the Great War no longer exist.  The American 
World War I remains, perhaps more so than WWII remains, are becoming relics that 
tell a vanishing story, more so than painful lived memories.  It will be interesting to 
study the visitation trends in ABMC cemeteries midcentury.  The draw of D-Day shows 
no signs of declining, but public imagination for other World War I or World War II 
battles might spike interest in other ABMC cemeteries.  The cemeteries are not going 
anywhere, and the United States government will surely keep its promise to perpetually 
care for these shrines unless something catastrophic happens.  These sites will also 
continue to be useful places for leaders to engage in memory diplomacy—so long as the 






Manuscript and Archival Sources 
 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
 Newton D. Baker Papers 
Charles Bohlen Papers 
Gold Star Mothers Collection 
 John Pershing Papers 
 
U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA 
 William O. Davis, Sr. Papers 
 Hardy Derx Papers 
 James Gavin Papers 
 William Jones Papers 
 Thomas North Papers 
 Matthew Ridgway Papers 
 World War I Soldier Surveys 
 
National Archives I, Washington, D.C. 
 RG 66:  Commission of Fine Arts 
 RG 92:  Records of the Quartermaster General 
 
National Archives II, College Park, MD 
 RG 59:  Records of the Department of State 
 RG: 84:   Post Files of the Department of State 
 RG 92:  Records of the Quartermaster General 
 RG 117:  Records of the American Battle Monuments Commission 
 RG 218:  Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
 RG 330:  Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
 RG 407:  Records of the Adjutant General 
 
John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, MA 
 JFK Papers, National Security Files 
 JFK Papers, President’s Office Files 
 JFK Papers, White House Central Subject File, ABMC 
 Sargent Shriver Papers 
 
Richard Nixon Presidential Library, Yorba Linda, CA 
 Richard Nixon Papers, White House Subject Files, FG 73 ABMC 
 
George C. Marshall Foundation, Lexington, VA 





Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library, Staunton, VA 
 Larry T. Grayson Papers 
 
American Battle Monuments Commission, Arlington, VA 
 Photographic Collections 
 
American Battle Monuments Commission Cemetery Files 
 Meuse-Argonne American Cemetery, Romange-sous-Montaucon, France 
St. Mihiel American Cemetery, Thiaucourt, France 
Suresnes American Cemetery, Suresnes, France 
 
American Battle Monuments Commission Overseas Operations Office, Garches, France 
 Dedication Files 
 
National World War I Museum, Kansas City, MO 
 Gold Star Mothers Collection 
 
National Personnel and Records Center, St. Louis, MO 
 World War I & World War II Burial Files 
 
Stars and Stripes Library & Archives, Washington, D.C. 
 Photographic Files 
 
West Virginia University Regional Collections, Morgantown, WV 





New York Times (United States) 
New York Daily News (United States) 
Washington Post (United States) 
Chicago Tribune (United States) 
Boston Daily Globe (United States) 
Baltimore Sun (United States) 
Los Angeles Times (United States) 
Kansas City Star (United States) 
The National Review (United States) 
Wall Street Journal (United States) 
Winston-Salem Journal (United States) 
Christian Science Monitor (United States) 
NBC News (United States) 




Fox News (United States) 
National Public Radio News (United States) 
Le Gaulois (France) 
L'Ouest-Éclair (France) 
L'Humanité (France) 
Le Figaro (France) 
Le Monde (France) 
Liberation (France) 
Guardian (United Kingdom) 




Printed Primary Sources 
 
American Battle Monuments Commission.  American Armies and Battlefields in 
Europe: A History Guide and Reference Book. United States Government 
Printing Office: Washington D.C., 1938.  Reprinted by The United States Army 
Center of Military History: Washington, D.C., 1992.   
 
American Battle Monuments Commission. A Guide to the American Battle Fields in 
Europe. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1927. 
 
American Battle Monuments Commission:  Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, House of Representatives, Sixty-Seventh Congress, Second and Third 
Sessions on H.R. 9634 and H.R. 10801, March 15-20, November 28, December 
7-9, 1922. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1922. 
American Battle Monuments Commission:  Hearings Before the Committee of Foreign 
Affairs, House of Representatives, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session on 
H.R. 6393, May 15, 1946. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1946. 
American Dead in World War II:  Agreement Between the United States of America 
and France, Implementing and Completing Agreement of October 1, 1947.  
Washington, D.C.:  Department of State.  
 
Bohlen, Charles E. Witness to History, 1929-1969. New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1973. 
 
Bullitt, Orville ed. Correspondence Between Franking D. Roosevelt and William C. 
Bullitt:  For the President, Personal and Secret. Boston:  Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1972. 
 






 Eichhorn, David Max, Greg Palmer, and Mark S. Zaid. The GI's Rabbi: World War II 
Letters of David Max Eichhorn. Lawrence, Kan: University Press of Kansas, 
2004. 
 
Graves Registration Service.  Location of Graves and Disposition of Bodies of American 
Soldiers who Died Overseas. Washington, D.C.:  Government Printing Office, 
1920. 
 
Griffin, Roger. Fascism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. 
 
Hayes, Ralph.   Care of the Fallen:   A Report to the Secretary of War on American 
Military Dead Overseas. Washington, D.C.:  Government Printing Office, 1920. 
 
Hearing Before A Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs United States 
Senate, Seventieth Congress, First Session, on H.R. 5494, Bill to Enable the 
Mothers and Unmarried Widows of the Deceased Soldiers, Sailors, and Marines 
of the American Forces Interred in the Cemeteries of Europe to Make a 
Pilgrimage to these Cemeteries, May 14 1928, Part I & II. Washington, DC:  
Government Printing Office, 1928. 
History of the American Graves Registration Services, Q.M.C. in Europe. Washington, 
D.C.: Office of the Quartermaster General, 1920. 
 
Investigations of the National War Effort:  House Report of the Committee on Military 
Affairs, Seventy-Ninth Congress, Second Session, House Resolution 20, A 
Resolution Authorizing the Committee on Military Affairs to Study the Progress 
of the National War Effort, June 1946. Washington, D..C:  Government Printing 
Office, 1946. 
Marcosson, Isaac. “The Americanization of Belleau-Wood.”  The Saturday Evening 
Post, November 14, 1925. 
 
Marshall, George C., Forrest C. Pogue, and Larry I. Bland. George C. Marshall: 
Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue. Lexington, Va: G.C. 
Marshall Research Foundation, 1991. 
 
Marshall, George C. "Our War Memorials Abroad: A Faith Kept." The National 
Geographic Magazine. The National Geographic Society, CXI, No. 6, June 1957. 
Mott, T. Bentley.  Myron T. Herrick:  Friend of France, An Autobiographical 
Biography.  Garden City, New York:  Doubleday and Dorran, 1929. 
Nichols, David ed. Ernie’s War:  The Best of Ernie Pyle’s World War II Dispatches. New 
York, New York:  Random House, 1986. 
Pershing, John J. "Our National War Memorials in Europe." The National Geographic. 




Psychology for the Fighting Man:  Prepared for the Fighting Man Himself by a 
Committee of the National Research Council. Washington, DC:  The Infantry 
Journal, 1943. 
Report and Recommendations Covering Graves Registration Service in the European 
Theater of Operations. European Theater: Office of the Chief of Military History, 
Study No. 107, 1945. 
Romier, Lucien, and Matthew Josephson. Who Will Be Master, Europe or America? 
New York: Macaulay Co, 1928. 
Shomon, Joseph James. Crosses in the Wind. New York, N.Y.: Stratford House, 
Incorporated, 1947. 
Twenty Sixth Annual Report of the American Scenic and Historic Preservation Society, 
1921, To the Legislature of New York. Albany, New York:  J.B. Lyon Company, 
1922. 




Articles & Essays 
 
Bruggemann, Karsten and Adres Kasekamp.  “The Politics of History and the War of 
Monuments in Estonia.”  Nationalities Papers 36, No. 3 [2008], 425-448. 
 
Budreau, Lisa. “The Politics of Remembrance:  The Gold Star Mothers’ Pilgrimage and 
America’s Fading Memory of the Great War.” The Journal of Military History, vol. 
72, no.  2, April 2008. Bruce Vandervot, ed. Published Quarterly for the Society for 
Military History by the George C. Marshall Foundation and Virginia Military 
Institute.  
 
Coleman, Bradley Lynn.  “Recovering the Korean War Dead, 1950–1958: Graves 
Registration, Forensic Anthropology, and Wartime Memorialization.”  The 
Journal of Military History, vol. 72, January 2008.  
Gienow-Hecht, Jessica. “Cultural Transfer.”  From, Michael Hogan and Thomas 
Paerson, Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations. New York:  
Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
 
Golsan, Richard. “From French Anti-Americanism and Americanization to the 
‘American Enemy.”  In The Americanization of Europe:  Culture, Diplomacy, 
and Anti-Americanism After 1945, edited by Alexander Stephan. New York:  





Grossman, Elizabeth G. “Architecture for a Public Client:  The Monuments and Chapels 
of the American Battle Monuments Commission.” Journal of the Society of 
Architecture Historians, Vol. XLIII, No. 2, May 1984. 
 
Gulliford, Andrew.  “Bones of Contention:  The Repatriation of Native American Human 
Remains. The Public Historian. Vol. 18, No. 4, Fall 1996.   
 
Kitson, Simon.  “Creating a Nation of Resistors’?  Improving French Self-Image, 1944-
46.”  In The Lasting War:  Society and Identity in Britain, France and Germany 
After 1945.  Edited by Monica Riera andGavin Schaffer, 67-85.  New York:  
Palgrave MacMillan, 2008. 
 
Laqueur, Thomas.  “Memory and Naming in the Great War.”  In Commemorations:  The 
Politics of National Identity, edited by John R. Gillis, 150-167.  Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994. 
 
Rose, Arnold M. “Anti-Americanism in France.” The Antioch Review, Vol. 12, No. 4, 
Winter, 1952. 
 
Sherman, Daniel.  “Art, Commerce, and the Production of Memory in France after 
WWI.” In Commemorations:  The Politics of National Identity, edited by John R. 
Gillis, 186-211.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. 
 
Stone, Dan.  “Memory War in the New Europe.”  In The Oxford Handbook of Modern 
European History.  Edited by Dan Stone, 714-731.  Oxford:  Oxford University 
Press, 2012. 
 





Adams, Michael C. C. The Best War Ever: America and World War II. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1994. 
 
Appy, Christian G. Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam. 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993. 
 
Arndt, Richard.  The First Resort of Kings:  American Cultural Diplomacy in the Early 
Twentieth Century. Washington, DC:  Potomac Books, 2005. 
 
Balkoski, Joseph. Beyond the Beachhead The 29th Infantry Division in Normandy. 





Barkan, Elazar. The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices. 
New York: Norton, 2000. 
 
Blight, David W. Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory. Cambridge, 
Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001. 
 
Blower, Brooke Lindy. Becoming Americans in Paris Transatlantic Politics and Culture 
between the World Wars. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.  
 
Bodnar, John E. Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism 
in the Twentieth Century. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991. 
 
Bruggerman, Seth C. Born in the U.S.A.: Birth, Commemoration, and American Public 
Memory. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2012. 
 
Brundage, W. Fitzhugh. Where These Memories Grow: History, Memory, and Southern 
Identity. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000. 
 
Budreau, Lisa. Bodies of War: World War I and the Politics of Commemoration in 
America, 1919-1933.  New York:  New York University Press, 2010. 
 
Chandler, Alfred D. The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business. 
Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1977. 
 
Connelly, Mark. The Great War, Memory and Ritual: Commemoration in the City and 
East London, 1916-1939. Woodbridge, Suffolk: Royal Historical Society/Boydell 
Press, 2002. 
 
Cook, Robert. Troubled Commemoration The American Civil War Centennial, 1961-
1965. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2007.  
 
Cooper, John Milton. Woodrow Wilson: A Biography. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009. 
 
Costigliola, Frank. Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural 
Relations with Europe, 1919-1933. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984. 
 
______ France and the United States: The Cold Alliance Since World War II. New York: 
Twayne Publishers, 1992. 
 
Davenport, Lisa E. Jazz Diplomacy Promoting America in the Cold War Era. Jackson: 
University Press of Mississippi, 2009.  
 
De Grazia, Victoria. Irresistible Empire : America’s Advance Through Twentieth-






Dean, Robert D. Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign 
Policy. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001. 
 
Dudziak, Mary L. Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000. 
 
Endy, Christopher. Cold War Holidays American Tourism in France. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2004.  
 
Enloe, Cynthia.  Bananas, Beaches, and Bases:  Making Feminist Sense of 
International Politics. Berkley:  University of California Press, 2000. 
 
Ewing, Joseph H. 29th Infantry Division: A Short History of a Fighting Division. 
Paducah, KY: Turner Pub. Co, 1992. 
 
Faust, Drew Gilpin. This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War. 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008. 
 
Fenby, Jonathan. The General: Charles De Gaulle and the France He Saved. New York: 
Skyhorse Pub, 2012. 
 
Fitzpatrick, Sheila. The Russian Revolution. Oxford [Oxfordshire]: Oxford University 
Press, 1982. 
 
Foner, Eric. The New American History. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990. 
 
Friedman, Max Paul. Rethinking Anti-Americanism: The History of an Exceptional 
Concept in American Foreign Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012 
 
Fussell, Paul. The Great War and Modern Memory. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1975. 
 
Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar 
American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. 
 
Greenberg, Amy S. Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
 
Halberstam, David. The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War. 2007. 
 
Hart, Justin. Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the 
Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 
 
Hemingway, Ernest. A Moveable Feast. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964. 
 





Hixson, Walter L. The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. 
Foreign Policy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008. 
 
Hobsbawm, E. J. The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848. Cleveland: World Pub. Co, 1962. 
 
Hogan, Michael J., and Thomas G. Paterson. Explaining the History of American 
Foreign Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
 
Hoganson, Kristin L. Consumers' Imperium: The Global Production of American 
Domesticity, 1865-1920. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007. 
 
Hunt, Michael H. Ideology and US Foreign Policy. New Haven u.a: Yale Univ. Pr, 1987. 
 
Hunter, James Davison. Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America. [New York]: 
BasicBooks, 1991. 
 
Igarashi, Yoshikuni. Bodies of Memory Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese 
Culture, 1945-1970. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000.  
 
Iriye, Akira.  The Globalizing of America, 1913-1945.  New York:  Cambridge University 
Press, 1993. 
 
Judt, Tony. Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. New York: Penguin Press, 2005. 
 
Kammen, Michael G. Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of Tradition in 
American Culture. New York: Knopf, 1991. 
 
Kettenacker, Lothar, and Torsten Riotte. The Legacies of Two World Wars: European 
Societies in the Twentieth Century. New York: Berghahn Books, 2011. 
 
Kolko, Gabriel. The Triumph of Conservatism; A Re-Interpretation of American 
History, 1900-1916. [New York]: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963. 
 
Kuisel, Richard F. Seducing the French The Dilemma of Americanization. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1993. 
 
Laderman, Gary. The Sacred Remains American Attitudes Toward Death, 1799-1883. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996.  
 
LaFeber, Walter. America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966. New York: Wiley, 
1967. 
 
Lawson, R. Alan. A Commonwealth of Hope: The New Deal Response to Crisis. 





Leach, William. Land of Desire: Merchants, Power, and the Rise of a New American 
Culture. New York: Pantheon Books, 1993. 
 
Lederer, William J., and Eugene Burdick. The Ugly American. New York: Norton, 1958. 
 
Lengel, Edward G. To Conquer Hell: The Meuse-Argonne, 1918. New York: H. Holt, 
2008. 
 
Levenstein, Harvey A. We'll Always Have Paris American Tourists in France Since 
1930. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.  
 
Linderman, Gerald F. The World Within War: America's Combat Experience in World 
War II. New York: Free Press, 1997. 
 
MacMillan, Margaret. Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World. New York: 
Random House, 2002. 
 
Marchand, Suzanne.  Down from Olympus:  Archeology and Philhellenism in 
Germany, 1750-1970.  Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1996. 
 
Margalit, Gilad. Guilt, Suffering, and Memory: Germany Remembers Its Dead of 
World War II. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010. 
 
Mazower, Mark. Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century. New York: A.A. Knopf, 
1999. 
 
McClellan, Andrew. Inventing the Louvre: Art, Politics, and the Origins of the Modern 
Museum in Eighteenth-Century Paris. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994. 
 
McMahon, Robert J. Dean Acheson and the Creation of an American World Order. 
Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2009.  
 
McPherson, Alan L. Yankee No! Anti-Americanism in U.S.--Latin American Relations. 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003.  
 
Moeller, Robert.  War Stories:  The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of 
Germany.  Berkeley:  University of California Press, 2003. 
 
Neff, John R. Honoring the Civil War Dead: Commemoration and the Problem of 
Reconciliation. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005. 
 
Neustadt, Richard E., and Ernest R. May. Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for 





Ninkovich, Frank A. The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural 
Relations, 1938-1950. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 
 
Nora, Pierre. Rethinking France = Les lieux de mémoire. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2001. 
 
Novick, Peter. The Resistance Versus Vichy:  The Purge of Collaborators in Liberated 
France. New York:  Columbia University Press, 1968. 
 
Nye, Joseph S. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public 
Affairs, 2004. 
 
Panchasi, Roxanne. Future Tense The Culture of Anticipation in France between the 
Wars. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2009.  
 
Passerini, Luisa. Fascism in Popular Memory: The Cultural Experience of the Turin 
Working Class. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 
 
Patterson, David S. The Search for Negotiated Peace: Women's Activism and Citizen 
Diplomacy in World War I. New York: Routledge, 2008. 
 
Pells, Richard H. Not Like Us:  How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed 
American Culture Since World War II.  New York, NY: Basic Books, 1997. 
 
Perry, Mark. Partners in Command: George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower in War 
and Peace. New York: Penguin Press, 2007. 
 
Piehler, G. Kurt. Remembering War the American Way. Washington, D.C.: 
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995. 
 
Pogue, Forrest C. George C. Marshall, Volumes I-IV. New York: Viking Press, 1963. 
 
Poole, Robert M. On Hallowed Ground: The Story of Arlington National Cemetery. 
New York, N.Y.: Walker & Co, 2009. 
 
Preston, Andrew. Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and 
Diplomacy. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012. 
 
Renda, Mary A. Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. 
Imperialism, 1915-1940. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. 
 
Reynolds, David. From Munich to Pearl Harbor: Roosevelt's America and the Origins 





Richardson, Elmo. The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Lawrence: Regents Press 
of Kansas, 1979. 
 
Robin, Ron Theodore. Enclaves of America: The Rhetoric of American Political 
Architecture Abroad, 1900-1965. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1992. 
 
Roger, Philippe. The American enemy: a story of French anti-Americanism. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005. 
 
Rose, Kenneth D. Myth and the Greatest Generation: A Social History of Americans in 
World War II. New York: Routledge, 2008. 
 
Ross, Kristin. Fast Cars, Clean Bodies Decolonization and the Reordering of French 
Culture. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1995.  
 
Rothman, Hal. Devil's Bargains: Tourism in the Twentieth-Century American West. 
Lawrence, Kan: University Press of Kansas, 1998. 
 
Rousso, Henry. The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France Since 1944. 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991. 
 
Savage, Kirk. Standing Soldiers, Kneeling Slaves: Race, War, and Monument in 
Nineteenth-Century America. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997. 
 
Schama, Simon. Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution. New York: Knopf, 1989. 
 
Schoenbaum, Thomas J. Waging Peace and War: Dean Rusk in the Truman, Kennedy, 
and Johnson Years. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988. 
 
Schrijvers, Peter. The Crash of Ruin: American Combat Soldiers in Europe During World 
War II. New York: New York University Press, 1998. 
 
______The Margraten Boys: How a European Village Kept America's Liberators 
Alive.  Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 
 
Shack, William A. Harlem in Montmartre: A Paris Jazz Story between the Great Wars. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. 
 
Shaffer, Marguerite S. See America First: Tourism and National Identity, 1880-1940. 
Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001. 
 
Singer, Daniel. Prelude to Revolution; France in May 1968. New York: Hill and Wang, 
1970. 
 
Sledge, Michael. Soldier Dead: How We Recover, Identify, Bury, and Honor Our 





Smythe, Donald. Pershing, General of the Armies. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1986. 
 
Snell, Mark A. Unknown Soldiers: The American Expeditionary Forces in Memory and 
Remembrance. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2008. 
 
Snyder, Timothy. Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin. New York: Basic Books, 
2010. 
 
Stephan, Alexander.  The Americanization of Europe:  Culture, Diplomacy, and Anti-
Americanism After 1945.  New York:  Berghahn  Books, 2006. 
 
______  Americanization and Anti-Americanism:  The German Encounter with 
American Culture After 1945.  New York:  Berghahn Books, 2005. 
 
Sullivan, Marianna P. France's Vietnam Policy: A Study in French-American Relations. 
Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1978. 
 
Trachtenberg, Alan, and Eric Foner. The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society 
in the Gilded Age. New York: Hill and Wang, 1982. 
 
Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History. 
Boston, Mass: Beacon Press, 1995. 
 
Trout, Steven. On the Battlefield of Memory: The First World War and American 
Remembrance, 1919-1941 (2010).  
 
Tuchman, Barbara W. The Guns of August. New York: Macmillan, 1962. 
 
Verdery, Katherine. The Political lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist 
Change. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. 
Wagnleitner,Reinhold. Coca-colonization and the Cold War the Cultural Mission of the 
United States in Austria After the Second World War. Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1994. 
 
Weber, Eugen. Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-
1914. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1976. 
 
Westad, Odd Arne. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of 
Our Times. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
 
Winter, Jay.  Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning:  The Great War in European 





Zubok, V. M. A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to 
Gorbachev. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007. 
 
 
Unpublished Theses and Papers 
 
Finkelstein, Allison. “The Gold Star Pilgrimage Rest Houses of 1930-1933:  Ephemeral 
Vernacular Buildings on the Landscape of American Military Memory.” Pending 
Publishing, 2015. 
 
Hulver, Richard.  Ezra Carman:  The Gatekeeper of Memory at Antietam National 
Battlefield.  West Virginia University, WVU Library M.A. Thesis, 2009. 
 
North, Thomas.  One Soldier’s Story.  Arlington, VA: ABMC Office Archives, 
unpublished, undated.  
 
Seitz, David W.  Grave Negotiations:  The Rhetorical Foundation of American World 
War I Cemeteries in Europe. University of Pittsburgh, 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
376 
 
 
